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ABSTRACT 
 
CITIZENSHIP IN TIMES OF EXCEPTION: THE TURN TO SECURITY AND THE 
POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN VALLE DEL CAUCA, COLOMBIA 
 
FEBRUARY 2012 
 
ERIKA MARQUEZ MONTANO, B.A., UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Agustin Lao-Montes 
 
  
 Since at least the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, security has emerged as a 
major political paradigm built upon an expansive definition of state control emphasizing 
not only the mere policing of violations of law, but the means through which the state 
asserts itself as a particular political entity through the militarized management of social 
actors both inside and outside its borders.    Through an analysis of the case of 
Colombia's Democratic Security policy, this dissertation documents the transformations 
of social mobilization within the boundaries of the newly politicized, and newly 
globalized, security state. 
 The research builds upon six months of ethnographic work and in-depth interviews 
with Valle del Cauca regional chapters of pacifist feminist grassroots network Women’s 
Peaceful Route, with human rights advocacy organization Permanent Committee for 
Human Rights, and with afrodescendant movement Process of Black Communities. 
Analyzing the work of these organizations, this dissertation assesses the uneven impact of 
security policies on social actors claiming territorial, cultural, and political rights.  
Through these organizations the work illuminates how security is gendered and 
vi  
racialized, while it is strongly resisted by the movements’ challenge to the model of 
citizenship promoted by the state. The research poses that, no longer able to see human 
rights work in terms of the defense of individuals, social movements have instead 
redeployed the concept of human rights as a mode of articulating radical democratic 
demands reflecting a collective social struggle. 
 Illustrating the connections between neoliberal development and security, and its 
impact for afrodescendants and women’s claims for rights and recognition, the 
dissertation shows how global discourses on security influence the constitution of new 
social identities through the constant re-iteration of the question 'who is the terrorist,' and 
the subsequent re-articulation of new parameters of citizenship. Beyond Colombia’s case, 
this research advances existing scholarship regarding the technologies of statehood in the 
post September 11 era, at the same time that it contributes to an understanding of social 
mobilization in the context of global and hemispheric governance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SECURITY STATE 
 
In 2003, the Colombian government launched its Defense and Democratic 
Security policy—a comprehensive strategy designed to strengthen the rule of law and to 
recover territorial control from illegal armed groups and drug traffickers.  According to 
governmental rhetoric, the main feature of the policy (hereinafter, Democratic Security) 
is that society, and not the armed forces, is in charge of carrying out state security.  
Amidst the highest rates of popularity a Colombian president has ever enjoyed (Posada 
Carbó, 2006), Alvaro Uribe Vélez’ government (2002-2006 and 2006-2010) positioned 
Democratic Security, the main pillar of his mandate, as the greatest indicator of his 
administration’s success.  For its detractors, however, Democratic Security represented 
nothing less than a thoroughly authoritarian policy built over the innumerable human 
rights violations its text implicitly endorsed.  
 While Democratic Security has come to be at the center of both public policy and 
popular rhetoric in Colombia, the implications of such centrality remain largely 
understudied.  As a contribution to fill such gap, this work analyzes the daily life of 
Democratic Security in the practice of social movements in Valle del Cauca, Colombia.  
Focusing on the effects of security on social movements, I address the question of how 
state and social movements are transformed under a political order based on the logic of 
security. 
 Democratic Security appears as the quintessential manifestation of an emerging 
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paradigm of state control that rests on the idea of security.  If in previous decades 
etiological, disciplinary, and punitive models of social control1 were dominant, we can 
say that today we live in a time of security. Under the security paradigm, the system of 
constitutional guarantees dilutes in order to protect a higher interest: security.  In this 
model, the state punitive apparatus is conceived as not only facing the violation of 
criminal codes, but a threat against its own existence.    
 Colombia’s adoption of the security model is, without a doubt, a case 
exemplifying such paradigmatic transformations.  Since the governmental attempt to 
have an Anti-Terrorist Reform and a Law of National Security approved by the Congress 
in 2003, it was apparent that a change in power rationality was at work.  These legal 
reforms suggested that under Alvaro Uribe’s government not only was there a switch 
from constitutionalism to exceptionality as the prevalent state model, (Carvajal, 2008) the 
governmental discourse of this regime, moreover, stressed security over plain military 
repression or penal control.  As Posada Carbó (2006) points out, “Uribe kept insisting 
that he was not seeking to install a police state, but "security for all" as a "founding value 
of democracy."” 
 This discursive transformation seemed to draw from changes in the rhetoric of 
security that started to manifest itself at the end of the Cold War.  The doctrine of 
National Security, that domestically pursued the destruction of the internal enemy and, 
internationally, the military dissuasion of foreign threats, was replaced by the rhetoric of 
democratic, human, or shared securities.  In Latin America, this transition manifested in 
                                                
1 For a discussion of etiological models of social control see Sumner’s work (1994) on 
deviance and Pavarini’s (1983) presentation of bourgeois criminological theories.  For 
disciplinary approaches of control see Foucault (1979) and Cohen (1985); and for the 
turn from a ‘social’ state to a ‘punitive’ state, see Garland (2001). 
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the approval of the 1987 Peace Agreement of Esquipulas II, which created a Security 
Commission for Central America, as part of a comprehensive effort to re-construct and 
democratize Central America after years of military conflict in the region.  The Security 
Commission, reactivated in the 1994 International Conference for Peace and 
Development of Central America, finally formulated the 1995 Central American 
Democratic Security Treaty (Tratado Marco de Seguridad Democrática en 
Centroamérica) from San Pedro Sula, Honduras.  In this treaty, Central American 
governments, without the intervention of foreign powers that had previously been key in 
the military conflicts throughout the region, decided to put an end to the defense 
doctrines based on the ideas of internal or external enemies and to formulate a security 
model based on mutual cooperation, civilian control over the military, politico-diplomatic 
(and not military) direction of national defense agendas, among others. (Zamora 
Corderos, 2005)           
 The Colombian national government has, in a way, subscribed to this paradigmatic 
shift from national to democratic security by claiming that its model of security is a 
democratic one, rejecting the idea of the internal enemy and focusing on the equal 
protection of all citizens.  For instance, in the presentation of Democratic Security policy, 
president Uribe stated,  
Democratic Security is different from the conception of authoritarian 
regimes, which supported ideological hegemony and political exclusion.  
This Government does not embrace conceptions from other times, such 
as “National Security” in Latin America, which considered an 
ideological group or political party as an “internal enemy”.  We predicate 
that everyone is welcome in democracy.  The opposition, those who 
dissent from the Government’s ideas or its party, will be protected with 
the same care that the friends or supporters of the Government.  There is 
no contradiction between security and democracy.” (Política de Defensa 
y Seguridad Democrática. Carta del Presidente de la República, Alvaro 
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Uribe Vélez. Presidencia De La República · Ministerio De Defensa 
Nacional 2003). 
 
 Yet, on the other hand, Democratic Security draws on the version of security that in 
Latin America has followed the implementation of free trade agreements in the 
framework of regional neoliberalization.  Such agreements have mediated the emergence 
of a new hemispheric security perspective built upon the idea that terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and illegal immigration are threats for the region’s economic stability.   This 
perspective, that broadly targets whatever it identifies with a terrorist, existential threat 
for the region, substitutes constitutionalism for exceptionality, while it claims that this 
substitution is fundamental to ensure every citizen’s security.  
 Indeed, throughout President Uribe’s two terms in power, measures emblematic 
of Democratic Security were justified as conditions of survival for Colombian society.  In 
this way, while Democratic Security’s measures such as massive detentions limit due 
process, prohibition of administrative capture, right to defense, among other liberal 
democratic principles, they are presented as the necessary mechanisms to effectively 
protect a presumably endangered citizenry.   
 At the same time, Democratic Security depends on a climate of consensus—a 
climate that relies on the discursive principle that only through security can society’s 
subsistence and best interests be guaranteed.  Under the official rhetoric an agreement is 
presupposed that society is a homogeneous body that fights an internal common enemy—
not a conflict, but a legitimate crusade of the good society to eliminate a minority of 
deviant elements.  As President Uribe puts it in a speech before the armed forces in 2003: 
“This is not a war.  This is not a conflict.  This is a law-abiding democracy at the service 
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of 44 million citizens, defied by some rich terrorists.” 2   In this rhetorical maneuver, the 
language of war is substituted by a reference to democracy at the service of citizens—
perhaps one of the most recurrent tropes in governmental discourse in the last years.  
 The glue that holds this discursive apparatus together is the idea that addressing 
security risks is above all a necessary part of the path towards welfare and development. 
Security measures appear indistinguishably linked to the possibility of economic 
progress—citizens must support their own securitization if they are to enjoy improved 
living conditions. The strategy of consolidation of Democratic Security (2007) states this 
principle when it points out that there is a “virtuous circle of security” which implies that 
the more security, the more trust and stability and consequently, given this climate, 
greater private investment resulting in higher economic growth.   
 Simultaneously, Democratic Security’s appeal to ideas of democracy and 
development are inseparable from a substantial military program.  If security, as 
previously noted, equates to development under liberalism, it also means war.  In his 
1978-1979 lectures at the College of France, Michel Foucault has noted this founding 
tension in modern government pointing out that liberalism exists as both a promise of 
democracy and as the capacity to wage war.  In the Colombian case this tension is 
constantly evoked in the dynamic between state and social movements, where the latter 
not only denounce the state’s role in furthering neoliberal development, but also its 
responsibility in implementing authoritarian measures to achieve such a goal.  
 At the core of the social movement critique of the logic of security is the collapse 
of the system of constitutional guarantees that such a logic entails. Because governmental 
                                                
2 Palabras del Presidente Uribe en Posesion del Nuevo Comandante de la FAC.  Bogota, 
CNE, September 8th , 2003. www.presidencia.gov.co/discursos/framdis.htm   
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rhetoric assumes a univocal civil society fighting against a common internal enemy in the 
pursuit of a shared development project, it comes to support a military and intelligence 
apparatus in charge of identifying potential violators of this presumed social pact.  
Policing of such nature provoked an increase in violations to civil liberties, especially for 
human rights defenders and grassroots organizations denouncing governmental 
indictment of political opposition.  As part of the so-called war against terrorism, 
governmental action targeted not only guerrillas but also political opponents or even 
unarmed citizens, often executed by the army and then falsely reported as insurgents.  
 As part of the military measures deployed with Democratic Security, military and 
police action have ordinarily relied on massive and selective detentions of peasants, 
human rights defenders, and activists; illegal data gathering by intelligence bodies; 
restrictions to carry combustible or food in conflict, usually rural, areas; census and 
identification of population in conflict areas.  Rhetorically, the government and its 
ideologues have produced a prolific body of literature in defense of Democratic Security 
and its theses, which have been consigned in written media, books, speeches, and in 
presidential oral interventions in popular open forums baptized as community councils.  
 Throughout President Uribe’s terms, governmental rhetoric gained great traction 
as it drew on the idea that there is a terrorist threat that can only be managed through 
security mechanisms.  Militarily, this meant the implementation of both strategies of low 
intensity war against social sectors and, simultaneously, elements of conventional war 
including the massive display of artillery, great troop concentrations, reorganization of 
military divisions in more specialized units, etcetera. Ideologically, a counter-terrorist 
agenda became the main expressed motivation of Democratic Security, one that conveyed 
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a dire urgency to repeal the ultimate threat of terrorism. 
 It is important to stress that despite the emphasis on the “democratic” component 
in the Democratic Security model, it is this military-ridden model that provided 
coherence to the entire project.  Development was thus tied to successful military action, 
and even though development maintains a great centrality in governmental discourse, this 
cannot be understood in isolation from the militaristic project that guarantees the 
condition for its execution.  Development, in this model, became expressed in a variety of 
ways, as prosperity, welfare, economic progress, but always attached to security. 
 At the same time, if the presidential program self-proclaimed as “democratic” 
because it produced protection for everybody, it praised itself not less for being the result 
of democracy with everybody.  While military tactics and the criminalization of 
dissidence constituted one side of the security edifice, mechanisms like welfare programs 
aimed to ensure greater cohesion around the security project.  Other efforts to consolidate 
security included periodical governmental interventions to garner support among social 
movements.  The sponsorship of a new indigenous organization in opposition to the 
traditional, progressive indigenous national leadership in early 2009 constitutes only one 
glaring example of how the military strategy of Democratic Security is balanced by 
intense campaigns to strengthen the ideological tenets of the security discourse.  
Significantly, during the controversy that followed the constitution of the new indigenous 
organization, its leaders declared that they supported Democratic Security arguing that 
"we (indigenous people) are the government." (Nasa ACIN, 2010).  
 Following both coercive and ideological threads of Democratic Security policy, 
this work engages with the conditions that allow for its emergence in Colombia, as well 
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as with the implications for citizenship in general and social mobilization in particular.  
Connecting Democratic Security with larger security formations, I address the question 
about the relationship between security and current economic designs.  In particular, to 
what extent is security central for contemporary forms of neoliberalism? By studying 
Democratic Security, I address the relationship between global designs, national policies, 
and local fields of power that constitute security as a political rationality.  On the other 
hand, by analyzing security as a distinct rationality with its own particular governmental 
technologies, I assess its effects on the social.  The questions that emerge refer to the way 
in which social mobilization confronts, negotiates, and transforms security logics, and 
what kind of trajectories do movements follow when they are subject to state security 
policies.  In those cases, does their project gravitate towards scenarios of greater 
autonomy or does the organization become atomized? 
 
The Nexus Security - Social Movements in Local and Global Perspective 
My entry point to the study of security is the intersection between state policies 
and social mobilization in the department of Valle del Cauca, Colombia.  By examining 
social mobilization, I follow Mitchell’s (1999) understanding that “the state is a structural 
effect –not a real structure, but a powerful and metaphysical effect that sustains the myth 
of its coherence, unity, and distinction from society” (Puri, 2008).  In this research, both 
the mythical construction of security as an articulated, intelligible project, and the 
materiality of its measures are analyzed through the experience of social movements and 
organizations. Throughout the chapters, administrative powers, use of legal faculties 
under states of exception, exercise of territorial sovereignty, and other forms of enacting 
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state security policies, will be revised in light of state-social movements relations in Valle 
del Cauca.   
 Studying security as an effect responds to the idea that security is configured in 
the struggles between state and social movements.  Challenging administrative or judicial 
security measures is, for instance, an opportunity for social organizations to produce a 
language of contention and for the state to shape its repertoire of responses against the 
perceived threats to security.  In the same way, ambiguities in the use of security 
vocabulary illustrate how conceptions of security are built.  In other words, it is not only 
the government’s application of draconian security measures disproportionately affecting 
social movements or social movements’ constant criticism of Democratic Security what 
configures security as rationality and governmental technique, but the sustained 
interaction of both security and mobilization fields.   
 An example of the ambiguities in using the security discourse often occurs when 
both state and social movements appeal to the concept of “human” security.  The fact that 
emerging conceptions of “democratic” and “human” security are invoked as rhetorical 
tools in support of vastly different programs to ensure security by state and social 
movements indicates that security is far from a program hierarchically imposed by the 
state.  Rather, it is a field defined in competing understandings of social life.  These 
conflicting conceptions call for an analysis of security within and outside the state 
apparatus and of what cross-links occur among state-sponsored and non-state conceptions 
of security.  For instance, a pressing question in this type of inquiry would be, when the 
state appeals to a program of “human” (non-militarized) security to reinforce its 
sovereignty in marginalized communities, what is left of the national (defense-oriented) 
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security model?  Or, conversely, when a social movement uses “human” security as an 
ideological platform, what idea of development underlines its vision?  When social 
movements pose alternative security conceptions, do they become agents spreading the 
security paradigm?  Is it possible for the state to develop a truly democratic security 
model? 
 These questions, I argue, can most properly be addressed through an analysis of 
social organizations working on the ground in Valle del Cauca. While defying the state-
endorsed idea of security, they still operate in the shadow of an all-encompassing security 
paradigm. It is this tension that I document when I examine, on the one hand, the effect of 
Democratic Security on social movements, and on the other, alternative conceptions of 
security that movements formulate as well as the extent to which their alternatives 
present a challenge to the principles of security. Ultimately, I intend to disentangle the 
discursive transformations brought about by the struggles around security and their effect 
at institutional and movement levels. 
 Of special concern in this research is the impact of global security discourses on 
state and social movements.  There is widespread agreement that after the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, a new era of anti-terrorist security has emerged.  In the post-2001 
security regime there is a predominance of the logic of security in more and more varied 
fields of social life, from immigration to policing, disaster prevention, urban management 
and ecology (Risley, 2006), at the same time that exceptionality substitutes 
constitutionalism as the main framework for state action. Yet, as I show in chapter 1, 
there are important continuities in security discourses.  The emergence of the Homeland 
Security apparatus in the United States, for instance, can be linked to landmarks in 
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American politics such as the anti-communist program of McCarthyism and the domestic 
militarization that paralleled the Vietnam war, while, as Davis (2005) points out, the 
terrorist has become only an updated version of the traditionally racialized internal 
enemy.  
 At the same time, security is tied to particular regimes of political economy.  As 
global models of security unfold with the trends of capitalist accumulation, current 
security policies can be seen, essentially, as an expression of neoliberal globalization. 
This being the case, social movements’ reading of security as ravage is particularly 
relevant, and this work largely focuses on the consequences of Democratic Security for 
afrodescendants, peasant communities, as it is in their territories and lives where the 
continuous militarization enabled by security underpins the super-exploitation of natural 
resources and people.  In this analysis I follow De Sousa Santos’ (2008) suggestion that 
security discourses and practices are fundamental tools to facilitate the non-contested 
extraction of natural resources in ancestral territories.  In chapter 2 I explore this idea and 
also touch on the argument that since it is racial and ethnic communities that have come 
to be identified as threats to economic liberalization, it is possible to say that security is a 
racialized project.  At the same time, inscribed in the security program is also its 
gendered character as it intends to impose a militaristic logic with devastating effects 
disproportionately impacting women.  As I will show in chapter 3, the national women’s 
movement has denounced, state security policies further create situations of insecurity for 
women within the Colombian conflict rather than mitigate the violations of armed actors 
against women.  
 By discussing social movements’ responses to security policies I also explore 
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these policies’ impact on citizenship.   In chapter 4, I examine how social organizations 
formulate alternative conceptions of security through their discourses and practices 
around rights.  Women, and their conception of women’s rights as anti-patriarchal and 
anti-militaristic, afrodescendants through collective rights in their ancestral territories, 
and human rights advocates with a vision of human rights as part of social struggles, 
challenge and redefine state conceptions of security.  With chapter 4, I further the 
argument, suggested throughout the previous chapters, that using existing traditions of 
human rights mobilization, social movements connect the defense of life, severely 
threatened with the biopolitical governance of Democratic Security, and the movements’ 
larger collective projects.  Discussing the experience of social movements in times of 
security, I conclude that human rights mobilization has been key for both launching a 
critique to the ongoing securitization of society, but also to envisioning citizenship within 
and beyond the security paradigm. 
 
Mapping the Terrain 
This work examines the impact and negotiation of security policies by social 
organizations in the southwestern department of Valle del Cauca in Colombia.  The 
analysis is based on seven months of field research, mostly done in the fall of 2008 and 
on 35 in-depth interviews with organizations’ participants and with members of human 
rights organizations. I did additional research and held follow-up conversations with 
organizations’ members during shorter visits in the summers of 2007, 2009, and 2010.  
During this period I also maintained periodical electronic correspondence with a few 
activists from Cali. 
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 My ethnographic research involved work with Comité Permanente para la 
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos - Valle (Permanent Committee for the Defense of 
Human Rights, or CPDH) and Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres - Valle (Women’s Peaceful 
Route). Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with members of the 
following organizations: Proceso de Comunidades Negras (Black Communities Process - 
PCN); Proceso de Unidad Popular del Suroccidente Colombiano (Process of Popular 
Unity from the Colombian Southwest - PUPSOC) and its Human Rights Network 
“Francisco Isaías Cifuentes” (Red de Derechos Humanos “Francisco Isaías Cifuentes”); 
Fundación Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos (Foundation Committee in 
Solidarity with Political Prisoners – FCSP); Asociación Nacional de Ayuda Solidaria 
(National Association of Aid in Solidarity - ANDAS); Comisión de Derechos Humanos 
de la Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Workers’ Unitary Central Human Rights 
Comisión); Colectivo Feminista “Fulanas, Menganas y Perencejo” (Feminist Collective 
“Fulanas, Menganas y Perencejo”).  Additional interviews were conducted with 
individual members of Colectivo de Abogados Suyana (Suyana—Lawyers Collective); 
Movimiento de los Sin Tierra – Nietos de Quintín Lame (Landless Movement – Quintín 
Lame’s Gradsons); Foro Nacional por Colombia (Nacional Forum for Colombia); and 
Coordinación Colombia  - Europa – Estados Unidos (Coordination Colombia - Europe – 
United Status – CCEEU) 
 I also interviewed or had conversations with representatives of the Defensoría del 
Pueblo (Ombudsman Office), the Office of the United Nations High Commisioner for 
Human Rights in Cali, and the Metropolitan Police in Cali.  Throughout the summer and 
semester of my fieldwork I also held interviews and invaluable conversations with 
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unionists, cultural workers, students, teachers, lawyers, and indigenous people in various 
spaces were issues of human rights were discussed.  I received assistance, also, from 
persons affiliated to the Cali smayor’s office, Valle del Cauca Secretary of Education, 
and Teatro La Máscara. 
In addition, I consulted organizations’ literature as well reports from international 
governance bodies and non-governmental organizations.  Official national documents 
consulted included bills of law and approved legislation, presidential decrees and 
resolutions, constitutional and judicial decisions, and government reports.  National and 
local newspapers as well as electronic listserves run by social organizations were also key 
sources of information for the project. 
As part of my ethnographic work with CPDH, I attended their meetings and 
events during the second semester of 2008.  While establishing relations of trust with 
human rights workers under situations of intense violence as in contemporary Colombia, 
I relied on acquaintances already part of organizations in order to establish my first 
contacts.  Thanks to the openness and generosity of CPDH members, who adopted me as 
an ad-hoc participant in the organizations’ regular activities, I got to meet and talk with a 
range of activists, as well as take part in the multiple events and mobilizations that took 
place in the southwest of Colombia during late 2008, including the important “Minga” or 
indigenous mobilization against free trade and security policies, a large sugar cane 
workers’ strike, and the various human rights forums where organizations converged.   
An important component of the work with CPDH was my collaboration to build 
an archive for the organization.  As I will discuss in chapter 1, current understandings of 
human rights are highly mediated by security global and national agendas.  In that sense, 
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recording human rights violations (what constitutes a violation, what type of violation is 
it, and who is responsible for it) becomes a highly contested part of human rights 
activism.  Participating in the construction of the CPDH archive alongside members of 
the organization allowed me to understand better how they themselves understood and 
advocated for human rights and how they used these understandings to engage with the 
state. 
The work with Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres (Ruta) involved weekly participation 
in meetings.  Twice a month these meetings included an all-day series of workshops with 
women from a variety of women’s organizations throughout Valle del Cauca.  I 
participated in regular meetings with the leading team and once a month attended the 
“plantón” of Women in Black—a silent demonstration where women from Ruta and 
other organizations, including women in media and theater stood outside the governor’s 
building in downtown Cali to protest militarization and its pernicious effects on 
Colombian women.  The character of my participation in Ruta’s activities varied widely 
depending on my own and their needs, but they were generously willing to accommodate 
me and the multiple identities I claimed or they ascribed me, some times as a “researcher 
from the United States”, as a student, as a participant woman, as a sociologist 
investigating security, or, at several occasions, as a lawyer.   
I am very grateful to both CPDH and Ruta because they welcomed my presence 
with total openness and generosity, allowing me to know and participate in their work 
without restrictions despite the difficult security conditions that they as organizations and 
many of their participants lived.  In the spirit of solidarity characteristic of their work, 
CPDH and Ruta shared from food to friendship in the multiple work days I joined them 
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for.  PUPSOC members that I met through activist networks were also key to have a 
broader view of the social mobilization situation in the region, especially across peasant 
and popular organizations. During the fieldwork, I attended a number of events such as 
forums, conferences, meetings, and demonstrations that largely broaden my view of 
social mobilization in the Colombian southwest.  Two events that were particularly 
importante for this purpose were PUPSOC’s 3-day IV Encuentro Internacional de 
Pueblos y Semillas por la Autonomía, Identidad y Unidad de los Pueblos--celebrated in 
October, 2008 in the town of La Vega, Cauca (Macizo Colombiano)--and the IV 
Encuentro por la Vida y Libertad de los Pueblos del Suroccidente Colombiano, 
celebrated in Buenaventura in December, 2008.  I am very grateful to PUPSOC members 
as well as to activists from Palenque El Congal, from Proceso de Comunidades Negras, 
for inviting me to these forums. 
The main organizations I will feature in this work are CPDH, Ruta, PCN, and 
PUPSOC. CPDH is a national organization created in 1979 by a group of activist-
intellectuals to promote the respect of human right abuses threatened by authoritarian 
governments at the end of the seventies.  Ruta is a national feminist, pacifist network of 
over 350 women’s organizations created in 1996 working for a negotiated solution to the 
conflict and to make visible the effects of the conflict on women. PCN is a national 
network of afrodescendant organizations that struggles for the collective rights of Black 
communities.  PUPSOC is a network of peasant and popular organizations in the 
Colombian southwest. 
Although these organizations and networks, with the exception of CPDH, do not 
identify their work as primarily human rights-based, I approached them because, in the 
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current conjuncture of militarization and paramilitarization within Colombia, they have 
combined their regular work (for women, afrodescendants, popular, and peasant sectors) 
with the defense of human rights of their members.  
Other collectives that provided a useful point of contrast and helped me further 
understand the work of these organizations were FCSPP, which defends the human rights 
of political prisoners and defends victims of state crimes; the Red de Derechos Humanos 
“Francisco Isaías Cifuentes”, which defends the human rights of peasants, students, and 
workers who are part of PUPSOC; and the Colectivo Feminista “Fulanas, Menganas y 
Perencejo” (now Feminist Collective “Fulanas, Menganas y Perencejas”), which is a 
feminist student collective with an emphasis on popular and peasant women.  
Valle del Cauca and Security 
 The choice of Valle del Cauca as the site for fieldwork in this research is 
significant, as this region displays many of the factors associated with the emergence of a 
security state.  Acute class and ethnic conflicts, as well as a history of political violence 
sparked or supported by the power elites have marked the region. The region’s history is, 
to a large extent, the history of the displacement of peasant communities by the sugar-
cane latifundia and the forced colonization of the highlands.    
 Valle del Cauca is located in the southwest of Colombia, between the Andes and 
the Pacific coast.  Although a small department, Valle del Cauca is of great importance as 
it harbors the main port in the Colombian Pacific and also because it counts with an 
active agricultural production, including mono-cultives like sugar cane and oil palm.  
Agro-industry has become a source of unrest as the cultivation of products like sugar 
cane, oil palm and its use as alternative fuel sources has been associated to the 
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displacement of populations, the presence of paramilitary groups, and the deterioration of 
labor conditions for agricultural workers. Development projects of great magnitude also 
proliferate in the region and in particular in Buenaventura, the city that hosts the main 
port in the Colombian Pacific.  Development in Cali, the department capital, has also 
been prompted by government-sponsored projects to execute 21 “mega-works” of 
infrastructure for the city.  Development projects’ potential to displace populations and to 
disrupt social structures also figure as a source of human rights violations and social 
unrest. 
Workers, afrodescendants, indigenous people, and leftist groups in Valle del 
Cauca have historically commanded mobilization against these forms of exploitation. The 
historical strikes of the regional teachers’ union and of the sugar cane workers, the 
continuous resistance of the indigenous peoples and the emergence of Black movements 
speak to the continuous mobilization in Valle del Cauca in response to declining labor 
and living conditions deepened by neoliberal policies. 
Historically, battles for political power have taken place in Valle del Cauca in a 
particularly dramatic way.  La Violencia, a 1948-1957 confrontation between Liberal and 
Conservative partisans, had an especially harsh manifestation in Valle del Cauca.  The 
armed bands of conservative supporters have been identified as the origin of drug 
trafficking and later on, narco-paramilitaries that came to operate in the north of the 
department (Betancourt, 1990). 
Violence has often been the focus of studies about Valle del Cauca.  Studies about 
earlier decades dealt with events tied to La Violencia; more recent ones address insurgent 
actions of guerrilla groups.  Notably, violence has been the main currency of drug-
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trafficking wars in the region, and common-crime related violence has reached very high 
levels.  Violence against women continues being particularly acute, and Cali, the capital, 
is the city with the highest number of feminicides in all Colombia (Sánchez, 2008). 
In this research I investigate the state’s administrative, ideological, and military 
responses to the real and presumed threats created by such violence and criminality, as 
well as the violence generated by the state through the application of security policies. 
Valle del Cauca is only a local example of the national project to enact a security policy 
that connects the possibility of economic development with a close penal, military, and 
administrative control of the population. With its monumental development projects, 
social movements repression, and counter-insurgency operations, Valle del Cauca poses 
an important case regarding the evolution of the punitive power of the state under the 
security paradigm. 
A final note regarding the identity of all people interviewed and referenced in this 
work.  For security reasons, and due to the multiple threats that many activists face by 
virtue of their political views or work, in this work I have changed all of their names or 
references that might identify them.   
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CHAPTER 1  
SECURITY AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE POLITICAL 
 
 Towards the early Two Thousands, the idea of security became a staple in the 
political vocabulary of Colombians.  While not a new term, it was only with the political 
campaign of president-elect Alvaro Uribe Vélez that pushed it into the national political 
mainstream as the policy that would, finally, allow Colombians to overcome the threat 
guerrilla, drug traffickers, and common delinquency pose for the great majority of 
“honest, hard-working” Colombians.  Uribe’s promise resonated with the broader appeals 
to security that--commanded by the United States’ government in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks in New York--reverberated in the political and mediatic 
international scenarios.  As the idea of security took hold of Colombians as a new 
political common sense—who would not want to be secure and eliminate the sources of 
insecurity--pressing questions emerged as to the precise posibilities and implications of 
this proposed formula for peace and prosperity.3 
 My attempt to investigate security as the key concept defining the field of the 
political in Colombia during the first decade of the twenty-first century began only 
partially by researching the speeches, decrees, and policies of Alvaro Uribe Vélez’ 
Democratic Security government, as he baptized his political project.  Because I intended 
to establish the roots of this project as a political logic with historical roots and global 
                                                
3 I use the idea of political common sense in reference to Gramsci’s concept of common 
sense, or the "diffuse, unco-ordinated features of a general form of thought common to a 
particular period and a particular popular environment" (Gramsci 1971: 330n). 
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correspondances, I calibrated my research to locate the effects of security as it played out 
in Colombian society, as much as its current expression within government and 
politicians.  My entry points into the effects of security—what security did and 
transformed--were social organizations engaged, in some capacity, in defending human 
rights.  The choice seemed logical at the moment of starting the research (when 
Democratic Security had already been in place for about six years) as the criticisms 
against Democratic Security questioned its potential to violate human rights.  But my 
choice of human rights-related mobilization as a vintage point to security also had to do 
with the possibility this examination offered to understanding the structure of the political 
field resulting from the state security project, along with the challenges that movements 
faced while engaging with security. 
 In this chapter I want to draw a cartography of security as a field of power with a 
particular historical trajectory.  In the first part, I will analyze the concept of security and 
will trace its constitution as a dominant political rationality attached to neoliberalism, 
gaining visibility in particular moments of hemispheric and global geopolitics.  In the 
second part, I will concentrate on the re-configuration of the political in Colombia 
through the growing use of security discourse as the counter face of economic prosperity 
and the social struggles challenging this project.  
 
1.1 Security and Liberalism 
 Within the field of international relations security has been understood as a 
transcendental value—a quality necessary for the existance of the state (Chatterjee, 
2003). Alternative formulations have characterized security as a technique of government 
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within liberalism (Foucault, 2008), as a tool to produce citizens for deregulated markets 
(Dillon, 2004), as a mechanism to manage the insecurities of capitalism (Wacquant, 
2008), or as a contemporary dominant cultural logic (Bajc 2011)4.  
 Here I am interested in exploring the Foucauldian approach as it engages elements 
of political economy relevant to understand the current conjuncture of governance within 
a framework of economic liberalization. Under the tradition started by Foucault, security 
is rather defined as a governmental technology “through which individuals, groups, 
classes and (…) the modern capital are molded and re-ordered.” (Neocleous, 2008: 4).  In 
Society Must be Defended (2003) and The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Foucault proposes 
the idea that after the second half of the eighteen century a modern governmental reason 
emerges with the goal of calculating and regulating resources, including, especially, 
population. The basis of this order is the government itself and not, as it occured in 
precedent periods, the law (Hindess, 1997). The new governmental reason or 
governmentality presented itself as an ensemble of institutions, procedures, and tactics 
that allow the exercise of the government. This form of governmentality has a foundation 
not in sovereignty derived from the law, but rather in reason d’etre, or, in other words, in 
the governmental objectives of the state (Foucault, 2008; 3-10). The novelty of this 
model is that in it, government objectives are determined by the index of national welfare 
and not the mere excercise of sovereignty.  That is, in order to achieve the welfare of the 
nation, the government will have to be focused on the organization, distribution, and 
                                                
4 For a genealogy of the concept of security see Der Derian, James (1995) The Value of 
Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzche, and Baudrillard. In Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.), On 
Security. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press. 
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calculation of resources and populations.  This utility calculation (a calculation that 
produces a value measurable according to the political economy) is the foundation of a 
new rationality and it is this the model that, according to Foucault, we know as 
liberalism.  
 Security is a central mechanism in this liberal rationality, organizing several 
aspects central to liberalism, from liberty to the regulation of populations. Security is, on 
the one hand, the principle with which the cost of producing liberty is calculated.  
Because liberty in liberalism is not given but in fact always requires a previous regulation 
or recognition by the state, it needs to be produced through security mechanisms and with 
specific costs that are defined by the state.  As Foucault (2008, 65) defines it, “(...) 
liberalism, the liberal art of government, is forced to determine the precise extent to 
which and up to what point individual interest, that is to say, individual interests insofar 
as they are different and possibly opposed to each other, constitute a danger for the 
interest of all. The problem of security is the protection of the collective interest against 
individual interests”  
 On the other hand, security is also one of the techniques, mentalities or 
rationalities that, according to Foucault, are employed to govern individuals and 
populations within the liberal order.  The notion of biopower works to understand the 
centrality of the population as an object of governmental power. At the same time, the 
idea of biopolitics refers to the political rationality that seeks to guarantee the biological 
existance of the population while it extensively deploys the security apparatus (Dillon, 
2004).  In this framework, security appears not as a negative concept referring to the 
exercise of a type of hierarchical police power, but rather as a mechanism that makes 
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possible the management of individuals in the form of bodies and populations.  Through 
security the state justifies launching the war for it appears as the best mechanism to 
protect the population. Because biopower refers to the coexistence of liberty with the 
logics of war, the idea of security appears as the best framework to unite concerns about 
the welfare of the population with the need to secure liberties through surveillance or 
war.  In this way, by protecting the population, the state finds itself in the paradoxical 
situation of defending life through the security apparatus. (Gordon, 1991: 10).  Or, as 
Foucault’s work suggests, there is no power over life without exposing it to mortal 
danger (Dillon, 2004) Thus, we can say, security, as expression of governmentality, is 
tied both to liberty and to the mechanisms to make liberty possible, that is, to surveillance 
and war.  
 A contemporary example that illustrates the governmental character of security 
within liberalism has to do with its double-faced intervention within the apparatus of 
National Security in the hemisphere during the Cold War period. As Neocleous (2008) 
has shown, both social security and military security are expressions of economic 
security, or, in other words, of the need to protect capitalism from any disruptions.  
Although National Security has relied on militarism and violent intervention, it, on the 
other hand, has drawn on narratives of social protection and correlate mechanisms such 
as social security or international aid.  In that way, to talk about social security as 
domestic security in opposition to national security as external security is not necessarily 
adequate.  Moreover, As Neocleous (2008) states, National Security arises from the 
ideological program of social security, as it was with this model that a new approach to 
administration of capital was promoted with the New Deal in the United States towards 
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the mid nineteen-thirties. 
 What must be noticed here is that, in opposition to the traditional conception of 
liberalism as laissez faire, the Foucauldian notion of governmentality makes the structure 
needed in order for the free market to occur visible, and it does it by making explicit the 
antinomies constitutive of the liberal discourse. For instance, Foucault (2008, 78), 
referring to the relation between liberalism and neoliberalism, points to the double origin 
of neoliberalism in its German form in the Weimar Republic and the American New 
Deal. Contrary to what theoreticians from within the liberal tradition maintain, Foucault 
suggests that liberalism has been dependent since its origins on the re-structruring of a 
wartime economy for peacetime, wherein state intervention—rather than some form of 
natural or a priori logic--establishes market freedom as the economic foundation of 
society.  In this sense, Foucault establishes how neoliberalism is really not a laissez faire 
doctrine.  Instead, it is based on a re-organization of the state in a way that it intervenes to 
create conditions for market operations.  This state intervention will affect every aspect of 
life and rely on the idea of competition.  The market implies, then, not the equality, but 
the opportunity to compete.  In this logic, from the most intimate aspects of life to public 
function will be based on the notion of competition between market and risk.  Security 
will appear as a central mechanism mediating these competing realms. 
 In chapter 2,  I will refer to the way security unfolds as a contemporary bio-
political technology under neoliberalism. Through the case of the Colombian Pacific, I 
will examine how in the last three decades, successive stages of neoliberalism—
deregulation, mass extraction, dispossession to re-appraise population and territory 
(Svampa, 2008), have required security mechanisms oriented towards re-ordering, re-
  26  
populating territories, establishing militarization, or, often, systematically murdering and 
disappearing as mechanisms for ordering populations under neoliberalism.  Here I would 
like to examine some of the key moments in which security has unfolded as a biopolitical 
governmental tool. 
 
1.2 The Geopolitics of Security 
 The consolidation of security as a governmental rationality within liberalism was 
articulated with the re-accommodation of imperial power that occurred after the end of 
World War II.  A central element of the postwar emerging political balance, security 
became an essential key to reconstruct a world order structured over the United States’ 
recently acquired condition of hegemonic power and its interest to consolidate this 
position in the new world geopolitics. In this period, the United States sought to solidify 
its economic hegemony through its “Open Door” policy, which aimed to support 
economic multilateralism based on the opening of commercial relations with former 
Asian and African colonies and the revitalization of war-devastated areas, especially 
Japan and Germany (as its bases in Asia and Europe), as a way to reestablishing the 
dollar in the international economy of the postwar.  This process attempted to re-organize 
the center-periphery world-system scheme, which was then threatened by a series of 
liberation movements in both the core and the periphery.  
 As Reifer and Sudler (1996) explain it, the United States implemented a type of 
international military Keynesianism. Initially aimed to achieve economic goals, by the 
late 1960's--when the difficulties to establish a broad multilateral trade with the 
peripheries became evident-- US policy shifted towards the defense of national security. 
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It is important to remember that at this moment a series of decolonial movements took 
place in Asia and Africa, and that the United States played a key—though often 
ambivalent--role in this decolonialization process.  On the one hand, Washington saw this 
conjuncture as an opportunity to break colonial commercial blocks in Asia and Africa 
and to impose its multilateralist trade policy. On the other hand, in this period the United 
States displayed what Reifer and Sudler (1996) have called a “global logic of 
counterrevolutionary violence” as a central mechanism of organization to face the threat 
to the existent order presented by the decolonial and nationalist movements. In this way, 
while the United States met its economic interests, it impeded the advance of decolonial 
movements and their subversive potential to alter the emerging hegemonic order, 
resulting in a process of controlled decolonization via the recently created United 
Nations. 
 In this context, and with the advent of the Cold War, security became a key 
dispositive in the redefinition of the United States’ imperial power and its relation with 
the world-system peripheries. With the emergence of the United States’ hegemonic 
power, a new economic map was constituted in parallel with a map of friends and 
enemies. The National Security that emerged in this period worked as an ideal instance to 
arbitrate the new cartography of the world-system with political rationalities that went 
from totalitarianism to nationalism and undemocratic parliamentarianism. In any case, 
security emerged as the imperial technology that provided a language of danger while 
facilitating the penetration of markets through a series of governmental and militaristic 
interventions later on articulated under the notion of development.  
 As Escobar (1992) shows, the discourse of development emerged after War 
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World II and under its powerful influence the world-system began reconfigure itself 
under a rubric of progress that thoroughly legitimated the unequal conditions of exchange 
between nations.  It is in this historical conjuncture that discourses about security suffer 
important transformations and start acquiring their current character. With the discourse 
of development, a particular view of the world is re-created and normalized.  In this view, 
the planet appears as divided into two parts: A modern and industrialized one (where the 
goals of development have been achieved), and the rest, which needs to be saved from its 
backward position in regards to the developed portion of the world.  As a complement to 
this vision, development offered a model of social organization based on efficiency as a 
way to productivity; on science, as superior to culture; on scientific production, in 
oposition to vernacular knowledge.  States were then catalogued as rich or poor 
depending on whether their population had access to a certain per capita income. 
 Development, with its hierarchical and essentially ethnocentric logic, helped re-
organize the world-system in a way that the recently discovered First World reinforced its 
domination through its construction as advanced and enlightened—the referent that all 
countries, now labeled as poor and belonging to the Third World, should aspire.  As it 
follows from Escobar’s (1992) work, the discourse of development helped to constitute a 
type of hegemony without conquest on Latin America, supported on the model of free 
market that it had been promoting since earlier decades and on this free market’s assumed 
neutrality for its participant nations.  
 Once conditions for free trade in the hemisphere were established, along with the 
ideological justification of structural inequality provided by the discourse of 
development, a new balance of economic and political power regulated the geopolitical 
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world and hemispehric map.  After the end of World War II, the United States’ new 
hegemonic role made it necessary for them to protect exploitation, production, exchange, 
as well as the social order brought about by the new model.  As a result, a host of military 
bodies and civilian institutions, took a dominant role in planning, international relations, 
etcetera.  It is at this point that security appears very strongly, supporting the post-war 
economic and social order underpinned by the discourse of development.  The emerging 
economic program--whose foundation included expanding the international market for 
goods produced by US domestic industry, as well as investing the excess of capital and 
access raw materials for internal production (Escobar, 1996: 32)--required that optimal 
conditions were ensured through the prevention of risks that jeopardized its reproduction.  
By linking free trade to defense, security became the beachhead of the post-war order as a 
discourse and as a series of control technicques.  
 In the same way that development was a key apparatus in the East-West dispute 
(Escobar, 1996: 34), security was instrumental in fulfilling the goals of the Cold War 
largely because of the ease with which it easily articulated with defense and 
developmentalist programs.  In Latin America, development and its correlate security 
agenda unfolded through the model of National Security.  At the level of defense, the 
constitution of discourses of danger around the fear of advance of communism eventually 
led to an intense persecution of anyone suspect to profess a leftist ideology.  In the 
following section I examine these trends through the case of Colombia, and then continue 
to show their transformations up until the current Democratic Security model first 
developed between 2002 and 2010.  
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1.3 Colombia: From National Security to Democratic Security 
 Although not written as an official policy, the National Security doctrine appeared 
as a set of practices and ideological principles that aimed to guarantee the internal order 
in Latin American countries through the systematic repression of individuals and 
organizations deemed to be committed to the spread of communism.   
 The emergence of this doctrine is largely shaped by the United States' nascent 
hegemony after World Word II. In 1947, hemispheric nations subscribed to the Rio Pact 
or Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance whereby states commit to provide 
mutual defense assistance. The main provision of Rio Pact, also known as Defense 
Doctrine, was that an offense against one of the member states was an offense against all. 
Yet, given the United States' role as an emerging hegemonic power in the Americas, the 
Rio Pact's goal of mutual defense was in practice guided by the United States' 
preponderant role as hemispheric security enforcer. In this scenario, Latin American 
countries became limited to enforcers of security, but only for their own domestic affairs 
(Leal Buitrago, 2006).  It is important to remember that the Rio Pact was signed almost at 
the same time that the Cold War was starting, and, in practice, it emerges as a way to 
counter the threat of communist expansion in Latin America.  As Wolf (2002) states, the 
Cold War began in Latin Ameirica a year after the Pact was approved.  It is precisely in 
this year, 1948, that the Ninth Panamerican Conference is organized in Bogota.  The 
Conference expressely consagrates an anti-communist agenda in order to counter the 
perceived interventionist threat of the soviet communist regime. 
 In the decades following the signing of the Rio Pact, what occurs is a reiteration 
of the United States’ power of defining the politico-military agendas in the region, as 
  31  
well as its accompanying tactics, in the sense of pursuing the internal enemy, using civil-
military tactics to neutralize it, and using the state of exception as a mechanism to re-
define the power of the state while also re-constituting the nation as a whole.  It is 
important to remember that, with the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959, the United 
States’ anti-communist agenda in Latin America had intensified, and that this agenda had 
led to increased militarization and surveillance of areas suspected of harboring similar 
upheavals or of what was perceived as the imminent outbreak of guerrilla warfare in the 
region. In this period, too, the Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev, had offered its 
support to the wars of liberation that were being fought around the world, to which the 
United States responded by implementing a plan to attack insurgencies from military and 
social fronts.   
 The major civil-military initiative that the United States set in motion under the 
administration of John F. Kennedy was the Alliance for Progress—a program designed to 
respond to the threat that insurgencies posed to the United States and its dominance in 
Latin America. The Alliance for Progress sought to mitigate the threat of communism in 
Latin America through a series of development programs that minimized the potential for 
social outbreaks, as well as strengthening the military and intelligence apparatus to defeat 
the nascent insurgency.  The result was the emergence of an apparatus of civil-military 
security where both the civil and military components were at the service of the United 
States’ agenda during the Cold War, which internally worked to dismantle internal 
opposition forces to the newly formed Frente Nacional—a platform of the two traditional 
parties to rotate in the government of Colombia, and in the end, to contain a popular 
revolutionary movement in the country. The program that was set in motion included 
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housing and production loans, and militarily it emphasized the persecution of peasant 
leaders and former guerrillas, as well as engaging in extensive intelligence, especially in 
rural areas where it was believed guerrilla cells could arise. 
 A further development in this period was key to determining the way security 
would be configured in the institutional organization of Colombia. After the period of 
internal war known as La Violencia (1948-1957), the Frente Nacional government 
bipartisan coalition (in power between 1958-1974) established that the Liberal and 
Conservative governing parties would act with an administrative and not a political 
character. It was determined also that the Armed Forces would follow a technical, 
apolitical operation.  In a subsequent development of this strategy, the government of 
president Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) implemented the principle that the 
military is autonomous regarding politics and that politics is autonomous vis a vis the 
military.  Leal Buitrago (2006) shows how, a result of this trend towards neutrality and 
technocracy was the configuration of two tendencies within the Colombian Army: a 
developmentalist and a technical trend. The developmentalist trend developed the so-
called Plan Lazo—a military strategy for pacification at the end of the alternated 
bipartisan government regime, Frente Nacional. The developmentalist trend continued 
Plan Lazo's principle that the best way to repeal communism was for the military to 
collaborate with community development through civic-military actions. Plan Lazo and 
the developmentalist trend aimed to gain civilian support against communist guerrillas 
through health brigades, literacy campaigns, roadworks, etcetera. 
 The opposite trend, known as technical, gained strength during Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo’s government (1966-1970). During this administration, supporters of a 
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technically ruled military advocated for the economic and military spheres to become 
autonomous from the realm of the political. Supporters of the technical tendency 
suggested that arms, not political maneuvers, would solve the armed conflict.  The effects 
of this binary understanding of military responsibilities have deeply marked the national 
history and are apparent in subsequent decades through the intervention of the armed 
forces in both ideologically and militarilyy driven strategies. The current Democratic 
Security policy has, indeed, integrated versions of the developmentalist and technical 
military through its conception that the anti-insurgency agenda must be ideological 
(emphasizing the population’s adherence to the institutions’ side), but also highly 
specialized in terms of technology, training, and strategic organization.  
 The other key trend that arose during the Cold War was the collectivization of 
social control.  As Cepeda-Castro (2003) explains, historically, the management of 
security tasks in Colombia has been shared between state, self-defense organizations, 
paramilitary groups, and more recently, stimulated by the state, common citizens. The 
genesis of this practice can be located towards 1965, when a conception of national 
security emerged with the Colombian National Defense Statute, and a year later, in 1966, 
with governmental Decree 893, which allowed civilians to carry arms. In 1974, Decree 
1573 became the first norm to expressly use the concept of national security, which, 
according to the norm, meant that waging war was not only a function of the Army but 
also of the entire nation. In the decade of the 1980s, the history of collectivization of 
social control in Colombia dramatically manifested when a paramilitary strategy started 
to be heavily implemented with the systematic assassination, disappearance, and torture 
of over 5000 members of leftist party Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union) (Cepeda-Castro 
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2006). As it will be shown later in this chapter, Democratic Security Policy embraced the 
collectivization trend through its emphasis in the notion that security is to be performed 
by all, and not only by the Armed Forces, if it is to be successful. 
 As I have showed so far, the consolidation of an anti-communist ideology under 
the Cold War became the direct antecedent in the consolidation of an ideology of national 
defense in the hemisphere. After this point, state security would come to be seen as a 
synonym with the security of society. Brazil, Chile, and then Argentina's authoritarian 
regimes became the predecessors in the application of National Security in the region, yet 
the doctrine rapidly spread to other countries in Latin America. Under National Security, 
the figure of the internal enemy replaced that of the external enemy, and social protest 
turned to be a subversive manifestation. At the same time, under this doctrine, state 
terrorism became a form of political action and intelligence work turned into a central 
tactic for the contention of Communism. If in the past national defense was conceived as 
an instrument to protect sovereignty, in this period the emphasis was put on National 
Security, as an eminently anti-communist endeavor. Yet, the strategy to conduct this 
agenda was not limited to military elements carried through astringent defense policies. 
On the contrary, non-military mechanisms, such as cooperation on development projects, 
fulfilled an important ideological role turning citizens into supporters or informants of the 
governments' counterinsurgency project and facilitating the intervention of the United 
States in the terrain, as it was the case with Alliance for Progress and Plan Lazo. 
 The emergence of revolutionary guerrillas throughout Latin America and 
Colombia during the Sixties marked the highest point in the war against Communism. In 
order to counter guerrilla warfare, Latin American states led low-intensity wars, some of 
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which ended with military dictatorships in their territories and, in the case of Colombia, 
continued over time simultaneously with other strategies such as the paramilitary project. 
 In Colombia, National Security unfolded throughout the 1970’s and well after the 
mid 1980’s. Making heavy use of the state of exception, the state sought to control urban 
protests led by social movements. Unions, students, and human rights defenders become 
the preferred target of state policies inspired in the social defense ideology. The security 
statute instituted by President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala’s government was broadly 
known for having turned the country into a constitutional dictatorship (Garcia Villegas, 
2001), as it used constitutionally authorized faculties to create a number of crimes whose 
definition was open to judicial interpretation, at the same time that it modified due 
process rules and granted broader powers to the armed forces, including the trial of 
civilians for largely political reasons.  
 To the extent that the end of the Cold War represented a new scenario in the 
world geopolitics, the National Security Doctrine was progressively articulated to new 
logics of power that, without eliminating it (rather, we could say, incorporating it to their 
operation) moved towards a different security paradigm. In the following section I will 
refer to this paradigm as Democratic Security.  
 
1.3.1 The Advent of Democratic Security 
 Three trends, largely rooted in the National Security Doctrine, characterize the 
historical evolution of security and determine its consolidation as a dominant discourse in 
Colombia: First, the persistence of the exception as an instrument of war; second, the 
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coexistence of civil and military tactics as a security strategy; and third, the continuing 
appeal to the idea of a left dissidence as an internal political enemy that has to be 
combated by society. With the coming to power of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002, and 
his formulation of the Democratic Security policy as the flagship policy of his 
government, not only is security defined as the centerpiece of public policy and 
simultaneously as the axis of the public in Colombia, but there is also an articulation with 
the historical trends giving shape to previous moments of the security discourse. In other 
words, Democratic Security claims that security must return to the center of public life to 
re-define a field of power—a field that is constituted in reference to a particular discourse 
and historical practices historically defining security.  In this way, the relatively new 
directions of security (who is inside or outside the nation, what are the contours of 
citizenship, and where are the limits of state power) are given by the meanings of this 
contested field.  In this section I will review how existing meanings of security come to 
shape new directions in the configuration of power.  
 One of the changes that came to modify the exercise of security at the end of the 
Cold War was the intensification of globalization logics resulting from the growing 
deterritorialization of the world economy and the loss of state sovereignty vis a vis 
supranational bodies (Sassen, 1998).  In this sense, a new security model based on supra-
state definitions began to emerge.  To the National Security led by the state in opposition 
to a single enemy (the Communist threat), an idea of security defined by multiple actors 
(international organizations, communities, countries, individuals, civil society) was 
configured.  Threats became multiple and diffuse, and the enemy opaque, rather than 
simply being represented by Communism or rival states. At this point, a period of 
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securitization starts, to the extentent that now a number of human, civic, environmental, 
urban "securities"  proliferate. (Leal Buitrago, 2006).  
 Colombia has been at the center of these new securities because of its strategic 
position within the imperial orbit of the United States in the hemisphere.  Both drug 
trafficking and the increase in guerrilla activity beyond the national borders have been 
subject of intense security-based activity in multiple scenarios (i.e., the creation of lists of 
individuals suspicious of drug-trafficking involvement, such as the so called “Clinton 
List”, military border conflicts, fumigations of coca crops, etc.). But also, as I will 
analyze in chapter 2, Colombia has been at the center of continental initiatives for market 
and their attempt to incorporate black and indigenous communities’ ancestral territories 
in the global economy through intense forms of securitization. 
 
1.3.2 The Appeal to Emergency Powers 
 Much like what has occurred in other parts of the world, in Colombia the 
expansive definition of issues thought of as security threats or securitization process has 
been dealt with through emergency legislation. The state of exception has played a 
central role in executing security in a way that makes possible to connect National 
Security with Domestic Security. In the mid 1980’s Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982-
1986) and Virgilio Barco Vargas’ (1986-1990) governments led the so-called war against 
drug-trafficking, once again appealing to the juridical instruments facilitated by the state 
of exception (i.e., elimination of habeas corpus, authorization for home searches without 
judicial order, etcetera). Under the language of war and urgency typically shaping 
security and defense policies, the target in this period became “narco-terrorismo” or the 
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urban terrorism practiced by drug cartels to oppose governmental power expressed in 
measures such as extradition. In this period, the state made extensive use of the state of 
exception in light of its growing incapacity to repress the, so-defined, threats coming 
from the insurgency and the drug-trafficking. 
 With the advent of the 1991 political Constitution, the limits to apply the state of 
exception became stricter. A constitutional provision proscribed military-led 
investigation or trial of civilians and established limits in time to apply norms of 
exception. The constitution prescribed, too, that human rights could not be suspended 
under states of exception and established that the norms issued during the state of 
exception had to be connected with the reasons that motivated the declaration in the first 
place. The Constitutional Court became the guardian of this mandate and in the almost 
two decades following this provision, has acted as the filter for successive governmental 
attempts to continue the institutional tradition of making excessive use of the state of 
exception.  
 At the same time, there is a culture of exception that permanently appeals to the 
idea of threats so grave that the very existence of society is put in doubt. As Garcia 
Villegas (2001) puts it, the excessive use of the state of exception in the preceding 
decades has led to “the colonization of the political by the war and the substitution of 
political actors by armed actors”.  Because successive governments have constantly 
appealed to issue a variety of penalties under states of exception, it is appropriate to talk 
about the normalization of emergency penalty and subsequently to what Iturralde (2008) 
calls authoritarian liberalism, a model “which encourages the hypertrophy of the penal 
state and the reduction of the social state.”  
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 In more recent years, measures of exception have implied the extension of powers 
for state security forces in order to investigate and practice unwarranted arrests or other 
measures, and also the relaxation of procedural guarantees such as the requirement of 
publicity in trials or the terms for detention. Notably, states of exception have led to the 
enlargement of military capabilities to investigate and prosecute civilians, as well as to 
the indefinite transformation of exceptional norms into permanent legislation. And 
because states of exception tend to impose the logic of war over the logic of law, the state 
ends up permanently acting as in a state of war, using military urgency and not political 
necessity as the primary criterion of operation (García Villegas, 2001).  
 With the advent of Democratic Security policy in 2002, Colombia’s traditional 
state model based on the coexistence of exceptionality and constitutionalism has come to 
rely more heavily on the exception. Yet, observing the daily life of security in Colombia 
would make it more accurate to say that the security paradigm has come to substitute 
regimes of exception as a normal technique of government (Carvajal, 2008). Because in 
the security paradigm there is not an alteration of the constitutional order in light of an 
exceptional situation of emergency but rather the normalization of an order that 
securitizes against the constant risks that threaten state and citizens, security would 
appear as a successor but also as a new development of the regime of exception.  
 
1.4 Democratic Security: Continuing Authoritarianism or New Governmental Technique? 
 A particular formation of the security rationality characteristic of liberalism, 
Democratic Security takes the shape of a governmental technique rooted in evolving 
geopolitical arrangements. In this section I will discuss the onset of Democratic Security 
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and the principles that propelled its constitution as a program with roots in earlier 
traditions of exceptionalism and a revamped governance based on the idea of friend-
enemy.  Throughout this section, I will examine how Democratic Security unfolded 
through a distinct set of discursive practices with effects on citizenship at large but also 
on collective mobilization.  
 As I suggested earlier in the chapter, Colombia has consistently drawn on a 
tradition of constitutional exceptionalism. Again, under Democratic Security, from 2002 
to 2010, with the stated purpose of strengthening the rule of law, the government 
appealed to measures historically authorized only in periods of exception: due process 
restrictions, administrativization of the criminal justice system, extended powers for 
intelligence bodies, and extension of the military jurisdiction to judge civilian offenses.   
 Immediately after assuming the presidency in August, 2002, the government 
issued a series of decrees with legal force instituting the state of exception in order to 
“control the public order” in all the country and especially in some rural areas in 
conflict—the so-called “rehabilitation and consolidation zones”. Measures adopted in 
these norms-- and particularly in Decree 2002 which, significantly, was publicized in the 
Official Gazzette on September 11, 2002--authorized the armed forces to conduct 
captures and other ordinarily judicial measures such as household and vehicles 
inspections without judicial authorization. In terms of the “rehabilitation and 
consolidation zones”, the measures were much more restrictive. The decree established 
that the right to circulation or residency could be limited through measures such as 
curfews, checkpoints, special authorizations or restrictions to circulate for people or 
vehicles at determined times and places.  
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 While initially presented as addressing zones of high conflict with a historical 
lack of state presence, the special measures, looking as a whole, clearly were part of a 
well-planned strategy of militarized governance and criminalization of dissent.  Indeed, 
towards 2003, the government presented to the Congress a bill of law that instituted a 
catalogue of geographic areas and specific conducts to be controlled through the toughest 
means of military and criminal enforcement.  A well-planned intervention of territories 
and communities presumably infiltrated by the insurgency, the new bill of law was 
formulated as an Anti-Terrorist Statute.  Exposing its character as a well coordinated and 
planned strategy, the Statute developed a kind of structured de-centralization—a flexible 
yet planned governmental de-centering that allowed the strategic militarization of areas 
deemed as risky for both public order and economic development.   
 Initially covering only some rural areas from Sucre and Arauca, two departments 
with historical presence of insurgencies, and in the case of Arauca an important oil 
reserve, the decrees soon covered 14 (out of 33) departments and 23 so-called special 
points.  Yet, while extending to other areas in the country, the decrees made it clear that 
this selective militarization constituted a targeted intervention with uneven application to 
areas that were seen as posing particular risks for national security.   Built upon the 
uneven application of exceptional measures and through extraordinary means, this form 
of militarized governance would guarantee economic development through the thorough 
display of the security apparatus. 
 An example of this connection development-security, Decree 2002/2002, that 
adopts the exceptional measures, starts the motivation for this norm by stating: 
“Considering (…) that criminal groups have multiplied the attacks to infrastructure of the 
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essential services of energy, drinking water, highways and roads (…)”.  Also, Decree 
1837/ 2002, whereby the government declared the state of exception, justified these 
measures, arguing that “(…) the whole nation is submitted to a terror regime in which 
democratic authority sinks and productive activity becomes more difficult and hazardous, 
multiplying unemployment and the misery of millions of compatriots”.  Through this 
appeal to the country’s need to adopt means outside the ordinary constitutional ones in 
the case the national prosperity was compromised, the government posed security as the 
natural, appropriate means for national welfare.  
 The complement for this legal construction of security was the constitution of an 
uneven national geography where urban, developed areas were presented as predated by 
the risks posed by lawless rural areas.  Furthermore, within rural areas there would be 
those that were compliant with the national policies and those that needed to be redeemed 
from their status as terror-prone regions through a comprehensive authorization for the 
armed forces to operate like a state subrogate. Decree 2002, for example, provided that 
the armed forces acted as judicial investigative authorities in those geographical areas 
where regular judicial investigators faced severe security risks to develop their task. 
 By constructing the notion of danger for some areas that appeared as saturated 
with threats in opposition to others that had to be defended from these perils, the official 
discourse instituted risk as the fundament of its governance.  It was under this logic that 
throughout 2003 the legislation of exception and the Anti-Terrorist Statute justified 
measures in rural areas, and once the ideas of risk became normalized, also applied to 
some urban contexts constructed as dangerous.  Thus, while targeted rural areas were 
heavily militarized, in cities, both the Police and the “Department Administrative of 
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Security”, an administrative intelligence body, intercepted private communications, 
practiced detentions, and executed raids without judicial warrant in cases where, as the 
law established, there were reasons to believe that the investigated person was implicated 
in the commission of a terrorist act (Alliance of Social and Like-Minded Organizations et 
al, 2008).   
 While the Anti-Terrorist Statute was ultimately declared unconstitutional 
(Sentences C-817 and C-818/2004), it left as a legacy a template to implement 
Democratic Security, which would be partially executed through administrative 
regulations as well as a vocabulary of danger that was broadly appropriated by media and 
publics.  Key to the constitution of this geography of danger was not only the regional 
separation of areas to be protected and areas to be protected of, but also the unequal 
treatment of citizens as friends or enemies of the state. Since early in Uribe’s 
government, the official rhetoric pointed at the increased guerrilla actions at the end of 
the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, and to the need of making the government's anti-
guerrilla offensive much firmer and effective.   
 The period between 2002 and 2004 saw the sharpest offensive against guerrillas. 
Yet, the interpretation the government would sustain throughout Uribe’s terms was that 
military and legal action should not only be to combat insurgencies’ armed structures, but 
also to de-legitimize any political or juridical recognition that allowed treating them as 
combatants in any type of symmetry with the state. Through the “Foundation-Center for 
Thought ‘Colombia First’”, Uribe and a team headed by then presidential advisor, José 
Obdulio Gaviria, defended the thesis that Colombia did not face an armed conflict but a 
terrorist threat (Botero, 2007). Maintaining that Colombia’s “disturbances” had to be 
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treated with criminal legislation and not with lax international law, the government 
dictated that the state was not at war but rather providing security for Colombians 
(Gaviria, 2007).  
 The discourse of the internal enemy was fundamental for Democratic Security’s 
positioning as an ethical and political imperative.  Excluding some groups as enemies of 
the nation allowed to galvanize public support into a rather unified political whole.  As a 
consequence of this discourse, citizens became automatically incorporated in the state 
security project as agents symmetrically struggling with the government against the 
terrorist threat that lied ahead (Rojas, 2009). Following a tradition of paramilitary 
mobilization, individuals were expected to collaborate with the state in defeating the 
terrorist enemy (Cepeda-Castro, 2003) either by providing information about suspicious 
movements in their areas or directly by combating as ad-hoc (non-professional) soldiers. 
State rhetoric soon translated into institutional programs such as “People’s Soldiers”, 
which recruited peasants to serve in the areas where they resided and therefore were 
familiar with the population after a brief military training. 
 Through the construction of social risks and by aggressively implementing a form 
of constitutional exceptionalism, the state re-constituted the geography of the political 
while delineating anew the contours of citizenship: At the onset of Democratic Security, 
broad but specific areas of the country had become “refuge for terrorists” (Decree 
2002/2002) while some groups in the population were presented as “terrorist 
supporters”5. In what follows, I will examine the implications of this discursive 
                                                
5 The third “Considerando” (motivation) of the Decree established: “Within the main 
forms of support to these organizations’ delinquent action we have, on the one hand, the 
camouflage of their members within the civilian population and the hiding of their 
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construction and its implications for social mobilization. 
 
1.5 Legacies and Ruptures in the Security Field    
 Given Democratic Security’s pervasive presence in Colombians’ political 
vocabulary during the period 2002-2010, investigating it was a deceptively easy task.  
Towards 2008, when I started my fieldwork, news programs still featured various aspects 
of its application continuously, government officials invoked it in every public 
engagement, and political opponents of the government had it as a sure aim to their 
criticisms.  Yet, with Democratic Security’s blinding visibility and also with its 
characterization as a discrete policy—an innovation brought about by the government--it 
became harder to descipher what was truly new about it and what was inherited from 
previous security policies iterations. 
 In order to establish these continuities and posible ruptures, I decided to engage 
with a social organization that had lived through various incarnations of national security 
policies.  The Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (hereinafter 
CPDH, for its acronym in Spanish) offered an ideal vantage point towards security 
policies as they emerged precisely in response to Colombia’s adoption of a stringent 
security statute modeled after the National Security doctrine.  CPDH was created in 1979 
after a national meeting of individuals and organizations concerned with the human rights 
crisis the security statute motivated, including over 16,000 political prisoners, widespread 
torture, and due process violations (CPDH n.d).  While not at all new in the long national 
                                                                                                                                            
telecommunications equipment in other towns, and on the other hand, the constant supply 
that occurs in the places where they stay.”  
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history of constitutional exceptionalism (García Villegas estimates that, considering its 
entire history, Colombia has lived under exceptional legislation for 36 years), the 1979 
legislation or “Statute of Defense and National Security” became more significant as it 
occurred simultaneously and under the framework of the hemispheric National Security 
doctrine that supported ongoing dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
and Bolivia.  
 I approached CPDH through my work with its Valle del Cauca branch, not 
founded until 2002, but integrated, for the most part, by veterans in the regional human 
rights movement. Conducting archival work with CPDH Valle I learned about the 
chronology of CPDH’s work since their foundation in 1979  and the ways both the 
country and the organization had changed from National Security to Democratic Security. 
Going over the chronology, I was struck by the similarities between the security policies 
back in the late seventies and in the early two thousands, let alone the parallels between 
the oposition the policy faced back then and now. The types of violations in 1979 and 
2003, the last year documented on this review, seemed to repeat themselves with slight 
variations: Arbitrary detentions, torture, dissaperance, massacres, and forced 
displacement.  Most outstanding in both periods was the persecution and elimination of 
community leaders and human rights defenders, including the assasinations of over thirty 
CPDH members throughout the late nineties.   On the CPDH’s side, actions in this 
chronologic review included, chiefly, campaigns to revoke laws of exception, to defend 
human rights, and to reach a negotiated solution for the armed conflict. 
 Perhaps observing continuities from National Security to Democratic Security 
similar to those documented in CPDH’s review, many of the human rights militants I 
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interviewed in the cities of Cali and Buenaventura, reached similar conclusions in regards 
to the marked parallels between these two security models.  To my question, what has 
changed from National Security to Democratic Security in Colombia? many answered 
that, despite its labeling as a new governance mechanism, Democratic Security 
reproduced almost identically the principles of National Security, chiefly the radical 
division between “good elements of society” and a dissident, internal enemy.  To support 
this thesis, it was said that the United States’ intervention was then, as much as now, 
shaping Colombia’s defense of economic and imperial interests. An activist from CPDH 
and sister organization ANDAS remarked: 
Democratic Security Policy is framed in something that is very old in 
Colombia, which is the National Security Statute; this is a thesis that comes 
from the government in the Sixties and is a concept which is very marked 
by the United States’ ideologies about the internal enemy, so from that point 
of view, the enemy for the government or the classes in power is all that 
who does political oposition, who does not agree with the government’s 
economic policies and, to that extent, makes use of a legitimate measure 
which is the right to protest, the right for communities to organize, of 
communities of any type… unions, students… so the concept of the internal 
enemy goes in that direction (Interview with Sofía) 
During an interview with Fundación Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos 
(FCSPP), a CPDH human rights sister organization, Jorge, a lawyer with the group, 
offered a similar interpretation to my question: 
(T)he government continues applying a theory of national security, 
developed by the United States, which is to drain the water to the fish; 
(this theory) has been developed by paramilitary groups assassinating 
many people and terrorizing many people.  This government intends to 
apply a new version that is not to kill, massacre or massively displace, 
but to detain people, which has a similar effect—that everybody gets 
scared of becoming a victim of one of these mass raids or these (cases of) 
unjust imprisoning that occurred, especially, in the government of Alvaro 
Uribe Vélez. (Interview with Jorge) 
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As this testimony highlighted, both security models were built upon a discourse of 
defense from an internal risk represented in politically dissident organized communitites.  
However, while rooted in post World War II anti-communist ideology, the differences 
between both models were clear for activists I interviewed too. While still considering 
imperialist projects as being at the core of continuous security models, some activists 
said that Democratic Security responded to a different moment in the geopolitics of 
capital and the disputes for hegemonic power within the world-system.   
1.5.1 Democratic Security and the Economy/Security Interface  
 Santiago, a leading militant with a network of popular and peasant organizations, 
Proceso de Unidad Popular del Suroccidente Colombiano (hereinafter PUPSOC), 
offered this reflection to contextualize current security policies:  
Here in Colombia we are talking about the problem of the hegemony 
between China, the United States, and the European Union.  Those are the 
tigers that are disputing this (territory) among them.  And the territory that 
they are fighting for is this… Colombia.  (Inteview with Santiago).   
Santiago’s response rightfully included a concern that all activists I interviewed 
identified as a chief factor behind the intensification of coercion brought about by 
Democratic Security and its tighter articulation with ideas of economic prosperity and 
development.  Indeed, while the generalized perception in media during the time of my 
fieldwork in Colombia was that Democratic Security would bring physical safety to all 
citizens to protect them from guerrillas or common delinquency, activists I interviewed 
were overwhelmingly clear that the government’s security program was closely 
intertwined with the country’s economy.  In the testimonies I collected it was clear that 
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Democratic Security’s inclusion in the National Development Plan, next to development 
policies, was a clear indication that this policy was not only a criminal policy strategy but 
a component of larger state economic designs.  
 Despite activists’ agreement on the role Democratic Security played in national 
economic agendas, the question remained, why had Democratic Security remained so 
closely linked in its methods and logics to National Security’s punitive orientation?  
Furthermore, how did Democratic Security linked with the new geopolitical landscape of 
the war on terror while still emphasizing the primacy of security not as a control 
mechanism but as an avenue to prosperity?   
 Coronil’s (2007) discussion of power formations in the Americas in terms of the 
continuing imperial control of the United States and the losses in its capacity for global 
control sheds light on the role of security within current configurations of security.  
Following his presentation it is possible to see how both National Security and the war on 
terror (key coordinates for Colombia’s Democratic Security), constitute manifestations of 
the United States’ imperialist domination in the hemisphere.  Coronil (2007: 266) 
suggests, in a reflection on the continuing importance of imperialist power, that “imperial 
control is achieved through the joining and transformation of distinct communities 
brought together by the force of the market as well as by armed force—whether actively 
deployed or kept as threat.”  
 Colombia’s adoption of Democratic Security occurs within this dual logic of 
forced incorporation into a market economy.  The nature and intensity of this forced 
incorporation has varied historically depending on how much coercion has been needed 
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to establish imperial domination.  This seems true from the post World War II situation 
where the United States consolidated its hegemony over segments of the Third World 
throughout the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, but also more recently 
with its loss of centrality in the last few decades.  
 What seems key here is that despite and perhaps because of the United States’ 
eroded capacity to exercise global hegemonic power, imperial control has become 
exacerbated and more openly displayed through both economic and police-oriented 
policies (Steinmetz, 2003). In the Colombian case, a key feature of this exacerbated 
imperialist power is that it is not maintained  through the ruling of a metropolis, but via 
national powers.  As Panitch (2000, 264) has observed, the U.S. “non-territorial 
imperialism” is exercised by the “induced reproduction of the form of the dominant 
imperialist power within each national formation and its state.”  It is this reproduction of 
the United States imperial power that we observe with clarity in the case of Colombia’s 
Democratic Security.  While the Colombian state maintains an autonomy in the 
formulation of policies and laws, it appears that imperial designs shape security policies 
according to their goals of economic and political dominance.  
 An example that illustrates current security policies’ ties to imperial designs and 
their larger political economic framework has to do with the criminalization of peasant 
modes of life and production.  As PUPSOC has conceptualized it, the state has conceived 
a series of regulations that have attempted to drastically modify modes of peasant 
production by introducing a set of prohibitions to manufacture or commercialize products 
basic to both peasant subsistance consumption and trade.  Through administrative 
resolutions, the government has tightly regulated the making and commercialization of 
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products like panela, a sugar cane derived product at the basis of working class and rural 
populations’ diet, and also the prohibition to commercialize farmer-bottled milk.  But 
also, through the Statute of Rural Development (Law 1152) of 2007, proposed under 
Alvaro Uribe’s government, the state eliminated limitations to adjudicate so-called 
unproductive common lands to corporations.  While ultimately declared unconstitutional, 
this statute limited the adjudication of collective lands to Black and indigenous 
communities, constituting what social organizations called a true counter-agrarian 
reform.  Attempts to regulate woodlands (Law 1021 from 2006) and water use aimed at a 
complete privatization of the trade on these resources also put obstacles to afrocolombian 
and indigenous communities’ exercise of territorial autonomy, while allowing corporate 
interests to prevail over these communities’ collective rights. 
 While these measures fully incorporated Colombia into the second phase of 
neoliberalism, they also placed peasant, indigenous, and afrocolombian communities in a 
space of marginality with respect to the corporate production model actively facilitated 
by the state.  By locating these groups’ production as peripheral, the state went even to 
constitute them as risks with respect to the normalcy represented by corporate production.  
Resolution 779 from 2006, which regulates panela production, for example, virtually 
eliminates the possibility of peasant and indigenous production as these groups’ 
processing techniques would fail to fulfill the tight regulations of panela under the new 
technical standards, even though its processing constitutes an ancestral practice at the 
core of communities’ dietary habits.   
 Citing technical regulations approved by Colombia in the framework of bodies of 
regional governance, Resolution 779 accurately establishes that technical regulations 
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guarantee “the imperatives of national security; the protection of health or human 
security, animal or vegetal life or health, or the environment and prevention of practices 
that may lead consumers to errors”.  Turned into anomalies or risks, as it occurs with a 
taxative interpretation of this norm, communities can be subject to various forms of 
administrative control or even criminalization.  As an activist from PUPSOC put it, 
referring to the agrarian regulations,  
Pressure increases, outlets are closed, and fire flares up with measures like 
these… like the administrative criminalization that is in the panela 
Resolution.  If you read it, it already has implicit the description of the 
crime with respect to panela, it’s said there.  Obviously, (this is) in order 
to criminalize a way of life (…), the way of peasant production.  And that 
is a war against all peoples. Not only the Colombian people.  (Interview 
with Santiago) 
 
 The regulation of panela, and more recently farm-bottled milk, and farm hens, is 
part of a trend to regulate local production while removing obstacles for free trade.  In 
this sense, Resolution 779 cites as one of this normative supports the World Trade 
Organization Agreement and its Agreement about Technical Obstacles to Commerce, 
which deals with product security and technical rules.  In the trend to integrate the 
Americas along the lines of free trade, ensuring uniform sanitary conditions goes hand in 
hand with detecting and managing risks to this projected area of seemless commercial 
traffic. 
 Security provisions have become an integral part of the framework that will 
facilitate the process of consolidating free trade zones throughout the region.  From Plan 
Puebla-Panama (U.S.-Central America-Colombia, 2001) to Plan Colombia (U.S.-EU-
Colombia, 2001), and Merida Initiative (U.S.-Mexico, 2007) economic development has 
been connected to coercive regulations to facilitate this traffic.  From sanitary conditions 
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to immigration and drug traffic, traffic on persons, and money laundering, more aspects 
have been regulated as risks to the region’s security, and treated as conducts deserving 
sanctions in a continuum from the administrative to the criminal.  
 As the counter-face of the economic liberalization policies that continued being 
implemented in Colombia towards the first decade of the twenty first century, security 
policies drew on both traditions of state authoritarianism and current designs of neoliberal 
governance.  The effects of these measures for social mobilization have been significant, 
as I will show in chapters 2 and 3.  In the final part of this chapter, I want to refer to an 
instance where national and international security frameworks have intersected with 
human rights mobilization in ways that illustrate the transformations in the field of the 
political in Colombia. 
 
1.6 Human Rights in the Era of Security 
 By 2008, with Uribe entering the second half of his second term as president, it 
was clear that the anti-terrorist agenda of Democratic Security posed severe problems in 
terms of limiting freedoms and in aggravating the abuses that the armed forces had 
committed during decades of state of exception and dirty war against insurgent groups.  
On the other hand, it was also clear that, under the influx of the war on terror, political 
and legal frameworks to deal with state violence had dramatically changed.  In the 
Colombian case, it was not that state violence ceased to be problematic, but that now it 
was justified as being in the name of everybody’s security.  And since security was seen 
as the way to achieve prosperity, then some forms of state violence, even if they were 
excessive, were officially justified as necessary for everybody’s welfare. 
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 In this conjuncture, the Colombian state emphasized its adherence to the 
framework posed by international principles to respond to what was viewed as the 
ultimate threat against society—terrorism. In the presentation of Democratic Security 
policy, president Uribe said, expressing the policy’s adherence to the war on terror 
doctrine,  “in order to defeat terrorism there is no sovereignty of nations, but democratic 
sovereignty.  The struggle is that of the state’s sovereignty and from democratic nations 
against the sovereignty of terrorism.  The struggle is of all against terrorism” (Letter by 
President Alvaro Uribe introducing Democratic Security Policy, 2003).  By vindicating 
the idea of “democratic sovereignty” or the power of the people vis a vis a diffusely-
defined common terrorist threat irrespective of national limits, President Uribe appealed 
to the war on terror discourse about an expansive and continual threat to be addressed by 
equally drastic means.  
 How did this regime coexist with the existing international human rights system is 
a question that must be answered by attending not only to the more or less lax 
enforcement that particular agencies conduct under the framework of the war on terror, 
but to structural re-configurations of the national and international human rights system 
that allowed for this heightened security rationality to gain a foothold. In the micro-
cosmos of human rights agencies, claims, and actors of Cali, a situation symptomatic of 
the institutional trends that had been ongoing during the last security-led decade was 
unfolding. Late in 2008, I visited the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) representation in Cali to explore how, in practice, human 
rights violations were conceived by an international agency in times of the war on terror, 
and also to get a sense of the relationship between this international agency and human 
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rights claims from social organizations and the state.  OHCHR had been one of the key 
human rights international agencies since its arrival in the country in 1997. An office 
only opened previously in the so-called six other most violent countries in the world 
(Cambodia, Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia), the OHCHR was opened in 
light of the heightened armed conflict in the country.   
 A fairly active agency at the beginning of its mandate, OHCHR’s first directors 
for the Office in Colombia, Almudena Mazarrasa (1997-1999), Anders Kompass (1999-
2002, and with a more moderate tone, Michael Fruhling (2002-2006) were so vocal in 
their tenure that armed forces, Congress, and government officials repeatedly accused 
them of exhibiting partiality because of their suggestions about the connivance between 
paramilitaries and the state or because of the official excess in implementing anti-terrorist 
measures (two examples of this were registered in El Tiempo, August 12, 1997 and 
Caracol, May 16, 2002).  
 In 2008, after eleven years of being in the country and while undergoing a process 
of re-structuration at the central level of the United Nations human rights system, 
OHCHR in Colombia was ostensibly lowering its profile.  The panorama I observed 
during my visit to OHCHR graphically represented the Office’s ongoing transition.  In 
that occasion, just after passing the security measures, I entered the emptied space of the 
office except for their furniture and documents packed in boxes. As I was soon informed, 
the Office was preparing to move from their current building at a highly-trafficked street 
in a commercial and residential sector in the north of Cali, to the city’s new industrial 
area in the outskirts of the metropolitan area, close to a number of corporate headquarters 
and difficult to access by public transportation.   
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 Coincidental or not, the change of location for the Cali representation fit the 
Office trend to lower visibility that had started as early as 2005. More recently, not only 
was the Office starting to prepare for the end of its mandate, in 2010, but also, as I was 
informed by a source that preferred to remain anonymous, there was a clear awareness 
that the Colombia Office demanded the highest transference of resources among all the 
human rights missions the United Nations had opened in the world, and therefore budget 
issues were being considered for the current transition.  However, another important 
consideration was a proposed re-orientation to have more cooperative relations with the 
state. Indeed, the Office registered, in the last period the relationship with the government 
had gained centrality while the ties with social organizations deteriorated.  
 In this period, the position of the Office in regards to Democratic Security was not 
one of confrontation but of respect. If particular human rights violations occurred as a 
result of the policy, the Office would take an official position, but would not publically 
question the policy as such.  An example of this occurred in 2008 when the Office 
condemned a number of cases of extrajudicial executions that were being attributed to the 
armed forces and asked that measures be taken by the national government, but did not 
claim that these cases were necessarily related to state policy. The official reasoning went 
that the presence of the Office in the country depended on maintaining existing working 
relations with the government. 
 The impending re-location of the Cali OHCHR representation as well as the 
changes in the Office orientation occurred also in the framework of major changes 
ongoing in the United Nations human rights system. Since 2006, the human rights main 
body at the United Nations went from being a Commission to a Council.  The new 
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Council was praised as being more democratic as it would monitor the human rights 
situation of all 192 United Nations member states instead of a few “problem” states.  
Despite this optimism, international human rights workers in Colombia were concerned 
that under the new system it would be much easier for states that routinely committed 
human rights violations, such as Colombia, to become virtually invisible under the 
aspirations for a democratic system effective for all members. 
 In her book on the activism and politics of human rights in Colombia, Tate (2007) 
calls attention to the production of impunity in human rights cases, which she sees as 
connected to the proliferation of bureaucratic structures that overlap in functions.  While 
this situation had not varied substantially under the Democratic Security government, 
now state security policies appeared as further connected to the international framework 
instituted after the war on terror, which expressly pushed for efficiency against terrorism 
even by sacrificing human rights. The re-structuration in the United Nations human rights 
system and the larger fact of the increasing acceptance of a security discourse that 
justifies notions like total war or war of low intensity with the purpose of combating 
terrorism were bound to produce more impunity as efficacy was privileged over human 
rights. 
 In the field, OHCHR’s lessen presence reflected on a reduction of visits to areas 
endangered by the presence of armed actors from 15 to 1 a month.  At the same time, the 
reports they received from the population during their visits also decreased.  The Office 
suspected pacts among armed actors to maintain their predominance in the area whereby 
the population was imposed a “law of silence.”  Beyond that, it appeared that the Office’s 
drastic operative change affected the precarious ties of trust they might have established 
  58  
in a community largely affected by the presence of multiple armed actors. By 2008, when 
I visited the Office, I hypothesized that their diminished access to especially rural 
populations in the area might have been responsible for the discrepancies in their 
violations reports and those presented by regional organizations.  The case of the recently 
exposed extrajudicial executions committed by members of the Colombian armed forces 
was an example of this.  As human rights organizations reported in an assembly of 
CCEEU that there was evidence of over 380 cases of extrajudicial executions in Valle del 
Cauca and nearby southwest departments of Colombia, an OHCHR extra-officially 
mentioned  that Valle del Cauca was not affected by extrajudicial executions with the 
exception of two isolated possible cases in two separate towns. 
 The politics of visibility in human rights cases were key to not only formulate 
demands for justice in particular situations, but to even recognize those situations as 
deserving of intervention.  When I asked an international human rights worker in Cali 
about their reduced access to communities in danger, the answer--“people can’t 
distinguish all the people that come in different vests every week” (referring to the 
multiple human rights groups that made sporadic presence in these areas) seemed to 
imply that it was actually unimportant who recorded the violations, or with what 
frequency. On the other hand, it is conceivable to think that the rupture of delicate ties of 
trust with communities might have been a factor affecting the registry of violations.  
Thinking of this scenario may be an explanation about why the figures of regional and 
international human rights bodies differ so drastically. 
 Despite their relative closeness in mission and fieldwork, local human rights 
organizations and international agencies like OHCHR have at certain points—as in the 
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issue of extrajudicial executions conjuncture--had radically divergent readings of the 
situation.  As the war on terror continues and security as a dominant logic remains, 
contending definitions of state violence and the proper limits of state sovereignty 
continue to be at stake.  As it appeared in Valle del Cauca’s case, the alleged 
democratization of the United Nations human rights system suggests that a modified 
politics of visibility for states’ violence and human rights is in the making.  
 As human rights violations are registered, evaluated, and categorized, the 
emergence of the security state as a central entity in the geopolitics of the war on terror 
marks the configuration of increasingly contested definitions of impunity, accountability, 
and victimization, as well as for the possibilities of intervention. CINEP (Centro de 
Investigación y Educación Popular), an important Jesuit organization for human rights 
and social research, has posed the question of what constitutes a human rights violation 
for the purpose of its report.  The definition they adopted--now applied by the multiple 
organizations that feed their “Noche y Niebla” database--proposed the criteria of socio-
political violence that is exercised by the state as the main aspect in defining a human 
rights violation6 (CINEP, 2008).  With the emergence of a securitized international 
governance, the United Nations’ evaluation and record of human rights violations gets to 
be about applying international human rights instruments inasmuch as it is about the 
                                                
6 Between 1995 and 1996, CINEP and Justicia y Paz, another organization recording 
human rights violations, led a process to sharpen and unify methodological criteria 
inhuman rights databases.  The result was a conceptual framework that addresses both 
international instruments definitions and cases of social and political violence where 
authors are unknown but where there is indication that political motivations existed.  As 
CINEP (2008) indicates, while the new conceptual framework is rigorous, it also 
addresses “the desire not to discard precarious information that manage to elude many 
censorships, pressures, fears, and deformations, but that are pointing the strategies 
through which media and justice administration apparatuses serve impunity, favoring the 
most perverse developments of the conflict.”   
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interpretations of those instruments in the face of the priorities that the war on terror 
poses: terrorist threats represented by state opponents, in the first place, and also drug-
trafficking, trafficking on people, as well as a growing and hard to determine catalogue of 
so-considered threats.   
 Under Colombia’s Democratic Security, OHCHR drew on these interpretations to 
produce a particular type of human rights monitoring.  In the case of arbitrary detentions, 
the Office expressed concern for their reliance on informants’ testimonies, but did not 
condemn the use of the informants as such.  In cases of extrajudicial executions, while 
they condemned murders by the armed forces, the cases as such were not considered as 
part of a systematic practice across the armed forces.  Also, when in 2010 social 
organizations denounced that a mass grave with the anonymous bodies of about 2000 
people buried by the armed forces in southeastern town of La Macarena suggested a 
possible new case of mass extrajudicial executions, OHCHR said that this was evidence 
of non-identified bodies individually buried but not of a mass grave, and that this 
suggested possible violations in norms to identify corpses but not extrajudicial 
executions. 
 Reading and interpreting military practices and determining whether they respond 
to systematic policies or to the “minutiae” of war has opened a largely contested terrain 
whose definition might define, perhaps, criminal responsibilities, but also, importantly, 
the contours of governance in regards to what is permitted and forbidden in the 
management of the “enemy.” State security is regularly interpellated through the 
discussion about the use of secret informants in arbitrary detentions, the norms used to 
identify and manage corpses by the armed forces, the use of rewards for armed forces 
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members for deaths and not for captures, among other aspects involved in the day-to-day 
operation of Democratic Security.  
 The opacity of state military practices and policies has been the subject of a 
continuous effort from the state to establish criteria of visibility from an institutional 
perspective. With that purpose, the armed forces have incorporated instruction on human 
rights and international humanitarian law in the military curriculum, as well as human 
rights offices within military units. With the approval of the second phase of Democratic 
Security through the 2007 Policy of Democratic Security Consolidation, the government 
introduced a policy of human rights and international humanitarian law. This Policy 
emphasized instruction on international legislation to the armed forces, and contemplated 
also internal bureaucratic structures including advisors, researchers about military 
doctrine, inspectors, an informational system of investigations, a modified disciplinary 
regime, guidelines for attending to “special populations” such as ethnic groups, unionists, 
and human rights defenders, and a strengthened system of legal advising for 
investigations against armed forces members (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2008) 
Despite this rather large bureaucratic apparatus, the prevailing narrative continued 
contemplating human rights violations by the military as individual actions of some 
“rotten apples”—problematic individuals that should be criminally prosecuted, but in no 
way the result of institutional designs or, less, a larger governance model. 
 In Cali, where figures of human rights violations attributed to the armed forces in 
2008 were rather significant (CINEP, 2008), armed forces, including the police, also 
started implementing the model of state-led human rights offices. Referred by an 
acquaintance at a local human rights organization, I made an appointment with the 
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director of the Cali Metropolitan Police human rights office.  In our conversation, I was 
struck by the officer’s elaborate language about human rights (doubtless the result of an 
intense exposure to institutional instruction on human rights) and the apparent 
assumption that the iteration of these rhetorical formulas shed light on the institutional 
dynamics allowing human rights violations. 
 Some of this rhetoric included statements such as these (I can only paraphrase as I 
was not allowed to record): “We have the material elements, but we need to be educated 
for the post-conflict”; “The ‘jungle’ course doesn’t work in civility”; “The principles of 
the National Police are those of Democratic Security”; “Security means tranquility, and 
democracy means participation”. In practice, the officer explained to me, the Police 
human rights agenda was one that emphasized educating Police officers and to explain 
this goal, he said, “We give Police officers ‘human rights pills’—what constitutes cruel 
or inhumane treatment; what is the Inter-American Human Rights Court....”  The other 
major emphasis, he elaborated, was about how the Police could itself promote human 
rights in the community. Examples of this approach included the education of youth to be 
“community police-men” and in that way promote civic-mindedness, and the 
implementation of the American Police-led program DARE, Drug Abuse Resistance 
Education, in Cali schools. 
 While it remained unclear how the aspirations to respect human rights could be 
met through some lessons of human rights-related concepts or through the promotion of 
civic values, at another point of our conversation a more important issue for the question 
about the relation between police and human rights was raised: How can we know, in the 
case of a conflict between individuals’ rights and the existing order, which of these, rights 
  63  
or order, should prevail?  The officer responded to his own question that “we always need 
to limit some rights in order to protect other rights.”  And he went on, saying “think of an 
eviction; on the one hand, you have someone’s right to housing; on the other, you have 
communities’ right to adequate sanitary conditions. If you have such conflict some rights 
will have to be limited in order to protect some others.  In the spirit of recognizing human 
rights, however undetermined this notion remained in this interview, the officer 
conceded, rights conflict should be negotiated.” Yet, as the terms of this negotiation were 
definitely not determined during the interview, it seemed to me that the problem with the 
Police and other institutional approaches to human rights discourse under security was 
precisely that the idea of human rights took a particular value as an attribute defined in 
reference to security—in itself a rather polysemic concept.   
 Analyzing human rights in the current conjuncture of imperial re-configurations 
and state authoritarianism, one could say that they can be defined by negation, or at least 
by the struggles around their observance.  In a context where those actors accused of 
being the greatest human rights violators become their greatest defenders, the reality of 
human rights (their definition and respect) seems to be more effectively formulated by 
conceiving them as a political postulate; a possibility contested in practice and an 
aspiration to be realized as an ongoing project. The presentation I have done here 
discusses how, under security, human rights are jeopardized both by their consistent 
violation and by the opacity of their definition under the changing geopolitics of security.  
In the second and third chapters I will explore the case of afrodescendant and women’s 
collectives and the meaning they attribute to human rights under the security paradigm.
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CHAPTER 2 
SECURITY AND TERRITORY: AFROCOLOMBIANS AND THE MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT OF THE PACIFIC COAST  
 
 In 1993, following the drafting of the multiculturally-oriented 1991 Colombian 
constitution, the afrocolombian communities’ claim for collective property titles over 
ancestral territories was finally attended with the approval of groundbreaking Law 70.  
Unfortunately, not long after this key legal and political victory, three related phenomena 
led to a dramatic reversal of the recent achievements.  First, the increase of paramilitary 
violence in areas surrounding economic megaprojects; second, the push, under anti-
narcotics Plan Colombia, of an illegal drugs market to areas bordering collective 
territories, and third, the escalation of the ongoing armed conflict between guerrillas and 
paramilitaries for the territorial control of these areas (Restrepo, 2010).  
 In the Pacific coast region--extending from the south of Panama to the north of 
Ecuador--murders, massacres, dissapearances, threats, and other serious forms of 
violence came to configure the "geographies of terror "7 (Oslender, 2006) that the 
ongoing wars between legal and illegal armed actors drew.  It was in precisely these 
territories that afrocolombian communities had been progressively constituting a project 
of ethnic and culturally distinctive organization whose main axis was the possibility to 
                                                
7 For Oslender (2006:161), “geographies of terror” refer to “the transformation of places 
and regions in fear landscapes with specific spatial articulations that break in a dramatic 
manner, and often unforseeable, local and regional social relations” (Author’s 
translation).  In this chapter I subscribe to Oslender’s definition and also to his important 
observation that current geopolitical discourses emphasizing terrorism against the state 
must be re-oriented to also include those technologies of terror mobilized by the state or 
other actors against local populations.     
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live and produce in ancestral territories under principles of autonomous participation and 
collective well-being. (Escobar, 2008)   
To discuss a part of this process, I will focus on the city of Buenaventura, second 
city in the Colombian southwestern department of Valle del Cauca, and a geopolitically 
strategic location uniting the Colombian Pacific north and south. Afrodescendant 
communities in the urban area of Buenaventura and in its neighboring river communities 
have undergone, as much as their counterparts throughout the Colombian Pacific 
systematic deterritorialization—the process of physically and socially expunging 
communities from the territories that they had historically inhabited with distinct ways of 
relation and regulation.   
While afrodescendants claim the territory as the physical and social space to 
recreate their identity and sociality within an ethnic and culturally distinct community, 
several related wars occurred simultaneously in this location. Largely excluded from the 
geography of the conflict, afrodescendants in the Pacific had become subject of mounting 
forced displacement towards 1996, only a few years, and seemingly at least partially as a 
reaction to the collective titulation that followed the 1993 approval of Law 70  (Escobar, 
2004).   Against this backdrop of economic development and further incorporation into 
the global economy, Buenaventura saw an intensification of the confrontation between 
right-wing AUC paramilitaries (Spanish acronym for Self-Defense United of Colombia) 
and leftist guerrilla FARC (Spanish acronym for Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia), who fought for the territorial control of areas historically occupied by 
afrodescendants.  Yet, the approval of multilateral, mainly Colombian-American anti-
narcotic, counter-insurgency Plan Colombia in 1999 marked a crucial moment for the 
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wars that were being fought in the Pacific. In this context, for the first time Plan 
Colombia began explicitly to define Colombia’s wars as being at the crux of both 
development and militarization, and the Colombian state as ensuring prosperity through 
intensive control.  
Scholars on the Colombian Pacific have presented comprehensive explanations 
about how the Pacific became a key site for development, as social movements struggled 
to maintain this territory in ways compatible with their conceptions of culture, ethnicity, 
and socio-political organization.  Escobar (1995 and 2008, especially) has extensively 
studied  the construction of the Pacific as a site of development. He suggests that 
afrodescendant communities have claimed ancestral territories to be in permanent tension 
with the state and, more recently, with illegal armed actors.   With a different emphasis, 
Asher (2009) has explained how the legal victories that allowed for the organizational 
peak of afrodescendant communities in the Pacific, mainly Law 70, were simultaneously 
a mechanism for the state to clarify the lands’ property regime as much as a conquest of 
the afrocolombian social movements. 
Although this scholarship has shed considerable light on how the state uses 
institutional discourses and practices to mediate Colombia’s insertion into capitalist 
modernity, we know less about the coercive face of this process, especially when state 
coercion is deployed not as an overtly negative exercise of repression, but rather as an 
intervention in the name of progress and development. In this chapter I will focus on the 
maximization of governmental control technologies as a means to regulate the Pacific 
coast’s insertion into the global economy and not only as an exercise of the state 
sovereign powers. I sustain that, by relying on warfare security mechanisms, the state has 
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furthered afrodescendant communities' deterritorialization as part of a process of violent 
capitalist accumulation.  Through this strategy, the state engages in the use and 
legitimation of coercive power against those perceived as security threats for the free 
market8.    
In this analysis I address the growing militarization of everyday life in the urban 
and rural areas of Buenaventura not only as a display of force from the Colombian 
government or as an act of territorial sovereignty, but as a form of population control and 
economic development (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001).  I am interested in how, by 
effecting an intervention in the Colombian Pacific, the state severely obfuscates the 
conception of the territory so central to afrodescendant communities’ experience, thereby 
leading the way to their extermination as a distinctive collective. If afrodescendant 
communities have led a struggle for the territory as a life space embodying a culturally 
and ethnically distinctive set of relations under conditions of self-determination, the 
pretension from the state to integrate this region into the global economy has necessitated 
a form of authoritarian governance.   
Though heavily strained by armed actors and their disputes for controlling the 
territory within the drug business or as part of the armed conflict, the place of 
afrocolombian communities within the territory has been largely disrupted by the state’s 
attempted mediation of these conflicts, through its ongoing project to incorporate 
domestic wealth into the traffic of economic globalization. In Security, Territory and 
                                                
8 In this point, I follow Dean’s (2002) idea that ‘liberal mentalities of rule’ are not 
incompatible with coercive governmental programmes.  To him, “governing liberally 
does not necessarily entail governing through freedom or even governing in a manner 
that respects individual liberty.  It might mean, in ways quite compatible with a liberal 
rationality of government, overriding the exercise of specific freedoms in order to enforce 
obligations on members of the population”. 
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Population, Foucault (2007: 13), reflecting on the emergence of liberalism in the 
seventeen and eighteen centuries, argues that the constitution of a territory requires not 
only that sovereign powers are exercised over such space but that there is a “spatial, 
juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the town; resituating the town in a 
space of circulation.” It is this management of circulation, of ordering anew the territory 
where the state looks to re-configure the territory as a space that articulates commercial 
traffic with the global economy; an enclave that connects but also works to rutinize and 
naturalize economic exchange. 
 In this chapter I draw on interviews I conducted with activists from Proceso de 
Comunidades Negras (Process of Black Communities) in Valle del Cauca cities, Cali and 
Buenaventura to establish the ways in which the state has effected this management of 
the circulation in the Pacific’s territories. Proceso de Comunidades Negras or PCN, by its 
acronym in Spanish is a network of organizations grouping afrocolombians living in the 
Pacific Region, and to a lesser extent, in Colombia's Inter-Andean Valleys and main 
urban areas.  Their political program rests on a threefold claim for territory, identity and 
culture or, more specifically, the search for collective territorial autonomy based on their 
political identity as afrodescendant communities. (See, among others, Grueso et. al., 
1998; Escobar, 2008; Asher, 2009) 
Through their testimonies, and in conjunction with the ethnographic work with 
human rights and women’s organizations I conducted in this region, I examine the 
process of re-configuring the territory as that space that Foucault (2007: 21) calls a 
milieu—a field of intervention over a population in its relation to the material world they 
inhabit.  As the Colombian state moves to intensify the country’s commitment to free-
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market policies, myriad measures and devices have been mobilized in order to produce 
the space required for such a project. Through the modality of government Foucault 
(1991) termed governmentality, both state and nonstate actors, from anti-poverty to anti-
drug agencies, assist in the production of the citizen, the community, and the territory 
appropriate for the liberalized space. 
 
As the case of the Colombian Pacific shows, governmentality may grow 
increasingly dependant on coercion in order to produce citizens and territories that 
facilitate the form of liberalization it pursues.  As Opitz (2010) has pointed out, “liberal 
rationality organizes the boundaries of the ‘powers of freedom’ and establishes ‘modes of 
illiberal rule’”; or, in other words, “illiberal governmentality is a potentiality of liberal 
reason” (Opitz, 2010: 94).  In this double-faced governmentality, Foucault (2008: 65) 
designates as security “the principle of calculation for (the) cost of manufacturing 
freedom”.  In the binary of freedom/security that supports liberalism, security appears as 
a mode or a technology that articulates the production of freedom with the logics of war 
(Dillon 2004). The anti-narcotics and anti-insurgency Plan Colombia was articulated as a 
chief security mechanism to mediate the liberalization of the Colombian Pacific through a 
comprehensive military ruling of the territory, in a project that is continued by 
Democratic Security policy.  
 
While repression has been a daily product of this military-led governance, in the 
following sections I want to show how security mechanisms have been instrumental to 
re-organize the territory in ways functional to larger templates of economic neoliberal 
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development.  In the second part of the chapter I will discuss the social appropriation of 
the territory as a chief deterritorialization mode under the governance of Plan Colombia 
and Democratic Security. The imposition of governmental logics that radically transfom 
spatiality and temporality for communities as well as the social uses of the territory and 
the communities that inhabit it will be examined as part of a security mechanism and as 
shaping a form of illiberal governmentality.   
 
2.1 Violent Accummulation in Valle del Cauca’s Pacific 
 
Valle del Cauca is located in southwestern Colombia, between the Andean region 
and the Pacific coast, with much of its territory in the valley of Cauca river, the second 
most important of the country. Buenaventura, the second city in Valle del Cauca and the 
largest in the Colombian Pacific, is also the main port in the country. Buenaventura is 
separated from the Cali, the department capital, by 70 miles, as well as by the western 
branch of the Colombian Andes. Valle del Cauca is home to 42 municipalities where a 
variety of economic projects unfold: The north-center is dominated by agriculture, 
mining and logging, the south, by the cane agro-business, and in a smaller scale oil palm; 
and the Pacific, by shrimp farm, timber, and  mining. The most important productive 
space in Valle del Cauca and the north border of the neighboring department of Cauca is 
the sugar cane latifundia, with its derived agro-businesses, sugar and ethanol. The other 
key economic activities are paper production through tree planting in vast mountainous 
areas of the department, industrial fishing in the Pacific, and mining of gold, platinum, 
and hydrocarbons. Illicit cultivation of coca and poppy flower have also become an 
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important part of the political economy of the region.  
Simultaneusly with these activities, economic projects have surrounded the port 
modernization in Buenaventura generating a large-scale intervention to execute a series 
of development mega-projects funded with both private and public capital.  Some of the 
main projects include infrastructure works conceived under plans of continental 
development such as the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South 
America and the Puebla-Panamá Plan.  Nationally, the most important plans are 
Arquimedes Project and the related Pacific Integral Regional Plan Initiative.  Among the 
works that are already in execution there is the Atrato-Truandó Channel—the connection 
of natural channels to communicate the bay of Buenaventura with Pacific city, Tumaco, 
through an aquatic highway or Acuapista.  Other local economic projects in the area 
include the Aguadulce Industrial Port, the Cement Harbor, the Dagua River Delta, the 
Bahía Málaga Deepwater Port, and the Port Expansion Project (Antón Sánchez, 2004).  
While the official governmental narrative about these economic projects has 
presented them as opportunities for growth and development, social movements have a 
different take, arguing that this model of economic production is the primary factor in a 
process that has led to the increasing dispossession of afrodescendant, peasant, and 
indigenous communities. Through the elimination or outsourcing of jobs and the increase 
in costs of living that ensues with the privatization of public services, as--occurred in the 
early nineties when public enterprise, Puertos de Colombia, became privatized--economic 
megaprojects are charged with provoking the pauperization of populations in their area of 
influence.  
Furthermore, afrodescendants have called attention to how privatization of public 
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services, unlimited extractive economic exploitation, and infrastructure megaprojects in 
the Pacific push communities away from the territories they inhabit, stripping them from 
the elements that identify them as communities with distinctive collective projects of 
culture, ethnicity and production. Catalyzing visions and claims of local afrodescendant 
communities, Proceso de Comunidades Negras (PCN), a network of local organizations, 
builds this discussion on a conception of political ecology that understands the territory 
as a space where not only nature but also culture, production, and social organization take 
place.  Under a vernacular, anti-capitalist paradigm of development, afrocolombian 
communities in the Pacific have struggled to achieve autonomy over ancestral territories 
within a framework of collective rights (Escobar, 2008).    
After leading a campaign for collective titling and recognition of autonomy for 
afrodescendant communities that led to the approval of Law 70 in 1993--and the virtual 
demise of this legal and political victory within the following decade--PCN links the 
more recent and systematic expulsion of afrodescendant communities to the need of 
draining the territory in a way that allows its complete incorporation into the global 
economy. The result of this forced incorporation, communities claim, is 
deterritorialization—the process of physically and socially expunging communities from 
the territories that they had historically inhabited with distinct ways of relation and 
regulation. One of the PCN activists I interviewed explained this process alluding to the 
changing interventions in the Pacific from an untouched natural reservoir to a place for 
expoitation given its economic and geostrategic importance:  
You know that for many years the Pacific has not been in the 
country's development policy; this was a place of community 
autonomy for excellence, so it was not in the map of development, 
there was not a connection between the state and society there; it 
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was very distant, if you can call it in some way. Yet, in the last 15 
years, after the whole globlization process and of seeing oceans as 
the development strategy of countries, after the influence of the 
Asian Tigers and all that happening with the global economy, there 
is an attempt to start inserting Colombia in that model. That is a 
process that occurs with no planning, in a way that was 
disconnected from the social and cultural reality of the country, 
and in this framework is that the Pacific comes to the scene… 
because this region, for many years, many centuries was a region 
of resource conservation. (Interview with Esteban) 
 
As explained by this activist, the Pacific’s forced transition from region of conservation 
to economic globalization pole has implied an active departure from earlier governmental 
agendas.  In fact, developing the Pacific towards capitalist modernity has required an 
exercise of systematic forced expropriation.  
 The role of forced expropriation in the expansion of capitalist globality has long 
been recognized. In Volume I of Capital, Marx’s investigation of early capitalist 
primitive accumulation suggests that this was exactly the trajectory that of capitalist 
formation would follow.  For him, the moment of creation of capitalism is nothing but the 
separation of the producer from the means of production through the expropriation of 
common lands and the degradation of people into conditions of servitude.  Both by means 
of physical force like conquest, enslavement, robbery, and murder (1976: 874) and also 
through the law9, capitalism inaugurated its history of violent accumulation.  In its 
current moment of accelerated global expansion, this process manifests anew by casting 
peoples out from their rights and territories. For Marx, then, capitalist accumulation, with 
its de facto and de jure mechanisms, requires the production of a dispossessed class and 
                                                
9 For instance, Marx (1976: 899) recounts that, once expelled from his land through 
violent means, the agricultural folk was forced to leave his territory and labeled as a 
vagabond.  This came accompanied by savage ways of punishment and a progressive 
disciplining that prepared his entrance into the emerging wage-labor system.  
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the maintenance of the frontiers that allows this class’ dispossession once there is a new 
productive and social order in place.   
 This process of violent accumulation transverses the history of afrodescendant 
peoples in Valle del Cauca with very concrete manifestations in the map of land tenure 
and social conflicts in the region. This testimony from a PCN activist illustrates how the 
recent labor conflicts in the regional sugar cane industry are connected with the historical 
dispossession of afrodescendants’ ancestral territories in the context of capitalist 
accumulation:  
(W)e wanted to (…) articulate the topic of the sugar cane workers’ protest, 
a labor protest, in terms of (…) work flexibilization, of misery conditions, 
but we also wanted to articulate that to the question that all those 
territories used to belong to afrodescendants.  It was afrodescendants who 
turned all of northern Cauca and south of Valle into a cultivable land.  All 
the sugar cane you see belonged to the people who were cimarrones, who 
achieved their freedom when slavery was abolished, and those jungles 
started to be cut and they started making them cultivable.  Then, when it 
starts all the interest, in the middle of the previous century, for agricultural 
production in general—first about livestocking and then agriculture, 
basically sugar cane for exporting sugar to Europa, (a process of) 
enclosure and violent expropriation starts to occur. (Interview with Nancy) 
 
This testimony points to the incorporation of the land into a regime of private property 
and the consequent dispossession of those who cultivated it.  In Valle del Cauca, the 
sustained exploitation of labor power from slavery to the sugarcane latifundia, as well as 
the extraction of resources through mining, timber, and fishing has led to similar forms of 
deracination as the region has moved to capitalist modernity.  Through a series of 
processes ranging from commodification and privatization of the land to transformation 
of proletarianization of the peasantry, establishment and protection of property rights, 
appropriation of resources, and institutionalization of credit the state leads the way to 
facilitate capitalist accumulation. (Harvey, 2004: 113)   
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 If capitalism requires a sustained exploitation of labor power and a continued 
extraction of resources in its peripheries in order to ensure its expansion (Amin, 1976), 
the Pacific has appeared in the last decades of intensified uneven globalization as a key 
geo-strategic referent, as well as a pole of biodiversity, ecotourism, and cultural diversity.  
In this context, Colombia’s re-positioning as a reliable economic partner offering safe 
juridical bases for foreign capital, abundant natural and human resources, as well as 
geostrategic advantages, has been the governmental mantra to capture foreign investors 
for these projects. In “globalizing” the Pacific, the Colombian state has developed a body 
of laws and policies that facilitate the extensive exploitation of the region by national and 
foreign corporations.  Through regulations enabling the privatization of the ports, laws 
guaranteeing property rights, a public registry to annotate and convalidate the 
transference of property, and a myriad other institutional mechanisms, the state has 
enabled while also reaping the benefits of capital accumulation.  
 Characteristic of this stage has been the construction of megaprojects or large-
scale investment project. As social geographer David Harvey (2004, 2006) writes, 
megaprojects--like the ones being developed by the dozen in the Colombian Pacific--
dynamize capitalism by absorbing the excess of labor and capital that capitalism itself 
generates.  Through fixed forms of capital such as infrastructural works, there is a 
“spatial fix” of capital that, at the same time that it might deal with issues such as 
unemployment (produced by an excess of available labor), it allows for further capital 
accumulation by generating new markets and productive capacity around this 
infrastructure (Harvey, 2006).  
 Yet, generating these new capitalist projects and private ventures--which, Harvey 
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(2004) explains, unfold as an active decision not to pursue social expenditure--requires a 
whole transformation of the physical and social landscape to allow for the re-
acconditioning of the territory within the agenda of the megaproject.  As expressed by a 
member of predominantly popular and peasant social movement, Proceso de Unidad 
Popular del Suroccidente Colombiano, “We can’t understand megaprojects only as a 
work, only as a cultive, only as mineral extraction, as degradation of nature, but as the 
conditioning of the territory, the conditioning of the population so these are functional in 
the private accumulation of capital” (Interview with Cesar).  
 The proliferation of megaprojects in the Colombian Pacific inscribes itself in the 
end of the developmental state, and comes to represent Colombia’s model of capital 
accumulation under neoliberalism.  Once a part of developmentalist economic agendas, 
the Pacific has long been a place for extractive exploitation of resources. But with the 
advent of neoliberalism, it also becomes subject to an agenda of privatization and more 
intensive extraction of resources through large infrastructure projects. In particular, with 
the 1993 privatization of the port of Buenaventura, modernization of the port has led to 
executing number projects that, according to the government rhetoric, intend to make it 
more competitive.  A deep-water port with capacity to receive larger ships; an extension 
of the port (aguadulce industrial port), and the terrestrial improved access to the area are 
only some examples of megaprojects as large, complex infrastructures that organize 
labor, capital, and consumption  (Harvey, 2006: 113). 
 The larger effects of this capital accumulation exercise have long been observed 
by various actors within the afrocolombian, labor, and human rights social movements. 
Their opposed interpretation of capital projects in itself has exarcebated the social 
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conflicts that this process is bounded to produce.  Some of these effects have to do with 
the transformation of labor conditions that some have termed the “flexibilization” of 
labor (i.e., dismantling unions, substituting full-time workers by contractors, eliminating 
social security and employment benefits, etc.).  Yet, other effects, which will be the focus 
of the remaining of this chapter, have to do with the violent deterritorialization of 
afrodescendant communities that is created at the crux of capitalist accumulation and two 
other key vectors of Colombian geopolitics: anti-drugs and counter-insurgency 
governance. 
 While the official rhetoric states that intensified extraction of resources and large 
infrastructure projects generate wealth “for all”, PCN has pointed at the ties between 
state-led capitalist accumulation, the armed conflict, and the territorial expropriation of 
communities:  
(…) In the Pacific, given its natural wealth and strategic position, 
megaprojects designed and in the process of implementation for this 
region, mobilize national and international interests that turn the armed 
conflict into a strategy of control and expropriation of collective 
territories to afrocolombians and indigenous communities through 
massacres, selective assassinations, threats and mass desplacement of the 
rural population towards Buenaventura and other urban centers (PCN, 
n.d).  
 By leading the incorporation of labor and territory into the global 
economy, the state has been a key actor in the deterritorialization of communities 
in the Pacific.  Relying on the conditions created by the conflict to solidify this 
deterritorialization, the state has aided in the everyday conditioning of the 
territory through intensive militarization.  Through the discourse of security 
provided by policies contained in initiatives such as Plan Colombia and 
  78  
Democratic Security, economic development has been connected to an agenda of 
forced re-accomodation. In the following section, I deal first with how the 
security paradigm, rooted in the geopolitics of the hemisphere, enables the state 
for afrocolombians’ deterritorialization, and, second, with militarization of the 
territory as an everyday form of executing the binary prosperity/security. 
2.1.1 A Territory in Dispute  
 Buenaventura, a city with 324, 207 inhabitants, 90% of which are 
afrodescendants, moves over 48% of the national market through the seaport it harbors 
(PCN et al, 2007). With the privatization of the port in the early nineties, the historic 
levels of poverty and marginalization grew in a dramatic way. With an unemployment 
rate of 60%, other serious social problems have increased to alarming levels (Salazar, 
2007). At a Congressional forum on Buenaventura, PCN reported municipal figures 
indicating that illiteracy among adults aged 15 reaches 17% in urban areas and 22% in 
rural ones.  This is in contrast to a national rate of  9%. In addition, 48% of school-age 
children are outside the education system, and the life expectancy is 51 years, versus the 
national average of 62.3 years (PCN et al, 2007).  
 In the shadow of these indicators, Buenaventura has become globalized, not only 
through the commercial connection with the port traffic, but also through the 
international traffic of drugs, structurally tied to the position and commercial function of 
the port (Betancourt Echeverry, 1998). At the heart of development projects, 
Buenaventura is a key geostrategic location both because of its status as the main national 
port, but also because of its positioning as a central city where the north and south Pacific 
converged—a position that subsequent state development and globalization integration 
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plans took into account (Escobar, 2008).  
 In this context, Buenaventura and the litoral became a fundamental point in the 
application of multi-million anti-narcotics, anti-insurgency Colombian-American 
initiative, Plan Colombia.  Approved in 1999, Plan Colombia substantially increased the 
military presence of army, navy and air force, historically deployed along the Pacific 
coast and in the woods, rivers, and towns neighboring the.  In total, for the first two years 
of the plan, 1,300 million dollars (Vaicius, 2002) were destined to strengthen, modernize, 
and increase the coverage of regional military structures. 
 Towards the end of the nineties, Buenaventura had became the epicenter of 
intense confrontations, as territorial struggles between armed actors in the national 
conflict—right-wing paramilitaries, leftist guerrillas and state--became more intense. 
While the local population reported that, before the late nineties left-wing insurgent 
groups were only spotted occasionaly passing through the areas they inhabited (interview 
with Esteban), by 1999 right-wing paramilitaries, who had started ravaging and 
exterminating entire communities in other parts of the country, penetrated and eventually 
became consolidated in Valle del Cauca with the so-called Bloque Calima from the Auto-
Defensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) towards 2000.  
In this way, Buenaventura and its neighboring rivers became sites of massacres and other 
serious violations such as those that occurred in the Naya River in 2001, when 
paramilitaries massacred 40 people in the community, including indigenous and 
afrodescendant, and other residents had to leave the area for fear of being killed. 
(Rodríguez-Garavito, 2009).  
 Activists I interviewed expressed that the first mass displacement of communities 
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in the Pacific had begun in Bajo Atrato, in the north part of the region, towards 1996, 
simultaneously with the beginning of discussions about the possibility to build the 
Interoceanic Canal Atrato - Truandó. Then, more than 8000 people were violently 
displaced from that area through aerial and land paramilitary incursions where people 
were intimidated through killings and threats.  Since then, events of forced displacement 
by paramilitaries moved to areas further south in Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Nariño. 
 According to figures of Departamento Nacional de Planeación - DNP (the state 
agency dedicated to national economic planning), only between 2000 and 2001 46 
massacres were reported in the Pacific coast of Valle del Cauca (Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación, 2006).  The forced displacement caused by dynamics of expulsion and 
combats in areas inhabited by Black communities has reached an approximate figure of 
1’000.000 afrocolombians fleeing from their territories (Afrodes and Global Rights, 
2007).  Often these displacements come with other grave violations, such as sexual 
violence against women as a way to control territories in the context of the war.  The 
number of homicides in Buenaventura’s urban area (797 only between 2006 and 2007) is 
also alarming (PCN, 2007), as are cases of forced disappearances, which in 2009 reached 
160 cases (2010).  In a 2007 report to the Constitutional Court PCN provided evidence of 
86 events related to the armed conflict that occurred in Buenaventura in 2006.  Among 
them, there were cases of extrajudicial executions arbitrary detentions, collective 
assassinations, among others..  The Constitutional Court, in Auto 005 from 2009, on the 
protection of fundamental rights for the afrodescendant population that has been subject 
to forced displacement, recognizes the seriousness of human rights violations in the area 
and cites, within its decision, PCN testimonies that reflect the ongoing situation.  As an 
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example of the gravity and extent of the situation the Court cites the following exerpt 
from PCN’s report: “Now, walking by Buenaventura, the traces of the war are around, 
anywhere.  Everybody knows a victim, a wounded person, a widow, an orphan, a 
mutilated police officer, a closed business, an unfinished suffering” (Constitutional 
Court, Auto 009/2009).  
 In this scenario, Plan Colombia provided a robust framework of intervention that 
would, through large-scale militarization, address both the drug economy and the armed 
conflict, two serious obstacled for Colombia’s full incorporation into the free market.  
While the war on drugs had extended for several decades then and transnational 
corporations operating in Colombia seemed to co-exist with a certain ease with the 
geopolitics of the conflict (in fact, corporations like Coca-Cola, Chiquita, and Nestle 
were proved to have hired paramilitaries to provide security for their Colombia plants), 
Plan Colombia constituted a new, mass effort to facilitate Colombia’s transition to a fully 
regularized and liberalized market.  An initiative of the Colombian government, Plan 
Colombia was quickly considered and endorsed by the United States Congress, which 
gave it a more militaristic emphasis, but still confirmed President Pastrana’s will to turn 
this initiative into a local “Marshall Plan” (2005) for Colombia’s further economic 
development.  Using the rhetoric of anti-narcotics and anti-insurgency warfare, both 
Pastrana and the United States Congress’ plans converged in the militarization of the 
territory as a way to recover the control compromised in these wars.  
2.1.2 Democratic Security: Militarization for Prosperity  
 After its implementation in 2002, Uribe’s presidential flagship policy, Democratic 
Security, followed the programmatic lead of Plan Colombia.  Like Plan Colombia, 
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Democratic Security upheld the war on drugs' free market orientation, while also laying 
out a comprehensive anti-terrorist program where national security and national wealth 
were intrinsically tied.  Yet, under Democratic Security it was apparent the growing 
articulation between risk management, military aid and market economy.  An example of 
this connection was the greater use of state security resources to guarantee multinational 
corporations' operations10, but also, as a central feature, the growing state intervention to 
facilitate the liberalization of the market.  Indeed, Democratic Security Policy stated, as 
one of its principles, “Economic development and employment possibilities are equally 
subject to the reign of a security climate that allows for investment, commerce, and the 
expenditure of municipal resources in benefit of community, which are the goal of 
permanent depredation by all illegal armed organizations” (Política de Defensa y 
Seguridad Democrática, Par. 31).  
 The use of a security discourse has been an important part of governance 
repertoires during the development of neoliberalism in Latin America (Svampa, 2007). If 
in the first phase of neoliberalization in the 1990s the state moved to economic de-
regulation and privatization of public services, in the 2000s, it prepared the terrain for a 
new neoliberal phase of corporate-led extractive-exports (agrobusinesses, mega-mining, 
agro-fuels, and infrastructure works) (Svampa, 2008) with the support of growing 
militarization.  Democratic Security provided an ideal framework to the former, second-
wave, of neoliberal reform.  While it has provided the ideological legitimation for 
corporate-led economic development, it has also facilitated the material conditions for 
                                                
10 A case of this was the use of Plan Colombia's military aid to protect companies that 
had lobbied for the Plan in the United States Congress, as it occurred, for instance, with 
the strengthening of the Army's 13th Brigade to protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas Pipeline 
operated by Oxidental Corporation (Estrada Alvarez, 2002). 
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this extractive project by conditioning the territory through the necessary legal and 
military means. In Colombia, Democratic Security became imbricated with the country's 
neoliberalized economy through its growing intermediation of the anti-drugs and anti-
terrorist programs as well as with the recognition that this intermediation would aid the 
national economy open to global markets.  
 As a policy, Democratic Security was unveiled at the beginning of Alvaro Uribe’s 
first term in 2002 as a tool to address the complex problem of drug trafficking and armed 
conflict that continued growing throughout the country. As the government formulated it, 
the policy would be a tool for promoting foreign investment by re-gaining control of the 
national territory disputed by drug traffickers and guerrillas. To that extent, social 
policies as initially formulated by president Andrés Pastrana as being at the center of Plan 
Colombia, were expresedly substituted by a more clear free market orientation with the 
support of a strong militarization. 
 Democratic Security and the larger anti-narcotics militarization operated after the 
2001 international anti-terror turn has been at the core of capitalist accumulation in the 
Colombian Pacific.  As the war on terror provided further legitimacy to Plan Colombia's 
militarized agenda, the Colombian state revamped security notions through the newly 
implemented Democratic Security Policy and its declared goal of regaining territorial 
control lost to drug-traffickers and guerrillas.  While in earlier stages of neoliberal 
economic management there was an emphasis on intervening in territories through a 
developmental, moderninzing agenda, the continuation of this project has been rather tied 
to more accentuated situations of coercion.    
 This situation of “new imperialism”, or the growing reliance on military means to 
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maintain economic and political hegemonies under a scenario of systemic crisis (Harvey, 
2004; Amin, 2001) posed a framework that under Democratic Security reunited a United 
States’ largely increased monetary, logistic, and advisory aid with the upgraded capacity 
of the Colombian armed forces.  This policy  was articulated within the dynamics of 
deterritorialization already occurring in the Pacific via the armed conflict and the drugs 
economy, incorporating a new series mechanisms to more fully effect this control. As I 
discuss in the next section, the state security policy actively led a process of territorial re-
organization that was already in progress with the long-term plans to develop, modernize 
and globalize the Pacific but that now introduced clearer regulations to govern the 
territory at a more minute scale and with an everyday periodicity.  
 
2.1.3 Territory and Racialized Militarization 
To address the regional situation while taking into account the different 
characteristics of the national territory, Democratic Security established that "the 
instruments to be employed depend on the nature of the threat. Where territorial control is 
weak, the focus will be the security forces’ actions; where control of the territory is not 
threatened, but there exists a high impunity, for example, judicial bodies will have the 
initiative" (Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática, Par. 17). In that way, in 
Buenaventura’s case, given the many threats contained in the region in regards to drug 
trafficking and to guerrilla and paramilitary presence, Democratic Security was deployed 
with all its military force in the port and also in the predominantly afrodescendant areas 
of the neighboring rivers, thus becoming one of the spearheads of the governmental 
security project.  
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Yet, as a region predominantly populated by afrodescendants and indigenous 
peoples, the military intervention in the state in the Pacific inevitably raises the question 
about the significance of race and ethnicity in the process of securitizing this territory. 
Indeed, community and scholars (for one, Almario, 2004) have used the term “ethnocide” 
to suggest that the systematic extermination and displacement undergone by populations 
in the Pacific is correlated with their claim of a distinct racial or ethnicity identity.  The 
argument that violence affecting afrocolombians connects with ideas of race and racism 
is also advanced by PCN activists, who sustain that racism has been a historical contstant 
even if it has manifested with relatively different faces.  As an activist expressed:   
The structural point is that in Colombia there is a situation of structural 
racism and everything responds to that logic.  At a time it was slavery, at 
another time it was the invisibilization of the Black community—saying 
that our territories were abandoned, that no one inhabited them, that there 
weren’t Black people in Colombia, and today is the repression and the 
attack against people. These are different scenarios but they all belong to 
a conjuncture—to a structure that is racist (Interview with Estela) 
 
 Using Quijano’s (2000)  framework of the coloniality power, the continuing 
significance  of race and racism that this activist recounts can be seen as a key 
mechanism making possible the configuration of a hierarchy between andean mestizos 
and racialized others.  By virtue of this hierarchy, afrocolombians, as the subordinated 
end in this relation, have been historically incorporated as slaves and super-exploited 
workers and more recently displaced from their territories under the modernizing agenda 
of the neoliberal state.  
 The greater impact of the war on ethnic communities has been partly explained by 
the fact that, historically, the Pacific has been represented as a territory of lawlessness 
and its peoples as in need of civilization (Almario, 2004).  Almario (2004) points out 
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how, up until the mid twentieth century, the myth of the good savage was used to 
characterize black and indigenous populations in the Pacific, yet this narrative gave place 
to the exploitation of these groups’ labor power under the idea that they possessed 
privileged knowledge about the topography and botanics of the local geography that was 
believed would facilitate the extractive economy taking over the region. 
 Underlying these views of ethnic communities as inferior or as subjects of 
exploitation, though, was the construction of black and indigenous populations of the 
Pacific and the territories they inhabited as incompatible with the modernity that the 
Colombian nation-state so decisively aimed to embrace. These representations, 
historically underlying various forms of racism, have contributed to the view that the 
Pacific should be incorporated into a project of development and modernization mutually 
benefiting their communities and the national economy as a whole.  Yet, with the 
intensification of the conflict in the nineteen nineties and first decade of the Two-
Thousands, the high numbers of displaced people from the Pacific and the extreme forms 
of violence these populations have endured suggests a different reading than the officially 
formulated at the local and national levels of the state.  Extreme violence in the Pacific 
might be read at least partially as emmeshed in the historical representations of Black and 
indigenous communities in the Pacific as uncivilized, or pre-modern. Current state 
interventions in this region rely on the racialization of the Pacific as a space that can be 
subject to forcefully participate from a model of development foreign to their ways of 
living and producing in the territory, even at the cost of the elimination and dispossession 
of its peoples.   
 While a narrative of the Pacific as in need of development has been at the core of 
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state, corporate, and development agencies intervention, (Escobar, 2008: 160) it is also 
true that race and racism have chiefly shaped the more recent securitization of the region. 
A soldier deployed from Bogotá to Buenaventura whose testimony was published as part 
of a 2007 New York Times feature on Buenaventura gave an individual yet significant 
illustration of how the Pacific is racialized in the public imagination.  The article 
transcribed the soldier’s testimony, “It’s as if we have a little Haiti within Colombia (…)  
It feels like another country”, and then continued to justapox images of Buenaventura 
with the headline “No Man’s Land” and a recount on the uselessness of Plan Colombia 
for Buenaventura given the particular ferociousness of the drug cartels operating locally 
(Romero, 2007).  With this reference to Buenaventura as a local Haiti both the testimony 
and the article play on images of blackness and otherness as requiring radical 
interventions to bring both modernity and order.  
 Reports from both Afrodes (2007) and Observatorio de Discriminación Racial 
(Rodríguez Garavito et al, 2009) have offered important statistical evidence about the 
socio-economic disparities between afrocolombians and mestizos. These reports show 
that afrocolombians not only enjoy worse health, educational, and economic conditions 
than the rest of the Colombian population, but they are also more likely to be victims of 
some human rights violations such as forced displacement. Afrodes (2007:21), for 
example, shows that between 1997 and 2007 355.629 people were displaced from towns 
where collective territories were located. The fact that a large number of afrodescendants 
have been displaced from towns with collective territories speaks not only about 
territorial struggles among armed actors in the national conflict, but also about the 
significance race plays in this confrontation.   In this sense, Afrodes notes, forced 
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displacement constitutes a war strategy against the afrocolombian population. 
 The significance of race under the Colombian conflict has also been documented 
through research on the exclusion rural afrocolombian migrants face when they relocate 
in urban areas such as Cali or Buenaventura, where they must endure conditions of 
discrimination, unemployment, lack of access to education, and residencial 
overcrowding, not to mention further prosecution or recruitment from armed groups 
(Urrea, 2002).  While the ethnic dimension of violence has been stressed in the analysis 
of the conflict (Almario, 2004; Restrepo, 2002), this research suggests that the racism 
afrocolombians undergo is a major underlying cause of their current displacement and 
victimization under the conflict, as well as a situation they must endure after such 
displacement occurs.  
2.2 The Internal Colonization of the Territory 
In what ways has Democratic Security impacted afrocolombian communities within 
the framework of economic neoliberalism and new imperialism I have presented here? 
Drawing upon Proceso de Comunidades Negras’ experiences and movement literature as 
well as on state official documents, I want to suggest that the constant and extensive 
presence of the state through its security policy has been instrumental for 
deterritorializing communities. Through its position as central regulator and possessor of 
the monopoly of force, the state has commanded--or at least actively participated in--the 
violent re-accommodation that structured Law 70 from 1993. Spearheading the multiple 
interventions that occur in this region by agents that go from the international to the para-
state level and the corporative, the state has commanded a militarized neoliberalization of 
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the Pacific.  
Analyzing the process of deterritorialization that afrodescendant communities have 
suffered throughout the last decade, PCN activists recall how not long ago the territories 
of the Pacific were a space of conservation, only touched by capital to exclude it from its 
domains. In this narrative, Law 70 of 1993, which recognized afrodescendant 
communities’ right to get collective titles over the territory has been presented as the 
elevation to law of the ancestral communities’ practice of preserving the territory 
according to their ethno-cultural principles and as an organizing tool to maintain this 
order. Yet at the same time, they pose that the model of territoriality conceived with Law 
70 of 1993 is at the core of the Pacific forced integration into the global economy.  As an 
activist pointed: 
We have an example every time we're in that state of despair… here law 70 
did not exist, and people united and created their Law 70, and no one, 
including the government, believed that blacks could create a law, that’s why 
they gave them the chance, because they never believed that they would be 
able to create a law in less than a year, and finally it was done, and when 
they reacted it was a very powerful political situation, so they didn’t have 
another way, and they haven’t had another legislative way to hide it all, then 
they do it violently; it’s what they are doing.  (Interview with Estela). 
 
This activist’s testimony coincides with Asher’s perspective (2009, 65) that Law 70 
deeply challenged the state’s neoliberal project towards eliminating goods of common 
use or any form of collective property.  Yet, as Asher (2009) also suggests, the process of 
elevating notions of sustainable development to law, as it occurred with Law 70, was 
mediated by the need to clarify property rights and to reduce land conflicts as part of the 
neoliberalization process that Colombia underwent towards the early nineties. 
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 Although popularly identified with the function of coercion, security policy has 
played a fundamental role in the insertion of the Pacific to the global economy.  By 
providing the discourse of prosperity with security, Democratic Security has re-organized 
the territory in order to facilitate the exploitation of resources by foreign capital.  
Through the armed conflict and the state’s pretension to recover the territorial control lost 
to armed actors, the state becomes a control agent that, simultaneously with its role of 
facilitating punctual economic exploitation, manages the territory in favor of an abstract 
idea of nation-hood. As the nation is conceived as having precedence over communities’ 
collective rights, the intended territorial recovery by the state becomes a way of 
dispossession of such communities via the pretended security for the nation.  
 PCN activists see how Democratic Security’s management of the armed conflict 
furthers the state positioning within the complex geopolitics of the war in a way that still 
allows it to achieve its goals of facilitating capital accumulation.  As an activist put it,   
Many times we think that the presence of guerrillas in the area—here there 
is a presence of the 30 front of FARC in Buenaventura, is a pretext for some 
actions against the people who inhabit this region, because we know that the 
Pacific region for its natural wealth generates interest for many. In this case 
for the government to manage and control, and in many cases to have the 
conditions to put natural resources under the international trade (...) Then, 
Democratic Security policy aims to create a territorial control that allows 
not to have much resistance to negotiate; in this case, the territories of 
ethnic groups. (Interview with Andrés) 
 
In the attempt to re-configure the communities’ life space as a location for capital 
production, the territory, understood as a vital space for social, productive, cultural, and 
political relations, becomes a space in dispute.   
 If, as Harvey (2006) has suggested, processes of capital accumulation are 
materially contained in the socio-ecological network of life, the territory, as a primary 
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vital space, must be the center to analyze a process as the one occurring in the Colombian 
Pacific.  As articulated by afrodescendant communities in the Pacific, the territory is a 
complex space for life and resistance, which entails losses beyond a mere place of 
residency. A PCN activist put it this way, when reflecting about the importance of the 
territory as a space in dispute: “How do you lose the territory? Not inhabiting it, not 
living in it. When you no longer live in the territory you no longer have rights over it; the 
territory is a space for you to use, dwell on it, and it is impossible to inhabit it because 
there is no law 70 (effective) anymore. In the territory everything is re-created, absolutely 
everything” (Interview with Estela).   
 In the continuation of her testimony, this activist elaborates on the situation  
afrodescendant communities in the Pacific currently face when the state announced the 
recovery of the territory lost to drug-traffickers and guerrilas.  This announcement 
implies, following the activists’ reading of the idea of territory, not only an increase in 
the state military presence, but  a whole draining of the territory.  To her, this strategy 
implies,  
to extract, to take out (…); territories become cleaned up, clean for them 
to do whatever they want because people become a nuisance to them—
“We have to take out so we can come” (is the position of the state), and 
their logic is that: To take people out of the territory, and for us the bet is 
to stay. (Interview with Estela) 
 
 As expressed in this quote, underlying the communities’ dispossession is the 
transformation of the territory into a space that fulfills functions other than hosting the 
community’s social, cultural, and productive space.  To the violent deterritorialization 
effected through the paramilitary incursions to the region and subsequent forced 
displacement of population, the state intervention has added greater intensity to these 
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communities’ deracination. Through a variety of institutional mechanisms from the 
government of the military to administrative regulations, judicial decisions, and 
legislation, the state has consolidated a form of government that extends from the 
physical control of the territory to its broader social conditioning.   
 While Afrocolombian communities from the Pacific have endured multiple and 
serious forms of violence, the territorial re-accomodation here examined is particularly 
problematic because it involves the communities’ way of life and its severe disruption 
through a ‘war management’ of their everyday life.  Taking into account the depth of this 
process, my contention is that deterritorialization of communities in favor of capital 
occurs not only through the expulsion provoked by forced displacement but also through 
the internal colonization of the territory by the state—indeed, the former should be 
thought of as a modality of the latter. Moreover, by internally colonizing the territory, the 
state both recovers territorial control of physical spaces occupied by communities, and, 
importantly, takes control of the social spaces that gave support to the communities.  
 The incorporation into global capital commanded by this strategy of control has 
occurred through minute territorial re-organizations, often focused on the smallest aspects 
of daily life. As an activist from PCN narrates, security policy  is implemented on a 
structure of daily controls ranging from food access to the militarization of the space: 
For Buenaventura’s case, Democratic Security Policy intends to restrict the 
mobility, in this case of supplies to rural areas.  For some supplies like, for 
instance, gas, boats must keep their records and receipts of what they are 
carrying, and there are also a series of searches in checkpoints.  On the other 
hand, there is the function of performing military operations in the area and 
also to generate, for the urban area, conditions that allow the functioning of 
a port society, as well as the import and export of commodities (Interview 
with Andrés) 
 
In what follows of this section, I explore the mechanisms the state uses to militarize the 
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territory and its ways to effect social deterritorialization.  Drawing on activists’ narratives 
I identify three types of manifestations of this military process and its utility to complete 
an internal colonization of the territory.  First, the physical and functional transformation 
of the territory; second, the alteration of temporal and spatial logics; and third, the 
militarization of social life. I conclude by discussing some of the effects these measures 
produce in the organizing process of afrodescendant comunities. 
2.2.1 The Physical and Functional Transformation of the Territory as a Space For Social 
and Productive Life 
 A naval base located in Bahía Málaga, 27 miles from Buenaventura, is the main 
military garrison guarding the area.  The base, built in 1982 with a loan from the Swedish 
government, had long been proposed as an alternative location to Buenaventura and its 
shallower shore (Campo, 1993).  In 2009, the Colombian and United States governments 
signed an agreement to allow up to 800 military units and 600 contractors to use Naval 
base ARC Málaga as well as six other military bases throughout Colombia (Acuerdo 
Complementario para la Cooperación y Asistencia Técnica en Defensa y Seguridad, 
2009).  Although the Colombian Constitutional Court invalidated the agreement because 
it lacked congressional approval, the Bahía Málaga basis continued being the center of 
the Pacific Naval Force and an important center for drugs and anti-insurgency operations. 
 As the institutional website for this military body announces, the Pacific Naval 
Force and its naval basis constitute the “Beacon of the Colombian Pacific Century XXI” 
as they are “the guardians of security, sovereignty, and of the development pillars of the 
region at the gates of the new millennium” (Armada Nacional de Colombia, n.d.).  With 
this imperative of securing Colombia’s future development, the naval force receives the 
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mandate of providing security for economic prosperity within the neoliberal framework 
established by Democratic Security.  
 By 2000, the Colombian armed forces prepared to receive Plan Colombia’s 
substantial military cooperation package, which would allow them to fight a “total war” 
with drug traffickers and insurgency in the middle of a whole “re-ingeneering” of its 
operational capabilities and the prospect of an extensive legislation of emergency which 
eliminated the need to observe civil liberties (Caycedo Turriago, 2002; 621).  The Pacific 
Naval Force, as well as the High Mountain Battallions that were created under the 
support of Plan Colombia and Democratic Security, operated under this framework.  Yet, 
as the testimonies of afrodescendant activists I compile below suggest, the war that was 
conducted in the territories inhabited by their communities far outdid the confrontation 
with drugtraffickers and guerrillas.  Instead, the territory itself, through the continued 
presence and command of the military and police forces, itself became the theatre of war. 
 The ways in which Democratic Security policy contributed to transform the 
territory included a radical spatial modification as well as a deep functional disruption.  
By turning Buenaventura’s space into a war zone, where inhabitants had minimal 
mobility, and by altering the productive functions of the territory, the military 
intervention produced a government of the territory that helped to operationalize the 
ongoing economic neoliberalization.  Through the physical intervention in the territory, 
not only was it possible to further secure it towards a more planned economic 
exploitation, but also, through intensified forms of military and social control, to advance 
in the constitution of an area liberated for a market economy.  In a context of social 
struggles and given the entrenched networks and mentalities knitting the fabric of local 
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communities, the militarization of everyday life became the beachhead of the internal 
colonization of the Pacific territory.  The following sub-sections illustrate some aspects 
of this process through testimonies of social organizations’ activists. 
 
2.2.2 Physical Transformation of the Territory 
 Under Plan Colombia and Democratic Security, armed forces have conducted 
intensive aerial fumigation of illicit crops and bombing of areas with suspected presence 
of guerrillas in a way that activists have seen as a “deterritorialization strategy”, given 
these operations’ long-lasting, uprooting effects.  As an activist expressed in an 
interview: 
These bombs thrown at the communities were really combined with aerial 
gliphosate aspersions, where what we were able to see was that, effectively, 
illicit crops were not being fumigated, but that what they were fumigating 
were the people, they fumigated communities, in a perfect strategy of 
deterritorialization, of displacement.  Then, after all these situations, but 
also because you know that illicit crops are the most profitable business in 
the world, armed actors start also coming down and get stationed in these 
territories.  So, communities are being pushed in two fronts: On the one 
hand, illegal armed groups, such as guerrillas and paramilitaries, and on the 
other, state pressure, through the armed forces; the army, the air force. 
(Interviw with DG)  
 
 Anti-narcotics militarization has contributed to this deterritorialization strategy in 
various ways. As the communities have repeatedly denounced, Plan Colombia has 
produced a displacement of coca crops from its initially targeted departments in the south 
and southwest to the Pacific, creating the need for new interdiction activity in the Pacific 
area, as well as an important re-population of the area with growers and entrepreneurs 
that look for new business venues. The intensive aerial fumigations that have followed 
the emergence of the Pacific as a cultivation area have drastically affected the subsistence 
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agricultural equilibrium but also, as they hardly discriminate licit and illict crops or water 
sources, inhabitants’ physical integrity (PCN and Afrodes USA, 2010). 
 Legally, the threat to expropriate parts of collective territories where any drug 
trafficking-related activity occurs has been considered as a possibility under the national 
anti-narcotics regulations, yet communities, invoking the International Labor 
Organization Convention 169 and the United Nations 3rd World Conference against 
Racism, have argued that collective territories constitute an imprescriptible, inalienable 
unit, or, as a PCN activist put it, “you can’t expropriate a little portion; you expropriate 
all the title”.  As such, PCN has deemed that legally-backed expropriation of the territory 
claimed by the state as a way of re-gaining territorial control under the conflict appears as 
a mechanism to “advance an economic model that doesn’t have anything to do with the 
communities’ project” (Interview with Esteban).  
 Bombing of territories where guerrilla presence is suspect has also become a 
regular tactic under Democratic Security.  According to activists’ testimonies, marines 
brigades conduct so-called "sweeps", which consists of bombings by the headwaters 
between two and three times a year.  Since these bombings occur in collective territories, 
it is difficult to discriminate their target. In some cases it has been reported that rural 
work zones have been affected by the bombings and that explosive devices remain 
unexploded, representing a serious risk for residents. As an activist states, bombings 
target the territory both as a place to inhabit, but also as a productive space for the 
community to use: 
Every time it is decided to bomb one of the areas here in Valle del 
Cauca’s Pacific you find from south to north the Naya River, the 
Yurumanguí the Cajambre, Nadal, Raposo, Anchicayá, Dagua, Calima 
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and San Juan Rivers. The southern rivers. All these areas are populated 
and you find that in each river there are several towns, but all this 
mountainous area is for the use of the community, that is, it is not 
populated, but it is the area where one has the farm, agriculture, where 
one goes to pick bananas, papachinas and also goes fishing and hunting 
animals, the whole area is an area for the community’s usufruct. With 
any of those areas (used for) bombing to look for FARC, (what is being 
done is) bombing people; people’s work areas. (Interview with Andrés). 
And then, on these tactics’ potential to displace: 
(W)hen those bombings occur, people have to leave their work area 
towards other villages.  It’s impossible to work because anything that 
moves in that work area is supposed to mean guerrilla presence (…) So, 
one of the things that affect us are bombings to collective territories, 
which happen constantly.  This represents a displacement from our work 
areas (Interview with Andrés). 
Also, with less drastic measures than bombs, but rather via the limitations to freely enjoy 
the territory, similar results of rendering it worthless for productive and community 
benefit have been achieved.  An activist from the northern Cauca area narrated how it is 
not necessary to physically expel communities from the territory to make it impossible 
for them to subsist in it.  By limiting the possibilities to use the territory in ways that 
allow for subsistance, the war on insurgency further creates situations of insecurity.  
According to the example she provided: “(P)eople who do artisanal (mining) need 
gunpowder to be able to have their work done, but they are not selling gunpowder to 
anyone.  Then, people are being led to a situation of food insecurity, of not having any 
economic resource” (Interview with Nancy).  Yet, invoking the security of the nation, the 
anti-narcotics and anti-insurgency militarization has also involved everyday securitization 
of the territory that make the effects of this intervention deeper. 
2.2.3 Alteration of temporal and spatial logics 
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 Altering communities’ ancestral ways of relating with the territory as well as 
imposing spatial and temporal logics on them is a part of this deterritorialization process. 
Examples abound and have to do with diverging conceptions of the territory for both the 
state and communities.  A PCN activist illustrates this by stating, 
The problem is that there is a reality that has been going on for over 400 
years here in the Pacific. Here people come at any hour of any of the rivers 
and then leave; people don’t use radio communication, all those things 
tourist boats use, for example; that’s where the first conflict began. (The 
fact) that whoever was going to sail had to have all the equipment required 
for shipping at the national level.  So for a fisherman who goes out and casts 
his net and draws his fish for house consumption… when will he be able to 
buy all that equipment? So, the conflict began there, with the Port 
Command. (Interview with Andrés). 
 
Or, as in this case, where the clash is between the military temporality and the sense of 
time dictated by the community’s productive needs:  
In Buenaventura’s case, all these areas you see here are surrounded by sea; 
their productive activity is fishing.  They leave in their little boats to fish 
and they have their houses on the rivers’ and mangroves’ sides, and here 
the time to leave is not defined by the clock but by the tide (…) Then, 
there is a restriction here imposed by the second Brigade, and the Port 
Command, that here in Buenaventura boats cannot enter before 6 a.m. and 
boats cannot leave before 6 am. So, that contradicts the nature of our 
peoples’ productive activity here because people are used to getting up 
early. So if at 4 am the water is high, I leave at this time, because if I stay 
until 6 am I cannot leave anymore because the water goes down, because 
it was low tide. Or if I come from any of the rivers and at that time the tide 
is high, I have to leave at that time because if I have to wait until the hours 
established by the military authorities, I have to stay outside, running more 
risks (Interview with Andrés). 
 
In the case of fuel limit regulations in the context of drug interdiction there is one more 
example that makes it further evident how the militarization of the territory not only 
facilitates its physical transformation but its dislocation as a life-space for communities 
through the imposition of foreign logics:  
There is a resolution, the 014 from the Anti-Narcotics Direction that applies 
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in (...) Buenaventura, Tumaco, and other towns in the Pacific region. The 
boats that travel cannot load more than 55 gallons of gasoline (...) Then the 
restriction of gasoline is because there are laboratories (for cocaine 
production); that did not exist before, but now they produce the base here 
(...) So that’s what the restriction is for, but why does this affect us? For 
instance, me, I am  from the Naya River, one of the rivers of Buenaventura. 
If I leave on a boat from here to my house, if I want to return, I have to 
spend about 170 gallons of gasoline. And there are communities that are 
more distant than from where I am. Then the restriction is created by many 
people who do not know the Pacific. We think it is created from the point of 
view of a reality—that of cars, because I put a gallon of gas in a car and 
(with that I) go two, three kilometers, but the outboard motors are another 
reality. (Interview with Andrés). 
 
 Administrative acts, resolutions, and decrees in these cases constitute 
technologies of power that, by establishing a course of conduct for the population and 
certain logics for its everyday operation, facilitate the constitution of a political economic 
order other than the one ancestrally directing communities.  While administrative 
regulations are not new state mechanisms, its articulation with a larger governmental 
scheme to transform populations and territories functional to capital accumulation and 
free market leaves them in a privileged position for, in a quotidian, permanent fashion, 
command the minute functioning of the territory.   
2.3 The Militarization of Social Life 
 One of the most outstanding features of territorial government under the security 
paradigm is the militarization of social life.  This means that organizational, functional 
and ideological structures of the military substitute those of civilian authority, 
reconfiguring the state-citizenship relation as one of hierarchical command, enemy 
neutralization, and subordination of material rights to formal rules. If by virtue of the 
unequal development characteristic of the world system urban core countries’ urban 
space control occurs through architectural security technologies and electronic 
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surveillance administered under the mechanism some have called the militarization of 
public space, (Davis, 1992) under Valle del Cauca’s application of Democratic Security 
we can see a militarization of life through the pervasive and commanding presence of the 
armed forces.  As a force display, military territorial government is daily verified with the 
conditioning of the territory as a theater of war.  For example, as stated by a human rights 
worker in the towns of Cisneros and Queremal, nearby Buenaventura: 
(I)n the framework of the accompaniment (to the community) we 
(monitored) the presence of the armed forces and we (analyzed) how to 
(…) look (at) the institutional in that area in order to reduce the actions 
from the armed forces, that were very strong at that time.  The police had a 
firing range in that zone, so they were shooting every day, they carried on 
bombings, supposedly training their troops, but if this is a conflict zone, 
where there is guerrilla presence and also paramilitary presence, which 
worked jointly with the police and with the army, then how are they going 
to have people in such fear; people were thinking there were combats all 
the time and also in the middle of all that, a peasant or any person 
appeared dead around there; that was a zone of throwing corpses, so it was 
a very hard time and also, besides (mass) detentions, this situation was 
occurring.  (Interview with María) 
 
 This transformation of the territory into a space with the physical characteristics 
of a combat zone occurred in tandem with the ordering of the population under criteria 
functional to military needs. Through censuses and information requirements to the local 
population, and also with the expectation that they act as informants for military forces, 
communities were subject to permanent management and ordering.  This situation was 
presented in the following account of a human rights activist in an area nearby 
Buenaventura:  
As there is a permanent presence of the police and the army, the army is 
always conducting a registry, updating the census, and fingerprinting men, 
especially when they leave the mines, as they leave their job and pass a 
checkpoint the police fingerprints them and take their pictures. Sometimes 
the police arrive, the narcotics police is around that area a lot, and they 
come to the houses to ask if guerrillas have been around, who live there; 
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they tell people that they are going to have a campaign about anything, then 
they take everybody’s names, from the youngest to the oldest. And 
especially, they ask about the men… where they are, where they work… 
(Interview with María) 
 
 Although in its justification of the security policy the government has argued that 
this is not a new form of national security doctrine--where borders between the state and 
citizen are blurred--the de facto territorial government carried out by the armed forces in 
Valle del Cauca reveals a different narrative. It seems clear that the state aspiration is to 
provide security to citizens but only to the extent that they become a part of the state 
security apparatus.  Such a security model has notorious effects on social life, not only to 
the extent that the military organizative and functional structure becomes elevated over 
the social organization existing in the territory, but also because the values present in the 
military ethos acquire a place and a significance amplified by the character of maximum 
territorial authority that troops have in this model. 
 As part of the military government and following the legacy of counter-
insurgency struggle established with the Alliance for Progress between Colombia and the 
United States during the cold war, the militarization of the social does not only occur in 
regards to the military but it also assumes a pseudo-civilian form through the so-called 
civic-military actions.  As illustrated with the following testimony, even when there is not 
a manifest military urgency, a pseudo-civilian structure is deployed in order to execute 
the intervention, and with it, the hierarchy underlying this operation is conveyed: First, 
the military, then, in a much lower level, civilians, and, at the end, degraded to animal-
status, women:  
(...) We fought a lot (with the commander of the High Mountain 
Battalion No. 3) because what he did was to generate terror in the 
population, and then he came with the famous civic-military actions. So 
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first came the arrest, prosecution, taking pictures; treating women as 
“bitches”, in literal terms, then he arrived with his troops to talk with 
leaders, he summoned them to the headquarters of the battalion and 
organized the civic-military actions. This was to bring hairdressers, to 
play football with the army, to bring doctors and groceries. Then we 
were able to avoid that several of these happened. (We said) well, what is 
this? First he comes and threatens people, and then he comes to generate 
a worse situation in the population because if there is movement of the 
insurgency here, simply with a civic military action what will happen is 
that the civilian population becomes a military objective of both the army 
and the insurgency, so we asked them to respect that. (Interview with 
María) 
 
 Civic-military actions have been an important vehicle in attempting to channel 
communities’ discomfort with the militarization of the territory, superficially addressing 
some of the basic material needs of the population without providing a stable structure to 
appropriately provide theses services in a stable and reliable manner.  In addition, civic-
military actions contributed to the militarization of the territory by its tendency to 
override the existing community organizational resources and substitute it with a 
hierarchical, unilateral definion of public administration priorities. As a human rights 
activist pointed out, “(…) there have not been clashes with the insurgency in the area, 
only with the civilian population, then after generating all that situation, civic-military 
actions started. And civic-military actions started precisely because of the demonstrations 
generated within the population. Then immediately it was not the mayor, but the high 
mountain battalion commander who went to talk directly with the community” (Interview 
with María). In this case, military commanders substituted the autonomy reached by the 
communities in providing self-government as the needs of the war overrode the mayor as 
a civilian authority and also the community councils or other authorities defined by the 
communities.  
 Yet, highlighting the role of the military as pseudo-civilian authority cannot 
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obscure its strong repressive orientation and heavy emphasis on control.  One example is 
how, as the military authority takes on a governance role, sectors usually considered as 
dangerous become further securitized as potential threats to the social order underlying 
the war.  The youth, for instance, under the logic of permanent threat, have passed from 
being considered unfit or immature to being potential criminals or insurgents, as they fail 
to meet the official expectations of collaborating with military authorities. The 
criminalization of the youth is consistent with a growing punitive approach towards 
citizens that fail to conform to the expectations of such governance model.  An activist 
with Proceso de Comunidades Negras offered a valuable testimony in this regard.  In her 
words: 
In these raids done by the authorities, the military came and there was a 
group of youngsters playing on the (soccer) field… since these 
youngsters don’t have tennis shoes, they don’t have anything, then they 
play in shorts, barefoot in a mud field. They (the military) came and (the 
youths) were just playing soccer. They took them to the precinct, 
fingerprinted them, and after that, they left them sleeping in there as if 
they were criminals, and that was it; the next day it was necessary to 
push for them to be released (…) And you hear a mother say—See? I 
told you to stop standing on that corner and going to that field… When  
this child has every right to go there! (Interview with Estela) 
 
 The testimony continues questioning the way in which the everyday life of 
Buenaventura communities is continuously shaped through surveillance and policing that 
warn the population that they are living under a state of exception and therefore are 
subject to any form of preventive monitoring.  As the youth appropriate public spaces for 
entertainment or socializing, and to the extent that by virtue of their age they might 
exercise a limited citizenship to demand the protection of their rights, they are easily 
turned into dangerous subjects or criminals after the account of military authorities: 
Young people have lost the right to social mobility. If they are in the 
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neighborhoods, for example in the San Francisco neighborhood, which is a 
very tough area, and if they are on a corner they can be abused, they can 
be thrown into a car, and anything can happen to them and they have no 
right to claim, say or demand anything because it is state policy; we are in 
a state of siege.  Then, he can’t claim, he can’t do anything… one, as an 
organization, can’t do anything… that is the way in which they control, to 
provide security, then one cannot do anything. (Interview with Estela) 
 
Yet, while there is a selection of dangerous groups, security policy has limited 
possibilities to discriminate the destinataries of its action, as one of its conditions of 
efficacy is to be thoroughly displayed throughout all of the territory.  As stated by an 
activist: 
Democratic Security policy aims to dismantle FARC, or rather, insurgent 
groups.  The problem is that those insurgent groups are rural, there’s no 
way to attack insurgent groups that leaves peasants on the side (…) How 
are they going to take FARC outside Raposo river? They can say—we 
bomb the Raposo, but the Raposo is full of people.  So, for us, in all this 
policy those who suffer the most are the country’s peasants.  (Interview 
with Andrés) 
 
 These testimonies suggest that security draws on efficiency criteria and on a type 
of governance that, unlike the law, targets entire populations through a general threat or 
expectation of repression, and not only punishes specific individuals. Concomitantly, 
repression of the population can carry with it the negation of any recognition to the 
collective’s social, political or cultural identity.  For the case of northern Cauca, an 
activist narrated an episode when the national government, in violation of national and 
international legislation, started building a maximum-security prison in afrodescendants’ 
ancestral territories without consulting the community: 
(...) The community did not know there existed (the obligation of) a 
previous consultation (with the community to build a prison in a 
collective territory) (…) So when by chance we met, I said, you need to 
use the consultation, then we started the whole process, it was sent to the 
Ministry, but the paradox of this situation is that the Ministry responded 
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that there is no black community; how are they going to say that there is 
not a black community when there is one? Then the process continued 
and what they argued was so absurd because a man came from the 
Ministry, from the direction for community affairs (...) So what (he) said 
was that in the grid where they were building the prison, there were no 
black communities. So, how can this be? Did we have to kill ourselves 
(to prove that we existed)?  This is the ancestral territory where they 
have lived for centuries, it belongs to the black community. We fought 
for it until it was recognized that there was a black community. 
(Interview with Nancy) 
 As  expressed by Nancy in this part of our interview, security needs as those 
expressed in the building of this prison have been put forward to selectively recognize the 
existence of afrodescendant communities in a way that effectively dispossess them from 
the territory and negates their existence as an obstacle for further implementing security 
measures. 
2.4 Effects of the Militarization in the Organizative Process 
As it consolidates, the logic of security and the subsequent militarization has 
affected the structures of solidarity within communities. A PCN activist summarized this 
process of growing mistrust and weakening of social ties under the armed conflict by 
stating, 
(…) There is a great impact (…) mistrust is one, weakening of people’s 
values is another (…) You can’t be in solidarity in those conditions, because 
if the neighbor’s son was killed (…) and he wants to claim his son (in the 
forensics office) there’s no other neighbor that joins him because he knows 
that he is going to also suffer the consequences.  Or if he’s going to have a 
wake, no one will be with him for this.  Then the sense of solidarity, all the 
existing ties, that had allowed life in community aren’t possible today 
because they have been cut.  (Interview with Estela) 
 
 As political, financial, and logistical ties between elected officials and members 
of the armed forces, on the one hand, and paramilitary groups on the other, have been 
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revealed in multiple judicial investigations (see, for instance, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights 2006 sentence in the Ituango massacres), communities experience 
increasing mistrust and fear in their interactions with state representatives, especially 
when such interactions put them in evidence with other possible armed actors.  In order to 
avoid reprisals, communities and activists adopt silence or codes that protect them in this 
uncertain terrain.  As an activist explains:  
People impose self-limitations, one has to self-limit in what one says 
because one can’t talk as one normally does it, or the way one should talk, 
but rather one has to try to mask data, mask words because you never 
know who is that person, or if this woman is the aunt of who knows what 
person, and also people don’t say things because they are afraid.  Because 
he knows that she is the aunt of some given person and even if it’s not 
something that interests her, he’s not going to say it because she’s that 
other person’s aunt. (Interview with Estela) 
 
 Underlying this process of social de-stabilization is what an activist names as 
“Pedagogy of War” or the more or less organized set of practices and messages that 
provide a horizon of what is possible or not in the context of the armed conflict—a type 
of ethos supported on an economy of destruction which is forcefully imposed by all 
armed actors, included the state armed forces, as a condition to gain control of the 
territory and its communities.  As this activist put it, 
(…) people are prepared and they understand that there are some things 
they should do and others that they shouldn’t, what I call the pedagogy of 
war. They have taught people that war is displacement, that it is 
massacres, tortures, murders and then through the war they teach people 
that they cannot continue living as they have always lived because if they 
don’t leave, they can be massacred, dismembered, chopped, whatever they 
want to call it… tortured, disappeared. Then within the methodology they 
use, which is displacement, which is massacre, torture, there is the 
pedagogy that is chopping them with cruelty, to be taught, if they speak, 
what can happen is this… so they learn in the framework of this pedagogy 
of war (Interview with Estela). 
 
 As this activist explains, within this climate of intimidation, communities are 
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taught by regulation, intimidation, and coercion against the option of collective work.  As 
another testimony suggests, a result of this pedagogy is that initiatives to organize the 
community have been particularly affected and the possibility of continuing to develop a 
political project undermined.  The consequence of this situation is, as this activist 
explains, the prospect of the physical and social elimination of the communities as they 
had existed in the territory: 
Because I tell you that some times guerrilla becomes a pretext, because 
one knows about the interest of weakening organizing processes.  That is 
to say, every time there is an event in one of our towns and a displacement 
is generated, the community organization weakens. This organizational 
debility does not allow to resist and to project the territory, which is a 
space of life, in the case of Black communities.  In Colombia the reason 
for a community to exist is that it has a territory where it can exercise its 
tradicional practices, its cultural practices, its practices of production, 
everything.  When a Black community ends up without a territory, it’s just 
one more individual, it becomes nothing, it loses autonomy, it loses 
everything  (Interview with Andrés).  
 
 The relative precision of this pedagogy and its consequent deterritorialization is 
established in a testimony that compares the Valle del Cauca Pacific port area to the 
Andean, agricultural department south: 
Here (in northern Cauca and south Valle del Cauca) restrictions to 
mobility are not an official thing (as in Buenaventura), that is, a police 
officer doesn’t tell you but in practice it exists.  Because corpses appear 
everywhere (…) so people don’t get out.  Mainly, there is not an explicit 
law but that it is implying that people don’t move around as freely as 
before.  Then, in some way, it’s as if we were in this territory but it wasn’t 
ours (…) Here the problem is mobility but through terror, people are in the 
territory but they don’t own the territory.  In the past, people walked out at 
1 a.m., at 10 p.m., now they know they can’t do it, even if there’s not an 
order, which is different from what happens in the Pacific.  “You don’t 
move from this to that day, nobody leaves”.  They haven’t gotten to that 
type of order.  Then it’s not said explicitly but if you do it, you die, so they 
don’t have to tell you (Interview with Nancy). 
 
 This testimony establishes how militarization in the Pacific, beyond the multiple 
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paramilitary terror campaigns from the last decade, has consolidated with a set of 
mandates and regulations that have normalized the existence of restrictions in mobility 
and use of the territory.  
 On the other hand, incentives and subsidies from the state are the counterpart of a 
pedagogy of war as they intend to create a climate of obligatory consent. An activist 
rightfully exposed this situation stating: 
Yes, there is a strategy that has generated a lot of benefits for them (…) it 
is the question of Families in Action, Youth in Action, Mothers in Action 
(programs).  (Governmental agency) Social Action has made possible that 
what the government has to give as an obligation, can be disguised as the 
government’s great kindness, in a state that never has given anything to 
anybody (…) now with seventy thousand pesos (35 dollars) that an elderly 
person receives that is (seen) as a great wonder, so I think that Social 
Action’s strategy has favored the (government’s) popularity and if you ask 
people if violence has decreased or not, (if) the threats (have lowered) or 
not, people will not answer yes or not; they don’t have elements to say yes 
or no because they are living in a space of general terror (Interview with 
Nancy). 
 
 The progressive erosion of the collective consciousness converges with the 
dispossession of autonomy to decide about the conflict to aggravate the position of the 
organizative process. An activist evaluates the situation observing: 
Because communities were able to manage the situation for a long time, that 
is, the relationship with the armed actors, communities were able to limit 
the mobility of each of them in the territory.  Then, for instance, armed 
groups didn’t reach the urban areas because they had to be at a certain 
distance; at a distance from populated areas, community centers; all that 
strategy designed by the communities themselves.  What Democratic 
Security policy did was to bring the different armed actors to function in the 
communities, pressuring community leaders… everybody, so they (armed 
actors) operate (exclusively) under their (own) logics (…) (Interview with 
Esteban). 
 
 As these testimonies illustrate, deterritorialization has included the physical and 
social dispossession of the territory.  Stripping communities of their political autonomy to 
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organize the territory furthers this process as maneuvering powers to deal with armed 
actors are also de facto eliminated. 
 2.5 Collective Rights, Human Rights, and Resistance Strategies 
 While deterritorialization continues in the Pacific, the testimonies of PCN 
activists also speak to the potentialities of long-term organizing processes.  As economic 
projects continue developing and military control maintains a hold on the Pacific, 
existing social mobilization projects such as those structured around PCN provide a 
framework for negotiating the ongoing violence.  A PCN activist offered the following 
story, which occurred in a northern Cauca town in 1998, to illustrate the immediate risks 
the community confronts as a result of the ongoing process of violent accumulation, as 
well as the type of grassroots resistance that it has been mobilizing:  
(The company was) drawing soil samples (…) and the (community) went 
and asked what was going on there.  They said they were taking samples 
because they were from (company) Aguas de Barcelona and they wanted 
to examine the hydric resources from the region. So people asked them, 
well, where’s the authorization?  And they didn’t have anything (…)  
Then they threatened them and since the community wasn’t scared, many 
women faced this and the community told them—“if you don’t leave, we 
throw this into the river”.  And those machines, that are very expensive… 
then those guys got scared and left, but three months later paramilitaries 
arrived, so one starts making connections (Interview with Nancy).  
 
 This situation illustrates the vast obstacles that communities at the center of 
neoliberal globalization face, but also the type of consciousness and tactics they have 
been able to develop to guarantee their survival.  In the Pacific, the imminence of 
deracination jointly sustained by legal and illegal armies has led social organizations to 
persist in a strategy of collective rights based on their cultural and political identity as 
afrodescendant peoples (Rosero, 2002).   
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 As PCN activists insist, collective rights constitute a relational category that 
implies both afrodescendant communities and the larger Colombian society as being both 
part of an aspiration for pluralism and equality, and not only as a unilateral claim for a 
discrete group.  As an activist pointed: 
When we talk about collective rights we are not only defending the 
territory of black communities.  We are defending the right to the territory 
of all the Colombian people.  We are guaranteeing food autonomy, the 
right to food of all the Colombian people, because there’s where food 
comes from. People don’t understand; they say, “you (afrocolombians) are 
talking and struggling among yourselves”, and we say no, water is a public 
good, and if we (…) denounce the situation that is occurring in the low 
Anchicayá, with the dam (…), we are making evident what is happening 
here because Anchicayá’s water doesn’t supply only Buenaventura… I 
understand that even Europeans are drinking that water, so we don’t (use) 
an individualistic perspective.  For us, it has to be collective because it is 
the conception that exists. I told them yesterday, you can have anything, 
might be very rich, but if at any point you have to walk by a corner and 
you see marginality, you will live it and may even be robbed there.  Then, 
you (…) have to think of yourself after the collective because the 
individual depends on the collective.  (Interview with Estela) 
 
 As stated by this activist, collective rights as proposed by PCN are, too, rights for 
all. In this understanding, collective rights are also connected with human rights, as a 
broader platform providing elements for survival within the ongoing deterritorialization.  
 At one level, communications and reports from afrocolombian organizations to 
international bodies locate human rights violations against communities within the 
framework of international obligations of the Colombian state infringed either by action 
or omission (for instance, PCN n.d. b).  Yet, afrocolombian communities have also used 
human rights in the larger regional and national map of human rights activism and against 
militarism and securitization.   
 Using human rights within larger activist arenas makes it evident that there are 
discursive and practical challenges that may collapse with the needs of the community as 
  111  
a distinct group. The human rights public hearing sponsored by the national 
Congressional Human Rights commission in 2006 was an example of this.  In this case, 
after denouncing serious human rights violations in the context of the hearing, 
afrodescendant communities were wary not because they did not know about these cases, 
but rather because for the first time they were openly exposed. With this action of 
disclosure, strategic silence as a key survival within the dynamics of an armed conflict 
was disrupted.  Despite the general success of the hearing, this exercise made it evident 
that democratic institutional arenas where human rights are invoked, do not necessarily 
coincide, in its enunciative possibilities, with those communities enjoy.  In these different 
registers of violations, various definitions of human rights seem to be at work. The risk 
communities face at assuming the open, impersonal language of the law instead of the 
coded, place-based vocabulary of the war eventually has materialized in equally serious 
but less visible violations, like the growing ones that ended with forced dissapearances. 
 Still, simultaneously invoking collective rights and human rights, PCN has strived 
to guarantee the communities’ survival.  In interviews I conducted with PCN activists, 
they summarized some of the strategies that they implemented with the ongoing crises11. 
Among others, they mentioned guaranteeing food autonomy by maintaining food 
deposits that could be used in case of blockages or combats that impeded people to access 
crops, and establishing safe places to re-locate groups trapped in a point of the 
confrontation. Also, one of the chief strategies was to resist drawing on cultural elements, 
especially in what referred to maintain both cultural manifestations as well as continuous 
                                                
11 These measures were first accorded in the First National Meeting of Displaced 
Afrocolombians celebrated in 2000. Escobar (2004a), Antón Sánchez (2004), and Rosero 
(2002) discuss some of the proposed alternatives.  
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dialogue to avoid a psycho-social chaos in the middle of armed confrontation involving 
elements of the community. Politically negotiating with armed groups at some point 
facilitated too the continuity of the communities in the territory, although in some  failed 
negotiations the results included even the assessination of leaders or community 
members.  Finally, and not less important, a strategy of everyday resistance involved the 
so-called “early alerts” to official institutions whenever the community foresaw combats, 
paramilitary incursions, forced displcements or other threatening events. 
2.6 Neoliberal Governmentality and the Anti-Drugs/Counter-Terror Continuum 
 
 
 Foucault's (1991) concept of governmentality refers to the way governments try to 
produce the citizen best suited to fulfill those governments' policies within a framework 
of market liberalization. As the following phrase pronounced by a US State Secretary in 
an anti-drugs summit in Bolivia suggests, the war on drugs has been one of the best 
mechanisms to, domestically or internationally, achieve such “conduct of conducts”, as 
Foucault would describe the exercise of governmentality.  According to the official, 
“Ultimately, self-government in the political sense depends on self-government in the 
personal and moral sense … A person must say ‘‘no’’ to drug abuse or eventually he will 
say ‘‘no’’ to life. A nation must say ‘‘no’’ to narcotics or eventually it will say ‘‘no’’ to 
democracy” (cited by Corva, 2008).  This phrase expresses how the war on drugs has 
been instrumental for spreading national, international (Hindess, 2004), and transnational 
(Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Ong, 2006) governmentality towards consolidating 
neoliberal globalization.  
 An example of international governmentality facilitated by the war on drugs is how 
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the United States-led anti-drug agenda has portrayed drug-traffic as an impediment for 
countries to join the free market given the lack of clear conditions for foreign investment 
to compete in “narcotized” economies.  As a result, a series of bi-national governmental 
technologies has been implemented (development assistance, fumigation, electronic 
surveillance, etc.), with the ultimate goal of turning countries like Colombia from “narco-
democracies” to modern, open-to-the-market business partners To the extent that such 
governmental power draws on the market as its propelling force, it can be characterized 
as an exercise of neoliberal governmentality (Harvey, 2006 and 2007; Dean, 1999; 
Hindess, 2004).   
 Using this framework, we can say that 1998 multimillion anti-drug, counter-
insurgency Colombian-American initiative, Plan Colombia, constituted a prime example 
of neoliberal governmentality.  This is so first because while Plan Colombia was initially 
conceived by the Colombian government as an economic and social aid package for rural 
populations, under the war on drugs' liberalizing agenda it became a militarized anti-
narcotics, counter-insurgency program aimed to insert Colombia in the free market 
economy. (Vaicius, 2002). Second, Plan Colombia became a surrogated national 
development plan to serve the interests and profitability of corporations and their 
domestic allies in accordance with the International Monetary Fund economic adjustment 
measures such as state diminished intervention through reduction in public expenditure 
and increased indirect taxation (Estrada Alvarez, 2002).  Third, anti-narcotics programs 
themselves became heavily privatized through sub-contracted surveillance and military 
advising services.   
 At the same time, as an eminently coercive enterprise that involved the large-scale 
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militarization of territories in the Pacific, Plan Colombia displayed a form of illiberal 
governmentality (Hindess, 2004; Dean, 1999). As Opitz (2010; 107) states, in relation to 
illiberal governmentality: “Liberalism not only exhibits a de-territorializing vector, but 
also moves towards re-territorialization.  It aims not only at enabling circulation, but also 
at securing and regulating such mobility”. As shown in this work, the application of 
Democratic Security Policy and of its predecessor Plan Colombia constituted forms of 
illiberal governmentality as they aimed to manage, discipline and coerce those opposed to 
the commodification of the territory or to its cesion for the designs of the global 
economy.  However, the function of this dynamic was not only to control population and 
territory but rather to, through that control, impulse their re-signification within the free 
market and its new economy of space and relations.  
 Social organizations have not assisted passively to this process, yet their 
possibilities to organize alternatives to negotiate or resist have been deeply impacted, 
especially in light of other ongoing forms of coercion, such as those brought with the 
paramilitary violence or its more recent, so-called “neo-paramilitary” manifestations 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010).  The communities’ insistence in continuing, while 
strengthening their ecologico-political project in the social, cultural, productive territory 
of the Pacific continues and takes the form of claims for collective and human rights.  
The dialogues here gathered and analyzed are, in part, testimony of that will to insist.  
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CHAPTER 3  
GENDERING SECURITY: PACIFIST-FEMINISTS INTERPELLATE THE STATE  
 
 Over the last decade, the worsening conditions of women under the armed 
conflict has become a central concern for the women’s movement in Colombia. Exposing 
the grievous effects of the confrontation on women, the movement has not only critiqued 
illegal armed actors, but also the state’s conduction of the war. Focusing on their analysis 
of the state, this chapter examines the women’s movement contention that security, as a 
key governmental discourse and policy, contributes to aggravate women’s conditions of 
subordination. As part of a political, juridical, and military strategy to end the armed 
conflict, state security policies have been widely discussed by Colombian feminists, their 
effects assessed through the accounts of women from across the country.    
 Because Democratic Security imposed a neoliberal model of citizenship where 
individuals are in charge of their own security and have duties to make state security 
possible, women’s insistence on political empowerment and effective enjoyment of rights 
became an important addition to the re-formulation of citizenship that social movements 
posed in response to the state. This emphasis on empowerment and rights gave me a point 
of contrast with other movements whose engagement with the state relied on a platform 
of opposition and not of claims for inclusion.  Also, engaging with the women’s 
movement allowed me to explore the way critiques to the state, collective agendas, and 
participants’ personal experiences were intertwined and mutually determined in ways that 
appeared less clearly articulated in other movements. 
 My entry point to the Colombian women’s movement was through the work of 
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Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres (hereafter, Ruta), a national feminist network of over 350 
women’s organizations and 9 regional branches whose main goals are to find a negotiated 
end to the armed conflict and to make visible the effects of war on women (Ruta Pacífica 
de las Mujeres, 2003).12  
 Ruta’s platform draws on the long-held feminist critique of the private-public 
divide (Pateman, 1989; Okin, 1989). Through the phrase attributed to Spanish feminists,  
“Neither War that Kills Us, Nor Peace that Oppresses Us” Ruta expresses its opposition 
to all forms of domination against women in times of war or peace, while it brings to 
light the fact that gendered violence is a continuum that extends from the household to 
the battlefield.  In the context of the Colombian armed conflict, Ruta has maintained that 
guerrillas, paramilitaries, and state agents each victimize women, often turning them into 
“spoils of war”.  In the household, on the other hand, women are subject to pervasive 
forms of domestic violence, while children are indirectly taught to reproduce their 
fathers’ abusive behavior, further perpetuating the cycle of violence. 
 Vigorously committed to expose the effects of this violence, Ruta suggests that 
the crime statistics on the conflict reflect gender disparities in times of peace. To be sure, 
men’s higher rate of victimization in the conflict mirrors their greater involvement as 
combatants. Women, on the other hand, while not prominently figuring as victims in 
conflict crime statistics, appear as targets of crimes that unequivocally respond to a 
pattern of acute gender subordination. An indicator of this trend is, for example, that 
conflict-related crimes against women are often committed in or near the household.  An 
                                                
12 While this research focuses only on Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, other important 
actors of the national women’s movement include Red Nacional de Mujeres, Mesa 
Nacional de Concertación, Organización Femenina Popular, and Alianza Iniciativa de 
Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz-IMP, among others. 
  117  
insidious example that women’s insecurity is closely connected to their subordination in 
non-conflict contexts, crimes committed in the victim’s household send a message to men 
in the opposite band as they are assumed to have a patriarchal jurisdiction over women 
(Sánchez, 2008).  These crimes reflect, too, women’s confinement to domestic spaces 
while their husbands become part of either side of the conflict. 
 Ruta has documented, along with the national women’s movement, how violence 
against women under the armed conflict has been strategically used by all armed actors to 
“dominate, regulate, silence, obtain information, punish, expropriate, exterminate, reward 
the members of an armed group” (Barraza, 2009).  At the same time, the Colombian 
women’s movement has become increasingly aware that crimes against women are 
largely under-reported, when not completely normalized as cases of domestic disputes.  
The figures of the National Forensics Institute have been, as part of this analysis of 
conflict-crimes against women, subject of criticism due to its failure to provide 
disaggregated information that clarifies the nature of violence women face (Buriticá, 
2007). National Forensics Institute data, for instance, suggest that between 2004 and 
2008 only 534 women had been victims of sexual violence in connection with “the logics 
of war” (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal, 2010). This figure dramatically contrasts 
with survey data from international non-governmental organization Oxfam and several 
Colombian organizations indicating that between 2001 and 2009, 489.687 women, or an 
average of 6 women every hour, were victims of sexual violence perpetrated by legal or 
illegal armed actors (Oxfam, 2011).  
 In order to problematize the official discourse that obscures the victimization of 
women under the conflict and its connections with broader violence in the household, 
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Ruta has made strategic use of categories such as feminicides.  Along with feminists who 
analyze the assassination of women in Ciudad Juárez and throughout Latin America 
(Carmona López et al., 2010), Ruta has used this term to signal the systematic killing of 
women because of their gender.  With the category of feminicides, Ruta intends to make 
visible those cases of women killed as part of a gender subordination pattern that extends 
beyond the conflict. Whether committed by armed actors or not, feminicides evidence 
women’s exposure to a continuum of violence from the household to war territories. In an 
environment where threats come equally from partners and armed actors, women suffer a 
pervasive situation of insecurity hardly addressed by the state. 
 Valle del Cauca, the site of this research and location of one of Ruta’s regional 
branches, has been a prime example of how this continuum of violence amounts to high 
levels of crimes against women in and outside the household.  This department has the 
highest number of suspected feminicides (239 cases between 2002 and 2006), a fact that 
might be tied to the prevalence of drug cartels violence in some areas of the department  
(Sánchez, 2008, 83).  At the same time, the formidable increase in the operational 
capacity of the regional military units facilitated by the state security policies throughout 
the 2000s, has led to mounting controls over the body and autonomy of Valle del Cauca 
women.  In this respect, Ruta’s mission has been to call attention to the normalization of 
violence against women, as well as to problematize a narrative that conceives of this 
violence as an exclusively private matter—a case of so-called “crimes of passion” or of 
jealousy between romantic partners.  
 To explore Ruta’s critique of gendered violence under the security turn, I joined 
its Valle del Cauca branch, in the department’s capital, Cali, between August and 
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December of 2008.  There, not long after participating in the first activities at Ruta 
Valle’s house in downtown Cali, the movement offered an analysis of this continuity 
between public and private types of violence against women that resonated throughout 
my work with them. While Ruta regional coordinators were meeting in Medellín, a city 
harshly beaten by drugs cartels and then paramilitary violence, Ruta activist Olga Marina 
Vergara was killed together with her son, daughter-in-law and 5-year-old grandchildren.  
While the multiple killing was attributed to the son’s alleged participation in illicit 
businesses, Ruta members assessed the role of gender relations to explain the nature of 
this crime.  To them, even though the event might have been triggered by the son’s 
alleged participation in illicit activities, its effects were amplified by the closeness of both 
his mother and female partner, who surely provided care for the son and husband in a 
difficult moment.  As in other instances of Colombia’s conflict and non-conflict derived 
violence, Ruta concluded, women are victimized in ways that parallel the roles assigned 
to them in a deeply patriarchal society:  Selfless mothers, devoted wives, family pillars, 
but ultimately dependant and subordinated individuals. 
 As if to underscore their point, at the time this crime occurred, Ruta had recently 
launched the book “Violence Against Women in a Society at War” (2008) in Bogotá. 
There, the author, and Ruta leader, Olga Amparo Sánchez, discussed the connection 
between different forms of violence against women and the larger structures of violence 
in a society at war.  Sánchez’ book addressed exactly the problems made evident by the 
assassination of her colleague in Medellín: that in contexts of heavy violence and guns 
use, women are victimized in forms closely related to their role as mothers, sisters or 
lovers, usually mirroring their position within dense family networks. 
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 This pattern of victimization, which persists throughout different expressions of 
the armed conflict in Colombia, has led Ruta to question militaristic solutions to the 
conflict, arguing that they only aggravate women’s situation. Because both illegal and 
state actors within the conflict are embedded in a deeply patriarchal system of social 
relations, they are bound to reproduce their gender roles while they operate as 
combatants.  By deploying their armed power against women and by using them against 
their military adversary, armed actors in all sides compound women’s historical 
subordinated situation. 
 In light of the growing militarization of the conflict in the last decade, Ruta has 
interpellated the state and its role in the conflict. Questioning the unrestrained adscription 
to a security model that relies on the division between society’s friends and enemies, they 
point at how the security state ostensibly fails to address women’s victimization because 
of its reliance on a liberal conception that sees society as divided into independent public 
and private spheres (Sánchez, 2008, 82).  To the extent that the standard liberal position 
disregards the significance of gendered violence--and particularly its pervasiveness inside 
as well as outside the household--it is unable to achieve its declared purpose of 
guaranteeing security for all. 
 In the following sections of this chapter, I will draw on my ethnographic work 
with activists from the Valle del Cauca chapter of Ruta to investigate the claim that the 
turn to security has disregarded, while further intensifying, the multiple types of violence 
Colombian women face. In the first part of the chapter I will characterize Ruta’s 
principles and the context for its critique, and then will move to examine its analysis of 
state security.  In the final section, I will focus on Ruta’s work to re-narrativize security 
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and the role of the human rights discourse in this process. 
 
3.1 Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres and the Pacifist-Feminist Critique 
 Ruta was born as a national platform in 1995 at the initiative of a national 
coalition of women from various non-profit and labor organizations.13 Moved by the idea 
of supporting women victimized by the war, Ruta conveners initiated a series of national 
marches, now amounting to over ten, whose long-term goal was to help end the armed 
conflict while, in the short term, exposing its effects on Colombian women. The first 
Ruta mobilization reunited nearly one thousand women from all over the country in 
Mutatá, Urabá, a Northwest region devastated by sharp and continual confrontations 
between the FARC guerrilla, paramilitaries, and the state.  Dismayed by a testimony that 
about 95% women had been raped in an Urabá town (Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, 2003, 
13), Ruta militants organized a bus caravan to the area in order to join local women and 
express their solidarity with them.  
 Geographically mobilizing through the country or, as the name of the organization 
suggests, being in “Route”, activists have continued organizing periodical demonstrations 
in the towns most affected by the conflict.  Besides redressing women’s disproportionate 
victimization under the war, the movement aims to contribute to a negotiated exit to the 
conflict, while, most immediately, palliating the devastating impact of war through 
adequate services and reparation for war victims.  As a broader goal, Ruta’s strategy also 
                                                
13 The organizations that participated in this call were union-organized Programa de 
Mujeres de la Escuela Nacional Sindical (National Unionist School—women’s program), 
and Central Unitaria de Trabajadores—Departamento de Mujer (Workers’ Unitarian 
Central—Woman Department), as well as non-profit Casa de la Mujer Bogotá (Women’s 
House Bogota). Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres (2003). 
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expects to address pervasive violence against women through the irruption of women’s 
claims into public spaces, while also turning women’s victimization into a matter of 
public interest.    
 Physical displacement to areas affected by the conflict has been a key 
methodology to Ruta as it has allowed for women’s direct participation. As Ruta claims 
that none of the legal or illegal armed groups represent them, they are invested in having 
women directly assume peacemaking work if they are to obtain any gains in this process.  
In this pursuit, Ruta has drawn from both feminist and pacifist doctrines.  With the chant, 
“Women Do not Give Birth to Sons or Daughters for the War”, Ruta summons women to 
take an active stance in the conflict while drawing on and also subverting their traditional 
gender roles. 
 Ruta leader, Susana Pineda, launched a similar call to women joining Ruta in a 
1998 document entitled “Colombian Lysistratas before the New Millenium” (“Lisístratas 
Colombianas a las Puertas del Nuevo Milenio”).  In this text, Pineda incites women to 
follow the example of Lysistrata, the Greek literary character who refused to fulfill her 
conjugal duties as a way to force men to pact peace in the Peloponnesian war.  As Pineda 
(1998) points out:  
Lysístrata, who knew more about psychology than today’s rulers, devised 
a way to force men to pact peace:  She incites women to make war in their 
households (which is not the same as violence) adding that the nation is a 
federation of households.  Feminine audacity that today I put before you 
as a symbol, as a way to recognize that we can also aim to end with the 
barbarity that beats us and exhausts us.  
 
Pineda’s reading embraces Ruta’s principle that women must actively interpellate armed 
actors to demand that they cease patriarchal violence in the war and in the household.  It 
also stresses that women’s commitment must be informed by their gender positionality, 
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and at the.  
 Ruta has identified this framework as one of pacifism-feminism. Abandoning the 
position of neutrality that was the basis of their initial work, they have taken a more vocal 
commitment to end the war by challenging patriarchy and militarism at large in society.  
In my interviews with Ruta Valle del Cauca activists, they often expressed their 
identification with feminist principles as a form of empowerment, and acquisition of 
political subjecthood. Susana, a self-taught photographer of humble background, 
reflected on her experience of acquiring a political consciousness articulated around 
feminism by pointing:   
We came to realize that women couldn’t keep being the same invisible 
beings, the household figure, the one who goes with her little basket every 
week grocery shopping. No.  We, the ones who do the mobilizations, the 
ones who are here, we are here because we are also political actors.  We 
don’t want to be made invisible, be thought of as the ones who only cook 
or are in the house with the children.  We also have a political 
responsibility in our country, and we are capable of advancing towards a 
negotiated solution for the armed conflict because the war affects us all.   
The fact that a bomb doesn’t fall here doesn’t mean that the war is not 
affecting my right to education, opportunities for the youth, health, 
opportunity for housing, because everything is going for the war. 
(Interview with Susana).  
 
Susana’s claim for political agency was characteristic of Ruta’s plea that women 
participate in finding a negotiated end for the war while in the long run addressing the 
conditions that contribute to their subordination. By connecting the realities of the war 
with the persistant socioeconomic inequalities women face, Susana puts on the table 
Ruta’s claim for a broadened citizenship where women can exercise a comprehensive 
political participation within a framework of social rights for all.    
 The framework in which Ruta formulates this agenda is one of pacifism, which, in 
the context of Colombia’s securitized state, perhaps can be seen not only as neutrality but 
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also as breaking the binary friend-enemy.  As the state allies/opponents division relies on 
the ability for the state to trace a clear-cut division that justifies an intervention on the 
‘enemy’ side of the pair, women’s strategy of pacifism complicates this political terrain 
through the inclusion of new parameters within the highly regimented political geography 
of the war.  
 The testimony of Rosa, a long-time activist who briefly participated as an 
unarmed member of urban, Bolivarian guerrilla M-19 long before she joined Ruta, 
illustrated Ruta’s pacifist stance by saying,  
I identify myself with Ruta as they propose to transform the political but 
not with guns because I don’t think this country is going to change with 
arms and force.  I think that people are not willing to do that, people are 
afraid of violence and flee from it because they have experienced it.  My 
mother, who lived throughout it, tells me stories about La Violencia. And I 
talk to older people and they speak to you horrified; they don’t want that.  
What they want is a state that defends them all the time from people who 
want to attack them. (Interview with Rosa) 
 
In this passage of Rosa’s interview, she references La Violencia, a ten-year period of 
bipartisan political rivalry between supporters of the liberal and conservative parties that 
left over 200,000 assassinated people in the eighteen years that followed its eruption in 
1948.  While over half a century has passed since this period, scholars have seen some 
continuities between the conditions that triggered La Violencia and contemporary issues 
such as land expropriation, violent displacement, and political exclusion (Camacho 
Guizado, 1991; Medina Pineda, 1990).  By invoking La Violencia, Rosa’s testimony 
speaks to the unresolved conflict in Colombia and the need to politically address its roots 
through the non-armed intervention of the state.   
 Ruta’s analysis of the armed conflict addresses both Susana and Rosa’s points of 
view in that they understand that adopting a pacifist agenda with a feminist perspective 
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implies not only to empower women to claim for legal rights, but also to work for a post-
conflict scenario that incorporates women’s perspective (Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, 
2003). With almost half a million women reportedly victims of sexual violence by armed 
actors between 2001 and 2009 (Oxfam, 2011). Ruta aims to make visible the realities of 
war for women, but its goal is not only to show solidarity with female victims of the 
war—a key goal in itself—but to ensure women’s full participation in remedying the 
conditions that cause their subordination both in times of war and peace.  As the war 
represented a central coordinate defining conditions of governance in Colombia, Ruta’s 
mobilization project along the lines of the conflict and its management, posed an 
important challenge to the state and to the model of limited citizenship that was promoted 
under the country’s prevailing situation of exceptionalism.  
 
3.2 Ruta and the Peace Policy   
 In the relatively short interval between Ruta’s first mobilization in Mutatá in 1995 
and the advent of the decade of 2000, the peace policy that had led to two separate peace 
processes with the guerrilla groups National Liberation Army and Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (ELN and FARC, for their acronyms in Spanish, respectively) was 
completely reversed. If under Andrés Pastrana’s presidency (1998 – 2002), social 
organizations actively participated in negotiation roundtables between government, 
guerrillas, and civil society, after 2002, under Alvaro Uribe’s administration, the peace 
processes, already liquidated during Pastrana’s term, was declared completely defunct 
and soon replaced by an entirely militaristic offensive against guerrilla groups.  
 During this period, towards the end of the 1990s, Ruta had gained national 
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recognition as a political actor thanks to its national demonstrations to support women 
affected by the war. Having mobilized thousands of women in towns seriously affected 
by the conflict, Ruta had soon become a political actor in the conflict negotiation 
scenarios.  In fact, during the peace process with FARC, Ruta was invited to attend the 
negotiations between the government, civil society, and the guerrilla group.  Ruta 
declined, though, because the subject they had been assigned to was labor—not a priority 
in their political agenda and therefore a possible move towards trivializing their 
participation.   
 Soon after this, the political landscape changed considerably.  With the failure of 
the peace process in 1999, a negotiated way out of the conflict became an enterprise 
increasingly difficult to defend.   Instead, Colombia signed the cooperation agreement, 
known as Plan Colombia, with United States and the European Union, the latter two 
providing enormous monetary and ideological support to a recharged—and never 
completely abandoned—military approach to guerrilla insurgency.  While Ruta continued 
struggling for non-violent conflict resolution in Colombia, the approval of Plan Colombia 
and the coming into power in 2002 of Alvaro Uribe’s right-wing government radically 
changed the panorama for negotiated peace in Colombia.  With its emphasis on a military 
defeat of the guerrillas, an emphasis fully supported by Plan Colombia, Uribe’s 
government represented the antithesis of Ruta’s dialogical, non-violent peace proposal. In 
this government’s model, not only combatants become terrorists, but the door to any 
possible dialogue became closed, and the participation of civil mediators became largely 
irrelevant.   
 Even before the 2003 implementation of Uribe’s flagship policy, Democratic 
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Security, Ruta had spoken against the patriarchal character of the violence exercised by 
all sides in Colombia’s long-term conflict.  Thus, the exacerbated militarization that came 
about with Uribe’s government elicited Ruta’s complete disapproval due to the policy’s 
exclusive appeal to military strength as a means for conflict resolution.  Ruta also 
criticized the Uribe administration’s displacement of civil society from the role it had 
assumed during the preceding peace dialogues.  Indeed, under Uribe’s government, peace 
policy became itself a problem and not a possible avenue to work in coordination with 
the state towards a negotiated peace.  
 As the main public policy addressing war and significantly shaping the conditions 
for peace during the first decade of the 21st Century, state security came to be at the 
center of Ruta’s agenda.  Problematizing women’s engagement with the fundamentally 
militaristic governance of this policy, Ruta women challenged state security policy’s 
mandates. In a response to the optimism regarding indicators like reduction of homicides, 
guerrilla kidnappings, and government takes of towns and roads, Ruta has pointed at 
Democratic Security’s alarming disregard of crimes against women and girls, who 
continue being victimized by both armed actors and partners even at a time when the 
success of the governmental security program is loudly proclaimed.  Instead, Ruta has 
proposed that Democratic Security has not made women, or citizens in general, more 
secure.  
 
3.3 Interpellating the Security State   
 With security and defense policies replacing a peace policy as the state’s 
organized response to the conflict, Ruta has been critical of how the logic of security 
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threatens people’s rights as a pre-condition to achieve its goals.  As security measures 
bow to efficiency considerations, civil liberties have commonly been made subordinate to 
public order as the supreme common good.  From Ruta’s point of view, state policies and 
discourse of the last decade have also turned the neutral attribute of “security” into a 
patriarchal device that perpetuates women’s subordination under the pretense of securing 
the population.  
 Observing the increasing concentration of powers that security justified all 
throughout the 2000s, women’s organizations have represented the state as a punitive 
father who has to protect his children while denying them the possibility to determine the 
terms of such protection.  Instead, the state, using the metaphor of the “family” to refer to 
society (Rojas, 2009) has implemented a body of measures appealing to citizen’s loyalty 
as members of an allegedly unified political body.  
 The governmental programs Network of Informants and Network of 
Collaborators, launched by the government in 2002, became a prime example of this 
trend.   This initiative aimed to establish a force of one million civilians in charge of 
providing authorities with information about the activities of organizations considered as 
terrorists (Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática, 2002; Ministerio de Defensa 
Nacional, Directiva 16/2003).   As president Alvaro Uribe indicated at the beginning of 
his mandate as a justification for this measure, Colombia faces a threat that can only be 
suppressed by the complete elimination of the enemy in a collective effort by state and 
society.  As Uribe pointed during an event launching a regional network of informants in 
the department of Cesar, “what we have here is a risk for 40 million citizens.  If we all 
work, we’ll get rid of that risk” (Esparza, BBC Mundo 2002).  Through the imposition of 
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a duty to accuse others, the state posed an ethical asymmetry whereby a good society 
faces en evil threat from terrorist forces.  Assumed to have a duty of loyalty with the 
state, citizens are expected to fulfill roles determined by the needs of war and the military 
imperatives to defeat the enemy.   
 Ruta has exposed the effects of this pretended division between friends and 
enemies by stating how the presence of informants has fractured the trust and solidarity 
inside entire communities, as all individuals’ actions are potentially suspicious and 
citizens possible informants.  Women have been particularly impacted by these breaches 
in trust within communities because, being the main bearers of social networks in their 
communities, they are more likely to be associated with any of the sides in conflict 
whenever they cultivate family, affective, or other relations of care with an armed actor 
or someone suspected of being one (Mesa de Trabajo “Mujer y Conflicto Armado”, 
2008) 
 Another major state security mechanism has been the training of 100,000 non-
professional peasant soldiers who, after only four months of preparation, become part of 
the armed forces, and thus immediately able to participate in combat in conflict areas.  
Instead of joining the army and being assigned to other areas where their services are 
required, as happens with regular soldiers, “Peasant Soldiers”—as civilians entering this 
program have been called--remain in their areas of origin, where they know both the 
geography and the movement of armed actors.  Critics of this program have pointed to 
the requirement for peasant soldiers to remain in their areas of origin in what constitutes a 
clear violation of the international human rights distinction principle, which establishes 
that those who participate directly or indirectly in the hostilities have to be clearly 
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distinguishable from those who do not do it.   
 The peasant soldiers program poses other extremely problematic implications for 
women.  Giraldo Mendoza (2006) has noted that the graduation ceremony protocol for 
new peasant soldiers, requires mothers to be the ones who, during the ceremony, pass the 
arms to their graduating sons, while they recite an oath offering the son to the 
motherland.  Giraldo Mendoza (2006) expresses Ruta’s opposition to this practice by 
stating, “even though women have said that we don’t give birth to sons and daughters for 
the war, we must attend this arms-handing ceremony in order not to unleash a 
punishment for these young people or to see ourselves stigmatized”. At the same time, 
through their participation as soldiers’ mothers, women are constituted as bearers of 
patriotic values, loyal subjects to the state, and producers of the military reserve forces.   
 Human rights organizations have criticized the informants and peasant soldiers 
programs for violating the international humanitarian law distinction principle that 
civilians are to be distinguished from actors in conflict and protected from the effects of 
the war (Alianza de Organizaciones Sociales y Afines et al, 2008).  In both of these 
programs, individuals are required to act as state agents and yet, as they remain part of 
their communities, they are virtually indistinguishable from civilians.  Being embedded 
in dense family and affect networks, women have been endangered by remaining close to 
male relatives and partners who participate as informants and soldiers in these programs. 
Women are also often portrayed as providers of intelligence information to informants 
and soldiers as they have a potentially greater access to information and might be used by 
men in their surroundings to gather data. 
 In their critique of these institutions of the security state, Ruta has followed the 
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tradition of the first Latin American feminist groups that in the nineteen-seventies 
opposed authoritarian regimes as an expression of patriarchy (Saporta Stenbach et al, 
1994).  Analyzing the Colombian case, Ruta women have strongly criticized this 
instrumentalization of civil society and of women for the constitution of a security state.  
For them, the figure of the peasant soldier underscores the fact that under the security 
paradigm, civil society is conflated with the state and subject to a process of heavy 
militarization. 
 
3.4 Militarization and its Effects on Women’s Lives 
 The result of a 1999 multilateral agreement between Colombia, the United States, 
and the European Union, Plan Colombia has provided the framework and resources for 
security policies during the last decade. With the United States contributing 7,500 million 
dollars for military and intelligence resources during the first phase of Plan Colombia 
(1999 – 2006), and 3,600 million dollars, destined to consolidate territorial control and 
civic-military aid in the second phase (2007 – 2013) (Colectivo de Abogados José 
Alvear, 2008) military presence has multiplied and gained greater control, in many areas 
becoming the primary or only state representation.  If in the first phase of Plan Colombia 
most attention was dedicated to eradicating coca crops in southern Colombian 
departments, in the second phase, the southwestern departments of Nariño, Cauca, and 
Valle del Cauca have become further endowed with additional resources coming from 
Plan Colombia successors, Plan Patriota and Plan Destructor.  In this new strategic phase, 
military units not only improved their mobility and adaptability to difficult environmental 
conditions, but, in an attempt to recoup state presence, they have established tighter 
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controls over the population.   As historically subject to the control of their autonomy, 
women have been further affected by the new restrictions brought by the militarization of 
everyday life under Colombia’s armed conflict. 
 Due to its primary focus on a military solution of the conflict, security policies 
have compounded women’s subordination, particularly in areas under territorial dispute 
by guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the state armed forces. Furthermore, the greater reliance 
on arms, hierarchical command, and disciplinary regulation of everyday life that comes 
with militarization has contributed to already tighten social controls on women’s 
sexuality and autonomy. 
 Discursively, Democratic Security has exalted the soldier as the new national 
hero, a hyper-masculine, aggressive, commanding figure.  In connection to this ideal 
image, military control of extensive territories is naturalized, as it is troops’ ability to 
exercise control in people’s, and very particularly, women’s everyday lives.  In urban 
areas—where the conflict manifests in forms other than combat--elevating an aggressive 
masculinity as a paradigmatic social identity, has made it more difficult and, in many 
occasions, deadly, to be a woman and to deviate from social roles, let alone to protest the 
patriarchal, economic, or racial dominant structures. 
 Mesa de Trabajo “Mujer y Conflicto Armado” (2008, 14), a national coalition for 
women’s rights under the armed conflict has documented this relationship between 
militarization and sexual violence by examining official sources such as the Attorney 
General’s Office and the National Forensics Institute reports.  While largely under-
representing sexual violence against women, the National Forensics Institute data from 
2006 and 2007 show that 49 (71%) of the cases where attributed to state Armed Forces 
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either by action or tolerance with paramilitaries; 15 cases (21.7%) to guerrillas, and 5 
(7.2%) to paramilitaries. While the National Forensics Institute has been criticized for not 
having clear mechanisms to identify violence against women under the conflict, these 
statistics reveal a pattern of Armed Forces members’ involvement in sexual violence 
against women. 
 Democratic Security’s growing militarization has greatly contributed to the 
aggravation of women’s situation of subordination at the hands of those who hold and 
dispute military power, and especially of national armed forces. Comisión Colombiana de 
Juristas (2008), for instance, has held that sexual violence against women has drastically 
augmented in comparison to years before Democratic Security was in place.  Indeed, 
according to their figures for 1997-2002 and for July 2002-December 2007, state armed 
forces participation in cases of sexual violence against women in the second period 
(2002-2007) tripled with respect to the first one (1997-2002, pre-Democratic Security). 
The report shows that similar patterns appear by studying other sources such as the 
Attorney General’s Office and the National Forensics Institute’s statistics.  These figures 
indicate that under the period of application of Democratic Security policy sexual 
violence against women has increased almost threefold, a significant figure that further 
supports women’s verbal accounts in this sense14. 
 The vast growth of specialized military anti-guerilla units under Plan Colombia in 
areas like the high altitude towns of Valle del Cauca has been one of the problematic 
                                                
14 The study revealed that 52% of sexual crimes were committed directly by state agents and 42% 
by paramilitaries. This means that, if one considers that in the case of paramilitary violations state 
agents have tolerated or supported violations committed by paramilitaries, the figure for state 
violations would have to be about 94% of cases attributed to the state, either by direct or indirect 
perpetration of its agents. 
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aspects in the execution of security policies, given the broad powers these units enjoy in 
areas otherwise out of the state purview.  A female human rights activist, for instance, 
offered the following testimony of military-led violence against women in an area where 
her organization had developed work against mass detentions in the west of Valle del 
Cauca.  According to her, during a meeting with the commander of an especially 
problematic battalion in the area,  
(P)eople were criticizing the soldiers, complaining with this man that his 
soldiers had raped several girls or that they were seducing them, and that 
several of them had become pregnant.  Then the man made a comparison 
that seemed to me horrible; he said, ‘the only thing I tell you is that my 
soldiers are not to blame, they are men and they are in the military. I tell 
you gentlemen, tie your bitches because my dogs are loose (...)’ (And) 
people could only laugh because of the fear this generated in them, people 
did not have the ability to think or react to a situation like that, so that was 
it.  The girls stayed pregnant; the ones who were raped stayed raped 
because (according to the commander), it was not his soldiers’ fault. 
(Interview with Maria).  
 
While mediated by the commander’s intimidating presence, the statements justifying 
forced sexual relations with troops rather continued the widespread rhetoric that women 
are passive subjects destined to bear men’s sexual urges—a narrative in effect within the 
context of the conflict but also outside of it.  Rooted on the popular view of masculine 
sexuality as uncontrollable, these statements are the more serious given the overall 
control that the military exercises over the communities were the troops are stationed.  In 
these sites, the accounts abound of women sexually and affectively involved with soldiers 
in areas most affected by the conflict, where highly asymmetrical relations leave local 
women bearing the burden of unplanned parenthood and transient emotional relations. 
 Valle del Cauca Ruta activist, Rosa, narrated one of these instances of violent 
sexual relations with soldiers stationed at a Valle del Cauca town.  She referred to the 
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impact of militarization by recalling the narrative of a female domestic worker whom she 
met at a rural area in northern Valle del Cauca, where anti-guerrilla and anti-drug military 
and police bodies is very strong.  Rosa recalls the domestic worker stating,  
(T)he military comes to town, gets close to our girls and so in this town 
almost all girls have soldiers’ children and so they (the soldiers) go like 
that; they arrive, come to your door, take a look in an aggressive way, 
conquest the girls, get them pregnant, and then leave.  (Interview with 
Rosa) 
 
 While it is hard to determine the extent to which women engage in forced 
affective relations with soldiers, it seems clear that these relations are mediated by the 
fact of the soldiers’ position of armed superiority.  And even when there is consent, other 
problematic situations in these relations arise when women must face single mothering 
given the parent’s geographical mobility or reluctance to accept parenting 
responsibilities. 
 Indigenous and Black women have been particularly affected by these cases of 
forced intimacy or by different forms of outright sexual violence. The National 
Indigenous Organization in Colombia—ONIC (2009), for instance, stated in a report to 
the United Nations Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples that since 2006 there have been 
cases in which indigenous girls have been sexually abused by soldiers from High 
Mountain Battalions, Counter-guerrilla Police, and other military and police unit.   
 Observing this trend, Ruta, in coordination with other social organizations, has 
suggested that, while enhanced military units such as high mountain battalions in Valle 
del Cauca have spearheaded Democratic Security’s defense program for urban, middle 
classes to have unrestricted access to all the territory, increased military control has 
further marginalized rural and working class populations and, within these populations, 
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reinforced the subordination of women and girls. 
 
3.5 Women in the War 
 In its examination of sexual violence against women, Ruta sees state security 
policies as a continuation of an authoritarian and patriarchal tradition that privileges male 
military authority over dialogic, horizontal decision-making. The systematic violence 
against women by armed actors and, in particular, by members of the military, appears to 
be correlated with the trend towards the militarization of society.  Under this trend, the 
military is entitled to exercise absolute local command in order to produce effective 
results, in a display of force that disproportionately impacts women, ethnic communities, 
and other groups already subordinated. 
 This point is consistent with the findings of the Rapporteur for Women’s Rights 
from the Human Rights Inter-American Commission (2006), who established that armed 
actors use physical, psychological, or sexual violence against women in four major 
forms: first, to punish the enemy with the purpose of controlling territories and resources; 
second, to cause displacement from the territory; third, to sexually exploit women in 
situations of forced recruitment; and forth, as a form of social control in areas dominated 
by illegal armed groups.    
 It is in this context of forced territorial and social control that Corporación 
Humanas - Centro Regional de Derechos Humanos y Justicia de Género (2009), has 
documented a number of crimes against women.  Among others, they found that armed 
actors, in pursuit of territorial control, engaged in a long list of serious crimes against 
women including forced sexual relations, sexual violation by one aggressor, sexual 
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violation by more than one man, violations repeated in time, sexual harassment, sexual 
slavery, forced prostitution, people trafficking, genital mutilations, forced abortion, 
threats to commit sexual violence, insults of sexual nature, controls over sexuality and 
sexual life, improper touching, forced and public nudity, breast beating, and forced 
unions. 
 When not subject to punishment for relating with the enemy side, women with 
any level of proximity to armed actors and their children have become subject to 
stigmatization by communities that see them as threats to local peace.  A human rights 
activist from afrodescendant group Proceso de Comunidades Negras, for example, 
explained to me how northern Cauca paramilitaries engaged in extreme forms of violence 
against women in a mode of operation that served their overall strategy of terrorizing 
communities to gain territorial dominion over areas previously dominated by guerrillas, 
but also in everyday forms of violence where coercion merged with more or less forced 
co-existence.  In her words: 
Paramilitaries entered in 1999 killing, threatening many people but there 
were also relationships between them and some women, and there is an 
area where many children are called “paraquitos” because they are 
children of women in this area with paramilitaries who are not there 
anymore.  (Interview with Mariana) 
 
These examples suggest how, while connected to larger struggles for political and 
economic power in Colombia, official and para-state armed forces have relied on both 
state hyper-militaristic discourses of social control and patriarchal narratives of violent 
masculinity.  Variously engaged with armed actors—, Campaña Ni Una Más (2009) 
describes these relations as usually motivated on needs of gaining economic security or 
status, women continue enduring violence as the weak link of the predominant 
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militaristic masculinity discourse.  
 
3.6 Women and National Security 
 The prevalence of violence against women associated with militarization in 
Colombia dovetails with Ruta’s feminist analyses in the sense that sexual violence has 
historically been used as a systematic practice to impose a version of national security 
(Enloe 2000, 123).  Compared to other cases of militarization such as Chile’s dictatorial 
regime between 1973 and 1990, Colombia’s model suggests, too, that sexual violence is 
broadly used to reinforce models of subordinate femininity. While not identical, the cases 
of Colombia and Chile suggest some parallels.  As documented by Bunster-Burotto 
(1994), under the Chilean dictatorship rape was used as a form of torture and torturers 
relied on images of Marianismo—the exaltation of traditional femininity based on 
catholic images of the Virgin Mary as pure and virginal.  Women raped by military 
torturers were perceived as deviating from this role and therefore as giving up their 
feminine respectability.  Ultimately, rape appeared as a way for ‘deviant’ women to 
newly assume their role as respectable women. Through physical violence and forced 
sexual relations, women in Colombia have been kept in roles as passive, submissive, 
naturally suited to satisfy masculine sexual desires, and ready to assume the role of 
mothering. 
 When women participate in political activities or develop some type of activism 
they have also met severe forms of repression. In my conversations with human rights 
female activists, they indicated that it was a common practice of security forces to attack 
activist women who participate in demonstrations by hitting their breasts and genital area 
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(Interview with María).  In events such as the 2008 strike of sugar cane workers in Cali, 
Candelaria, Florida and other surrounding towns, women of various organizations and 
particularly workers’ wives faced police repression when they protested on the roads 
surrounding their husbands’ strike locations.  
 Lola, a female leftist activist doing community organizing at an impoverished 
Afrodescendant area revealed to me at an informal conversation that at a protest she 
attended, an anti-riot police agent hit her and then threw her on the floor after lifting her 
from where she was standing because her and her group refused to abandon an area 
where they protested.  As a result, she received a severe and chronic back. A member of a 
popular-peasant organization also provided me with an example of how, when a protestor 
is killed during a demonstration and his mother comes to recover his corpse, the anti-riots 
police address her with insults in order to demoralize the rest of the movement. Keeping a 
relative semblance with the Chilean case, these situations reveal how women in 
Colombia, and especially those who hold activist roles, have been subjected to numerous 
forms of violence in an explicit declaration that any deviance from their reproductive or 
domestic role will not be tolerated. 
 As perpetual targets of state violence, women’s bodies—as sites of social and 
biological reproduction—have become focal points for state violence against leftist and 
radical democratic social movements. Indeed, women holding leadership roles within 
their communities bear high consequences for challenging the state instead of passively 
accepting their fate under the conflict. Through their vocal participation, and also by 
reclaiming their right to the territory before the state, women have come to face threats 
both as organizers in their communities and when they collaborate with allied non-
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governmental organizations.  Cecilia, a professional woman working with a non-profit 
organization itself heavily threatened due to its work with forcefully-displaced women, 
explained this situation to me, emphasizing how the persecution some women endure is 
selective and directly intended to undermine their centrality in displaced communities’ 
organizing processes:  
 A lot of displaced people from different regions, especially northern Nariño and 
southern Cauca are followed to the places where they migrate to and paramilitary groups 
continue pressuring displaced women (there).  All the population in situation of 
displacement continues being followed—well, not everyone, only those who have 
showed a leadership profile before migrating, and those in a high percentage are women 
because within the displaced population female leadership stands out since women 
constitute the majority of the displaced people. And women (…), together with the 
people who depend on them, children and the elderly, constitute about 74% of the 
displaced population (…) In addition, women are generally the ones who make the 
decision to migrate in the areas where they are displaced in order to save the lives of their 
families. Men often stay to cope with the situation or disappear—that is to say, they 
abandone their family responsibility; they look for their own salvation but do not assume 
the family responsibility because coming to the city to have the family get ahead is very 
complex; women make these decisions.  
 Cecilia continues to explain that, once displaced, and doubly burdened by 
paramilitary violence and by the subsequent absence of their partner, women assume 
leadership roles that bring new vulnerabilities when they denounce crimes such as land 
dispossession and violations of their social and political rights:  
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(M)any (of these women) are being surveiled on what they're doing in the 
place where they have arrived, and since it is women who are responsible 
for their families, they fight for their rights, they fight for all the aids the 
state provides because they are seeing the situation of their children, the 
situation about education, food, food security… then you see that much of 
the population that is organized leading these processes of displaced 
people are women; there are also men but a high percentage of those 
struggling are women. So these women who often are tied to programs 
such as Familias en Acción are mothers leaders of (different) 
organizations. And they are often getting threats from paramilitary groups 
because they are organized; because they already know how to write a 
right to petition15, how to file a writ for the protection of constitutional 
rights, they know how legislation operates here, how to claim for their 
rights, all that. So they are being called to account, and we know cases of 
women who receive a visit in their organizations and are warned that they 
are being watched, also others have received threats in letters and things 
like that, so many women are under pressure (…) (Interview with Cecilia). 
 
As Cecilia narrates, women in situation of displacement assume roles of leadership partly 
in response to the needs they have to sustain their families in the chaotic situation that 
ensues after leaving both their places of residence and, for many of them, as dependant 
from their partners.  Women who act as advocates for their communities become 
“dangerous,” their capacity to demand remedies making visible the injustices which have 
led to their displacement.  Paradoxically, by using the constitutional mechanisms 
guaranteed to any citizen, displaced women are further targeted and, after having their 
physical existence compromised, they are also stripped from their capacity to exist as 
legal subjects.  
 A similar situation of legal exclusion for displaced women and other victims of 
paramilitarism arose with the questioned governmental attempts to address their claims 
for justice and reparation. Law 975 of 2005, or Law of Justice and Peace (Ley de Justicia 
                                                
15 The national constitution establishes that any person has the right to formulate petitions 
to authorities for reasons of general or particular interest and also the right to obtain 
prompt response.  Public employees face disciplinary sanctions if they fail to comply 
with this obligation.  
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y Paz), whose text states as goals, truth, justice, and reparation for victims of crimes 
committed by paramilitaries, has been an example of this situation.  Law 975 was 
conceived as a component of Democratic Security policy that would regulate the 
demobilization of thirty thousand members of paramilitary groups in exchange for prison 
terms of 5 to 8 years, and the obligation to confess and make reparations to the victims of 
their crimes. Despite paramilitaries’ admitted engagement in multiple crimes affecting 
women, the extremely low sanctions to these acts has created outrage among women’s 
organizations, which, like Corporación Humanas insist in the need to judge acts of 
sexual violence as crimes against humanity given its systematic use as a tool of war 
(Barraza 2009). 
 In Mesa Mujer y Conflicto Armado’s VIII Report of Socio-Political Violence 
against Women and Girls (2008), non-profit organization Comisión Colombiana de 
Juristas has also pointed at a series of grave problems in the application of Law of Justice 
and Peace.  Among others, they found that sexual violence against women is often treated 
as a secondary crime, rarely investigated with specialized teams or with the proper depth.  
Furthermore Comisión Colombiana de Juristas found that prosecutors seldom ask 
demobilized paramilitaries about this type of violence when they are confessing other 
crimes or about control patterns this army exercised over women.  Moreover, in their 
confessions, paramilitaries habitually tried to trivialize violent relations between their 
troops and local women.  Finally, the report states that because the newly created Justice 
and Peace jurisdiction has allowed that paramilitary commanders be extradited to the 
United States, it has been impossible to know all the truth about their crimes when 
establish the actual facts of their action was one of the main goals of this law (Comisión 
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Colombiana de Juristas, 2008).   
 In collaboration with human rights organizations like Movimiento Nacional de 
Crímenes de Estado (National Movement of State Crime Victims), women’s social 
movements have demanded greater governmental commitment to guarantee victims of 
state crimes adequate judicial protection given the danger they continue to face after the 
questioned state-led demobilization process. Strongly criticized by human rights 
organizations, the Justice and Peace jurisdiction has been particularly opposed by the 
women’s movement because it has excluded women from designing instruments to 
protect victims, even though a large number of victims are female.  This is in spite of the 
fact that Colombia signed the UN convention for women in security.  Widespread 
evidence that many of the old paramilitary structures have gone back to commit crimes 
under different identities (Human Rights Watch, 2010), has put women’s organizations in 
alert after they continued receiving threats by what the government has euphemistically 
denominated “emerging bands” or former paramilitary groups. 
 The threats have in fact given way to actual violence against some displaced 
women leaders. A leader from afrodescendant organization for displaced persons, 
Afrodes, based in the predominantly Black port of Buenaventura told me in October 2008 
that 27 afrodescendant female community leaders had been assassinated in the last years 
by paramilitary organizations due to their attempts to organize the community to claim 
for their rights.  During the time I conducted this research, in June 2008, Martha Cecilia 
Obando, a social worker known in the community as “Doña Chila”, was assassinated in 
Buenaventura and at the time there were very little concrete progress to clarify this crime.  
Yet, despite the official inaction in these cases, activists continued upholding the long-
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time reached conclusion that Human Rights Inter-American Commission (2008) 
enunciated in a report on the subject: “(A)rmed actors find that leadership exercised by 
women, represents an obstacle to advance their social and territorial control”. 
 The militarization of women’s lives also appears when they, invoking their roles 
as mothers or wives, raise concerns about human rights violations against their relatives 
or communities.  Nationally, the most emblematic case of this type is probably that of 
mothers demanding investigations to clarify their sons’ extrajudicial executions by state 
security forces in 2008.  A practice long documented by human rights organizations in 
Colombia, recent extrajudicial executions occurred mostly in rural areas, where 
Democratic Security policy operations were conducted.  Victims of extrajudicial 
executions or so-called ‘false positives’, often men residing in marginalized 
neighborhoods, peasants, indigenous or community leaders, were falsely presented by the 
Army as guerrillas killed in combat.   
 An independent Mission to verify the existence of these crimes corroborated in 
October 2007 that impunity was the rule in official investigations for these cases 
(Coordinación Colombia - Europa -Estados Unidos, 2008).  Other observations from the 
Mission included the confirmation that there was a pattern of concealing victims’ 
identities as well as a strong intimidation fed by the army’s presentation of the victim as a 
guerrilla member and, consequently, the whole stigmatization of the family.  Mothers of 
Soacha, a marginalized Bogotá neighborhood where a number of victims resided before 
they were taken with false pretexts to later be executed, have since worked, under 
constant death threats, to demand justice for their sons’ deaths.  
 In 2008, when cases of extrajudicial execution gained notoriety and the 
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government had to remove 27 armed forces officers, including 3 generals connected to 
human rights violations, new cases in different parts of the country started to emerge.  In 
this context, Melba, a Ruta activist I interviewed spoke about the role of women in 
mediating cases where community youth are recruited by paramilitaries in situations that 
resembled youth’s extrajudicial executions cases and the difficulties they face in this 
activism. Though Melba did not link the case of youth recruitment in her neighborhood 
with the ongoing extrajudicial executions, she did introduce the issue of how women who 
assume positions of leadership in their neighborhoods face obstacles because their work 
is seen as unduly politicized.  In her case, when community women who had started 
working to recuperate public spaces for the youth heard local youth were being recruited 
by paramilitaries, they rejected the work of the most vocal female activists by stating that 
they were “too political”.  In Melba’s account: 
In the neighborhood (…) there are situations of paramilitarism.  Youths 
are invited to a firing range, they are taken blindfolded from the 
neighborhood, boys tell their experiences but they don’t know where they 
have been taken, only that they are in luxurious country houses, with many 
girls and lots of alcohol… that’s a delicate situation.  On the other hand, 
the working community is very indifferent towards that.  The rest of 
women from our Association don’t want to know anything about politics 
(…) Naturally what I bring from Ruta, I bring it to them.  Some of them 
are very conscious (…) but one invites them to the activities of Ruta and 
they say “We don’t want (…) because there’s too much politics there” 
(…)  I tell them, what you do, this concern you have about the youth and 
childhood is political, therefore we have to continue, we have to go on.  
And they say, “sorry but no, we are fine like this”.  (Interview with Melba) 
 
As Melba explained, when women’s roles as caretakers or guardians of family values 
takes on a character other than that of submission and passivity, they are severely 
interpellated both by the men that see their privilege questioned with their actions or, as 
in this case, by other women entangled in a patriarchal discursive framework. 
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 Under the model of militarized security, the state has drawn on deeply patriarchal 
narratives as a mode of reproducing structures of gender subordination. Governmental 
programs such as “Peasant Soldiers” have borrowed from cultural scripts conceiving of 
women as naturally subservient and suited to serve the state through their capacity to 
reproduce and sustain the family. The widespread militarization of the state security has 
worsened the situation of women who already had to deal with sexual violence, forced 
single pregnancy, controls over their bodies, and other types of violence. 
 Because the trope of security involves the notion that state power aims to protect 
helpless citizens from external threats, it is uncommon that these types of violations are 
associated with the state or to a specific pattern of human rights violations.  Yet, for 
women who challenge militarily enforced authority it is apparent that not only the 
promise of security is illusory; in fact the securitization of everyday life has also greatly 
aggravated their subordination.  
 In forms of aggression ranging from death threats to trivialization, women’s work 
against violence and discrimination affecting women has been met with hostility as it 
transgresses imaginaries of women as loyal to the state. Women’s human rights are 
threatened because they dare to challenge the matrix of patriarchal, economic, power and 
the racial hierarchy in which this is sustained. 
 With the most serious cases affecting women in marginalized communities, 
militarized securitization reinforces and replicates the systematic devaluation of those 
who deviate from the expectations attached to being a women in a society at war, 
expectations that value loyalty to the state while sustaining traditional structures of race, 
gender, economic, and political power.  An anecdote provided by a Ruta Valle member 
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alludes to the exact nature of these loyalties.  A member of a landowning and politically 
influential family, she narrated how her predominantly male colleagues at a local 
professional association criticized her by comparing her with Piedad Cordoba, a 
progressive female afrodescendant senator whose support of a negotiated end to the 
conflict has subjected her to accusations of being a collaborator of both guerrillas and the 
socialist Venezuelan government, not to mention a host of sexualized jokes associating 
her with Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez.  At an assembly of this organization, 
members joked about the fact that the Ruta member “should marry Hugo Chávez” too.  
The incident was the more telling about ongoing imaginaries of femininity and political 
properness since the Ruta member comes from a wealthy family and on all counts, except 
for her feminist activism, she represents the local establishment as much as her 
professional colleagues.  Questioning her lack of loyalty to her class and to her male 
counterparts, her colleagues invoked ideas of racial and political properness in order to 
call her to ranks or else face ridicule and exclusion. 
 Because security discourses rest on the idea of a homogeneous community 
fighting an external threat, they require the continual reproduction of the family as the 
main locus to guaranty such homogeneity.  In this model, both men and women are 
bound to conform to a tight gender binary where women are expected to be submissive 
and men committed to militarization. An expectation for women of all backgrounds, 
gender securitization most harshly affects afrodescendant, indigenous, peasant, and 
working class women as they not only defy gender roles, but also challenge the larger 
socioeconomic and racial hierarchies that compound their subordination.  
 In order to address these problems, women in different social sectors have turned 
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to organized mobilization.  In the next section I will turn to women’s mobilization and to 
the alternatives they have proposed in the face of the militarization of society and the 
securitization of gender. 
 
3.7 Women’s Rights as Human Rights 
 As I have shown so far in this chapter, Ruta’s critique emphasizes the differential 
impact of security policies on women, as well as the fact that women’s victimization 
under the conflict parallels their subordinate condition in other social realms.  The 
question remains, what are the alternatives to securitization and militarism the women’s 
movement has proposed.  In addressing this issue, I’ll focus on the ways the feminist 
analysis of securitization has been influenced by human rights discourses on the security 
state, and how, at the same time, human rights mobilization engages with women’s 
claims. 
 During the last decades, women have advocated for a legal framework that 
protects their human rights at a supra-national level. A redundant category for some, 
women’s human rights have been vindicated by the women’s movement in order to 
correct the misconception that crimes against women are a form of “private” violence 
between partners—an event too discrete and gender-specific as to merit the universal 
protection of international human rights law (Bunch and Frost, 2000).  In the context of 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, feminist scholar Catharine A. Mackinnon (1994) 
defended the importance of recognizing women’s human rights by critically stating, 
“[W]hat is done to women is either too specific to women to be seen as human or too 
generic to human beings to be seen as specific to women”.  
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 In Colombia, the discourse of human rights has been influential for the field of 
social mobilization, yet it is clear that there is not a unique approach to the nature of 
rights and their use for different struggles.  Below I briefly present two perspectives on 
human rights and their implications for the local women’s movement using the case of 
Ruta Pacífica.  In the first, I address the human rights movement’s systemic view of 
human rights violations as power-ridden, and then reflect on the view of women’s human 
rights as part of a legal and political platform to reach women’s empowerment. 
 
3.8 Rights for Women 
 The Colombian women’s movement has advocated to extend human rights 
protection for women, yet there have been widely divergent opinions about how to 
implement this protection.  Overall, the movement has embraced human rights as a legal 
platform to provide women with a repertoire of protective mechanisms, a catalogue of 
state obligations, and a legal vocabulary to express their grievances.  Yet, for some 
feminist sectors, the focus has been on the idea that women’s human rights can 
potentially address the multiple forms of economic, racial, and patriarchal exploitation 
that underlie violence against women.  Ruta Valle del Cauca showcases these different 
orientations in their own pedagogical work by including both an emphasis on legal 
equality and a concern with patriarchal structures in Colombian society.  
 Some of the tensions and negotiations about the role of rights emerged in the 
workshops that the group held in Ruta’s “Itinerant School for Political Training, Peace 
Education and Democracy – Weaving Knowledges and Powers”.  In one of these 
workshops I participated in, on the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
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Discrimination against Women—CEDAW, where women were asked, in groups, to come 
up with examples of the three generations of rights—individual, political, and social, and 
to illustrate these categories with situations from their own lives.  Groups gave 
experiential examples of cases that ranged from the forced disappearance of one 
participant’s husband, to the dumping of toxic substances in a river close to someone 
else’s community.  This exercise illustrated that the plurality of issues that converge in 
Ruta, and further illuminates their understanding of the problems they deal with.  On the 
one hand, the focus on individual, legal-based action as a privileged form of action spoke 
to the liberal tradition that was part of Ruta Valle’s organizing.  On the other, women’s 
suggestion that legal remedies are to correct structural imbalances enabled by a 
patriarchal society also emerged as an important element of the discussion. 
 Ruta--Valle del Cauca’s origin as an outgrowth of Unión de Ciudadanas de 
Colombia--a pioneer organization of professional women founded soon after a 1954 law 
granted Colombian women the right to vote--partly accounted for their focus on women’s 
equality and political participation.  Still functioning in a house that belongs to Unión de 
Ciudadanas and sharing a handful of its members, Ruta--Valle del Cauca has taken this 
interest in equal political participation into new terrain by focusing on the introduction of 
women’s perspectives, and not simply physical presence, in public policy-making.  Equal 
participation of women is now deemed a critical goal, but only through the full 
empowerment of all women as political subjects, regardless of their possibility to access a 
position in the public sector. 
 Ruta--Valle del Cauca’s coexisting goals of equality and empowerment manifest 
in their agenda of women education to influence public policies in areas where women’s 
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interests are neglected—an exercise they call “incidence”.  Through advocacy with public 
agencies, Ruta strives to influence institutional agendas while they empower women to 
claim for their rights. 
 In an interview, the Ruta--Valle director explained their “incidence” work stating 
that, while the problem of the absence of a gender perspective in public institutions is 
about lack of women’s representation, it is also about power.  Ruta Valle del Cauca 
director expressed this duality, observing that, 
(T)he state is not prepared for our challenge to inequality.  There’s only 
14% of state offices filled by women when we should have parity. (On the 
other hand,) the state accepts claims only until power is questioned; then 
it’s the end of any negotiation.  This shows how power is the great 
struggle; from the family to the state (Interview with Alicia). 
 
Ruta activist, Rosa, also explained, through her experience, the salience of both equal 
participation and political empowerment as a goal of feminist politics.  In her words:  
In the 80s all my feminist friends had a, let’s say, vengeful way of 
thinking.  This attitude towards men didn’t seem ok to me.  Because if we 
wanted to effect all those social transformations, we had to transform both 
men and women’s relationships (…) (Today) the most important aspect is 
the political.  There’s where we have to learn so we can exercise 
incidence, because ultimately the political has to do with power and if we 
don’t get there, we’ll be doing the same stupid thing of protesting here and 
there but we will never exercise incidence.  (Interview with Rosa). 
 
In this testimony, Rosa refers to the work of influencing institutional agendas in areas 
where women’s interests are neglected. She also puts emphasis on the work of 
empowering women to make claims for their rights.  Other participants, such as Elena, a 
professional and unionist, explained incidence as a mechanism that allowed them to 
obtain their rights’ effective protection against governmental arbitrariness.  In a brief 
conversation we held at the beginning of a Ruta School session she said: “It is as with 
your research subject, Democratic Security.  Reading CEDAW is easy to know that this 
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policy violates first generation rights such as mobility, expression, and political 
participation; as a feminist and as a unionist, this policy infringes upon all my rights”. In 
this conversation, Elena stressed the importance of legal action as a platform to address 
the multiple facets of their subordination.  
 Indeed, a number of important women’s human rights victories have been won 
through the strategic promotion of this combined perspective.  One of the most 
resounding occurred in 2008, when the Constitutional Court issued Auto 092/08, a 
judicial decision protecting the rights of forcefully displaced women.  Auto 092 was the 
result of a process where women from 27 organizations led by Casa de la Mujer and Ruta 
testified about the disproportionate impact the conflict has on them.  After receiving 
testimonies from 600 forcefully displaced women, the Court determined that displaced 
women are at a greater risk of suffering sexual violence, exploitation, forced labor and 
social control by armed actors.  Women are also at risk to be dispossessed, discriminated 
by institutions, and overall to be unprotected and separated from their partners that 
economically provided for the household.  Once they have been displaced, the Court 
pointed out, women must become providers themselves as well as to be responsible of 
dealing with state institutions in charge of providing them aids and subsidies.  For this 
reason, the Court stated, state institutions must implement a series of 12 different 
programs to address this vulnerability and prevent further victimization of displaced 
women. 
 The process that led to issuing this constitutional decision was important not only 
because of the participation it elicited, and the actual institutional protection achieved, but 
because it is a step in empowering women—and in particular disenfranchised women to 
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demand their rights from the state.  Ruta Valle del Cauca women had raised this point 
repeatedly at a workshop I attended where participants questioned how state policies such 
as Plan Colombia and Democratic Security conceive of women as welfare subjects and 
not as citizens.  Through a critical reading of state assistential policies and their 
entanglement with militarism, women concluded that the consequence of this practice 
was to turn them into passive spectators of state policies and potential collaborators of 
these policies’ militaristic goals.  By autonomously representing their situation in the 
security state, women re-formulated their position as political actors vis a vis the state 
while also setting the basis for operating in this contradictory location both with and 
against this state. 
 
3.9 Women and Human Rights  
 As part of their rights activism, Ruta has been rather autonomous from the 
broader human rights movement, yet the potential for theoretical and political 
collaboration is apparent. Human rights organizations led by Centro de Investigación y 
Educación Popular (CINEP), for example, have developed a framework to document 
human rights that might be useful to understand the violence women experience in a 
securitized society.  To them, human rights violations refer to the violence that the state 
or its agents systematically deploy in order to dominate a population that is seen as a 
threat to a particular model of state or society (García Méndez, 2011; CINEP, 2008).  
Under this definition, violations to women’s human rights might correspond to those that 
affect both women and men equally, like the cases of arbitrary detentions that increased 
threefold for both genders between the periods 2002-2007 and 1997-2002, or they could 
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be violations that differentially affect women—for example, the cases of female prisoners 
subject to sexual abuse by state guards during their detention. 
 Defining human rights as part of a pattern of state-led socio-political violence 
might also help to make visible violations to women’s transgressions of social roles under 
contexts of securitization. As I discussed in the previous section of this chapter, when 
women claim their rights as women and also as peasants, workers, part of a threatened 
ethnic or racial minority, or as uprooted from their territories demanding restitution of 
their land they might meet very strong reactions as they elevate claims potentially 
destabilizing against both capitalist and patriarchal arrangements.  
 Using the language of human rights in the Colombian case is potentially useful in 
uncovering the role of the state in perpetuating violence against women.  As I suggested 
in the previous sections of this chapter, the security discourse has provided a vocabulary, 
an imaginary, and a military structure to reproduce a public sphere already entrenched in 
gender subordination. Democratic Security policy came to elevate violent, militarized 
masculinity as the center of Colombia’s political discourse and in that way, to endorse or 
legitimize abuses against women. If analyzed in the tradition of the Colombian human 
rights movement (see chapter three of this dissertation), human rights violations against 
women, in tandem with all forms of state-supported socio-political violence, can be read 
as attempts to contain any challenge to the patriarchal, economic, and racial hierarchies 
of power.  While often downplayed as discrete abuses product of the degradation of the 
conflict or the exceptional wrongdoing of some dysfunctional individuals, violations of 
women’s human rights sustain, at an everyday level a larger structure built upon gender, 
class and race privilege.   
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3.10 Women’s Praxis as Critique 
 Being political actors in a context of securitization, where the state assumes both 
arbitrary and protective facets, poses important challenges to the women’s movement.  
For one thing, it is likely that judicial remedies have limited effectiveness in the larger 
context of the state security program. 
 In response to the difficulties in the work with the state, Ruta has continued 
strengthening the movement internally.  Perhaps the two elements that have most 
decisively pushed this process forward have been consolidating a feminist consciousness 
in response to the country’s armed conflict, and articulating this consciousness in the 
form of a national mobilization in solidarity with women victim of the conflict.    
Ruta activist Rosa’s testimony spoke to her process of acquiring a feminist consciousness 
as a political process where women’s oppression was historicized and connected to a 
context of systematic subordination.  In an interview, when I asked her about the 
feasibility of translating Ruta’s political program to communities she stated,  
Since I have always been there, for me it’s not difficult; on the contrary, it 
has strengthened me.  In the spaces I work, the people with whom I work, 
they have told me, ‘awesome, now you sound more secure, it’s as if you 
approach the political question and the women’s question better’ (…) 
“Because the type of feminism I felt I identified with was that of being 
rebellious, but I didn’t have the historical consciousness about women and 
that is what I have achieved here in Ruta, to have that historical 
consciousness and that gives you a base to talk in a more coherent and 
forceful way in any space. (Interview with Rosa). 
 
Ruta’s key mechanism to connect this feminist consciousness with the concrete 
experience of women in a context of war has been national mobilization.  Ruta 
participants’ testimonies show how participating in large-scale national demonstrations 
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has allowed them to connect their personal issues with regional and national problems.  
Through their participation in national marches, Ruta participants report further achieving 
a consciousness that a feminist perspective will be instrumental to solve these issues.  
 Rocio offered an illustrative account of her more intense involvement with a 
pacifist feminist perspective after mobilizations like this one, where she and other women 
from Ruta Valle traveled by bus to Chocó, a predominantly afrodescendant area in the 
Pacific greatly affected by the conflict and difficult to access by land, in order to join 
activists from all over Colombia in solidarity with local women.  In the following part of 
her testimony, she connected this mobilization experience with her rising feminist 
consciousness.  Rocio stated, in the first part, 
Going to Chocó was hard, the roads were destroyed, at some point we lost 
communication with the world because phones didn’t work there, we had 
to arrive one day and we actually arrived the following, and everyone was 
scared because those were some immense jungles and we didn’t know 
where we were, there was no food, we arrived exhausted… but when we 
got there it was like we were born again (…) Chocó, to us, was a different 
people, a different culture.  It’s the Colombia that one sees so far, because 
one thinks that this, the city (where we live), is the center of Colombia, but 
then it turns out that Colombia is jungle, water, biodiversity, flora (…) 
The roads were in very bad shape so we all, like little ants, pushed the bus 
together (…) We helped fill those holes with rocks, we did operation 
“rock in hand” and that was something that made us focus more in the 
reality that Colombia lives, that this is not only a problem of guerrillas, it 
is a social problem where there is not social investment from the 
government’s part, so these are forgotten populations.  I myself said, “Oh 
well, I’ll bathe in Rio Atrato”, but then, oh surprise! When I went to bathe 
I couldn’t because it was so fast-flowing, but especially because the only 
thing that came down was mud and then we went to a house but could 
only shower one hour later when it rained and they collected water.  Then, 
the problem there is about water supply, roads, social investment (…). 
 
 Here, Susana--like other women who have joined Ruta and in there learned by 
experience that their problems are the same of women and people all over the country--
narrates the way in which she has come to realize that any diagnostic and solution to 
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these issues has to be the result of a dialogue inspired by recognition and solidarity. 
Promoting feminine solidarity or, in Ruta’s parlance, sorority, presumes the collective 
construction of security where problems are defined side by side in a dialogue of equals. 
Ruta--Valle del Cauca leader Martha Elena Giraldo (2006) has pointed out, in this 
respect, that it is women who, recovering “feminine traditions”, can support each other in 
an environment otherwise adverse for them. “Ollas comunitarias” or community 
potlucks, for instance, are ways in which women can provide for their families and resist 
hunger, as well as the blockades that armed actors often impose on civilian population.  
In her research, Giraldo (2006) highlights how, as women’s customary ways of 
approaching the public sphere, “feminine traditions”, provide women with an outlet in 
situations of danger and scarcity.  For example, she refers to gossip or small talk among 
“comadres” (godsisters) and its use to communicate crucial information in contexts of 
war where open communication could be deadly.   
 Work with the symbolic has also been central to reinforce sorority around 
alternative representations of the public sphere. Symbols to represent hope, resistance or 
sorority have been part of Ruta’s work to replace the logos of war and a way to make 
their claims visible. Colors, rituals, performances, have gone hand in hand with the use of 
legal mechanisms to represent the state and the possibilities women have to interpellate it.   
Analyzing these “feminine traditions” and the entire feminist challenge of the state 
through symbolic and practical actions, it remains as an open question the extent to which 
this exercise of re-thinking women under the war will have an impact not only in the 
everyday of the ongoing securitization of society but also, importantly, in the larger, 
proximate, human rights movement.  The experience of women becoming active around a 
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feminist-pacifist project opens also a window to social movements possibilities to create 
alternative narratives of security and citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CITIZENSHIP IN TIMES OF EXCEPTION 
 
 In this chapter I examine the relation between security and citizenship through the 
lens of social mobilization.  Jorge, one of the heads of a national human rights 
organization, referred, bluntly, to this relation in an interview on the meaning of the 
recent turn to security for Colombian society: “(...) what (security policy) has produced is 
that a lot of people have been assassinated, taken to mass graves; the number of victims is 
incalculable.  The situation in Colombia is that social mobilization has not become 
consolidated towards the creation of a more democratic and just society” (Interview with 
Jorge).  This claim, often stated by activists in various Colombian social movements, 
leads me to inquire about the ways in which social mobilization is modified under the 
security state and the consequences this pose for citizenship.    
 My focus in this inquiry will be Valle del Cauca and its human rights-based 
mobilization in response to Colombia’s security policy. I will analyze the transformations 
of citizenship throughout this process of confronting the security discourse.   The thread 
for this discussion will be given by the question, how does security, as a principle of 
governmentality  transforms citizenship and what challenges have been posed to such 
governmental rule?  Human rights-based mobilization in Valle del Cauca suggests that, 
by relying on existing human rights repertoires16, regional social movements have 
articulated a critique both of security discourses and the citizenship model promoted 
                                                
16 I use the concept of “repertoires”, in the sense suggested by Tilly (2006), as the sets of 
tools through which mobilization is conducted, but also recognize that the use of the 
category of human rights is problematic and involve various and often conflicting 
understandings (Speed, 2007).   
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under the security turn.  At the same time, nourished by regional social mobilization, 
human rights organizations have challenged security policies with political contentions 
much broader than those contained in the international law of human rights.  It is my 
argument that, confronted with the predominance of security-centered governance, 
human rights organizations and broader social movements have grown increasingly 
interconnected around a human rights-based mobilization to reclaim full citizenship.  
 My focus in this chapter is the work of  CPDH for the Defense of Human Rights 
(CPDH) - Valle del Cauca, with whom I developed ethnographic work in the second half 
of 2011, but, in order to complement the analysis, I will also include aspects pertaining to 
the work of Valle del Cauca chapter of Foundation-Committee in Solidarity with Political 
Prisoners (FCSPP) and Human Rights Network “Francisco Isaías Cifuentes” (Red FIC), 
affiliated to the Process of Popular Unity from the Colombian South West (PUPSOC).  
While part of broader, older national organizations, the first two, and of a regional multi-
sectorial grassroots network the second, these three organizations have been founded  in 
the 2000s in response to sharpening regional human rights crisis.   
 Through the analysis of these organizations I will claim that human rights 
mobilization operates as a central location17 articulating different modes of social 
mobilization against bio-political governance—that mode of government which relies on 
the constant production of mortal violence (Foucault, 1997)18. I will argue that, while 
                                                
17 I conceive this location as equivalent to Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) “nodal point” or 
the privileged position that operates as a discursive center from which other subject 
positions are defined. 
18 Castro-Gómez (2007) succintly summarizes Foucault’s notion of biopolitics by 
stating: “Foucault intends to think how biopolitics sought to favor the emergence of a 
desired type of population (as a prototype of normality) in contrast and through the 
violent exclusion of his/her “otherness”.  Biopolitics declares as “enemies” of society all 
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fraught with tensions and programmatic differences, Valle del Cauca social movements 
converge in the use of human rights tools and vocabulary. Through this human rights-
based mobilization, social movements have, in many ways, re-worked state-imposed 
designs of citizenship.  In order to understand the role of social mobilization in 
challenging these designs, I will analyze how human rights-based mobilization has 
engaged in re-signifying citizenship while it goes through a double and interrelated 
process of, on the one hand, adopting an increasingly politicized definition of human 
rights and, on the other, working in further inter-penetration with broader social 
mobilization and their struggles for social rights, identity, autonomy, and territory.   
 
4.1 A Politics of Human Rights: From Individual Rights to Collective Projects of 
Citizenship 
 
To a large extent, the considerable increase in number and severity of human rights 
violations is the common ground for human rights-based mobilization.  Human rights 
organizations and social organizations alike have denounced that during the first five 
years of Democratic Security policy, serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial 
executions, disappearance, tortures, and arbitrary detentions almost tripled, compared to 
the previous five years, and that their constituencies were disproportionately targeted by 
such violations (Report for the Universal Periodic Review on Colombia 2008).  As 
actions perpetrated or tolerated by the state, these violations speak about the fundamental 
                                                                                                                                            
those races that do no not adjust to the wished population norm.  In other words, 
biopolitics is a technology of government that “makes live” those population groups that 
best adapt to the production profile needed by the capitalist State and “lets die” instead 
those that are not good to promote productive work, economic development and 
modernization.  To face the imminent danger that these enemies represent, society must 
“defend” itself and that is precisely why biopolitics is there”. 
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erosion of citizenship rights under the security paradigm.   
 In response, through human rights-based mobilization, organizations of diverse 
origins have implemented a politics of human rights to challenge this democratic deficit. 
Relying on existing human rights repertoires, social movements articulated a critique of 
security discourses that, at the same time that it has challenged the state conception of 
rights under security, it has started to re-narrativize citizenship within the parameters of 
broader expressions of social mobilizations such as those coming from women, students, 
afro, indigenous peoples, and popular sectors. 
 In his analyses on the relation between state and citizenship, Etienne Balibar 
(1994 and 2001) has used the concept of politics of human rights or politics of civility as 
the projects necessary to extend individuals’ universal citizenship (in Arendt’s words, 
“the right to have rights”).  I draw on these ideas and at the same time attempt to further 
them by introducing the role of social movements in reclaiming collectively forged 
citizenship.  My argument is that, in defying the state trend to dismantle, criminalize or 
co-opt them, social movements have deployed an alternative politics—one that both 
interpellated security as a technique of government and proposed different frameworks 
for their relation with the state.  I contend that if under the security turn state-defined 
security needs became the essential condition shaping social life, human rights as a 
discourse and as a politics of mobilization, became a key terrain to re-claim collective 
rights so drastically undermined under the security paradigm.     
 I start this chapter laying out a brief theoretical discussion of the impact 
constitutional exceptionalism has had on citizenship. I discuss, too, the role of human and 
political rights activism in repealing exception measures. After laying out these 
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theoretical points, I will discuss the case of mass detentions as an example that illustrates 
human rights organizations’ use of the human rights tradition in order to constitute a 
politics of human rights in Colombia.  Through this case refer to the use of litigation as 
an element to deconstruct security and to, in the process, build mobilization at the local 
level. I take this example to illustrate some of the concrete human rights repertoires that 
organizations have used to re-politicize citizenship amidst the ongoing national and 
global securitization processes.  
 As I show in this chapter, mobilization against security policies’ bio-political 
governance draws on human rights as the foundation to claim for a strengthened 
citizenship.  I use the example of arbitrary detentions to reflect on the interpretations of 
human rights that militants effect.  In doing so, I problematize Balibar’s (2001) view that 
full political recognition entails an intervention based on political rights and not on 
human rights.  In previous works, Balibar has called for the need to recover the political 
foundations of rights as a response to the violence inscribed in the state production of 
citizenship.  Here I analyze how Valle del Cauca human rights mobilization engages in a 
similar project of human rights politicization, yet for it, human rights, as much as 
political rights, constitute a central element to re-formulate a relation with the state.  In 
fact, I will argue, human rights constitute an ethical horizon, a strategic tool, and a 
narrative framework. Ultimately, it is my argument that if observed in a broad manner, 
human rights constitute a nodal point uniting the defense of individual rights with 
broader, collective, political aspirations across diverse modes of regional mobilization. 
4.2 State of Exception, Citizenship, and Human Rights 
 If we understand citizenship not only as the legal, but also as the political ties 
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mediating individuals’ relationship with the state and with others in the polis, we can say 
that the emergence of the security paradigm has led both to increasingly limit 
constitutional rights and to considerable transformations in the relation between citizens 
and the state. As theorized in the tradition of German philosopher Carl Schmitt, the 
juridico-political structure that has facilitated such re-alignment has been the state of 
exception, or the condition that allows for the state to suspend the law while still 
operating under the law’s authorization (Schmitt, 1996).  Turned into a major paradigm 
of government during the late twentieth century, the state of exception has allowed states 
to strip individuals of their citizenship rights and to, ultimately, erase them as legal 
subjects (Agamben, 2005).   
 The result of this trend has been a split in the body politic between those who 
enjoy citizen rights and those marked as state enemies, who must exist in the outside of 
the law (Arendt, 1973).  A constitutive feature of contemporary politics, the state of 
exception has turned liberal democracy into a site of legally authorized state violence 
whose main political subject is not the citizen but the subject stripped of rights. As 
Agamben’s (1998) work articulates it, it is bare life and not the qualified life of the 
citizen that defines current liberal democracy. 
 The centrality of bare life and the radical relativization of citizenship operated 
under the security paradigm beg the question about the power struggles redefining this 
organization.  What discourses and practices are used by the state to enforce this order, 
and, under what conditions do social actors challenge the politics of the exception? In 
light of the duality between life existing outside the law and fully-endowed citizens, what 
instruments are being used to respond to this fractured body politic?  
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 My analysis of human rights mobilization in Valle del Cauca follows up on this 
duality outside of the law–citizenship observing that Colombia’s “permanent exception” 
(GarcíaVillegas, 2001) has created vast zones of no-law.  While everyday fulfillment of 
state constitutional mandates for all citizens is, at any rate, precarious, (De Sousa Santos 
and García Villegas, 2001) and greatly determined by emergency powers, there are, yet, 
more drastic levels of legal exclusion. Through the constant application of the state of 
exception, large groups of the population have been deprived of basic due process rights 
under the assumption that they might become potential risks for national security. At the 
same time, within military and paramilitary forces have been found responsible of 
assassinating civilians as part of a dirty war strategy to eliminate guerrilla combatants in 
cases of extrajudicial executions, massacres, and human rights violations. 
 An analysis of this multi-layered state-perpetrated or tolerated violence in times 
of exception has partly followed Hanna Arendt’s (1973) critique of totalitarianism by 
pointing at the nature of the human after the severe erosion of citizenship emerging from 
this political order.  Arendt, herself, concluded that reinstating the parameters of the 
human required a discussion about the state or the development of what she called 
agonistic politics.  Engaging with Arendt’s quest, Agamben formulated his thesis that the 
central feature of Western political history is “the distinction between natural being and 
the legal existence of a person” (Lemke, 2011), concluding, from that point, that the 
sovereign power of the state is given by its capacity to include life stripped of rights into 
the political realm or, as he called it, in the production of the bio-political body.  
 Under the conditions of coloniality dominant in Latin America, bio-political 
governmentality can be best understood by observing that it lies at the crux of economic, 
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political, epistemic and gender domination or what Quijano (2000) has defined as a 
colonial matrix of power.  The key constitutive mechanism of such a matrix is the 
production of a power differential through a hierarchy of race.  Focusing on this colonial 
condition (and its character as the necessary underside of modernity) illuminates 
continuities in national projects as well as the significance of race for the production of 
citizenship.  In the case of Colombia, the disproportionate victimization of Black and 
indigenous peoples within Democratic Security can be seen within a continuum of 
colonial power where national borders are built at the expense of the exclusion of large 
segments of the population and their racial otherness.  This history of inclusion –
exclusion connects with the current security state in which racial others are excluded or 
often eliminated in order to produce the conditions for projects of neoliberal development 
to be implemented.  Attending to Hindess’ (2002) discussion of liberal citizenship in 
what he calls the system of states, it would be possible to say that the advance of 
citizenship in the colonial world is to be secured under neo-liberal political conditions.  
 State mediation of Colombia’s conflict has largely been based on producing a 
framework of liberal democratic rights which in appearance is universal but in practice 
relies on a model of drastically unequal application. Following Agamben, we could say 
that, in fact, Colombia’s rule of law has at its core the production of citizenship on the 
basis of the systematic physical or legal elimination of entire segments of the population.  
The systematic assassination 5,000 members of leftist political party Union Patriótica 
(Cepeda-Castro, 2006) speaks to this project. But also, state-tolerated or supported 
paramilitary massacres and “cleanings” (Taussig, 2005) reveal Colombia as a bio-
politically produced democracy, where disposing of life is a constitutive element of 
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democratic ruling (Rojas, 2009; Escobar, 2004). 
 The case of Buenaventura in Valle del Cauca is illustrative in this respect.  As I 
showed in chapter 2, the predicament of the predominantly afrodescendant populations of 
this area illustrates the paradox many disenfranchised communities throughout the 
country experience.  On the one hand, they have achieved constitutional and legal 
protection of ancestral rights over the territory; on the other, they have been 
systematically extricated from their lands and many of them assassinated as part of a 
paramilitary strategy to re-populate the territory (Escobar, 2004b; Oslender, 2006).  
Sometimes by action and always by omission, the Colombian state has exposed its 
citizens to death in a form of extremely racialized governance (Foucault, 2003; Fanon, 
2004). 
 As I show in this chapter, social movements’ response to bio-political governance 
has been multifaceted.  From national and international juridical reclamation, to protest, 
memorialization, forms of self-policing, and simultaneously blaming the state and 
requesting its protection, movements have attempted to re-establish their rights through a 
broad repertoire of recourses.  Social mobilization against security policies in Colombia 
shows that, in struggling against bio-political governance, it has relied on an extended 
conception of human rights.  In response to systematic elimination and de-facto exclusion 
from the law, social movements have used the human rights discourse not only as a 
protective shield against violations, but also as a vantage point to articulate local and 
transnational mobilization. I refer to this articulation as human rights mobilization or the 
multi-sided struggle of social movements against bio-political power that converges in 
the use of human rights repertoires while still maintaining a distinctive political program.   
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 If, as Arendt (1973) reminds us, the paradox of contemporary politics is that only 
citizens can enjoy human rights, I find that human rights mobilization effects a radical re-
appropriation of human rights repertoires in order to re-establish or institute citizenship.   
In the Colombian context, human rights repertoires address the institutional duality that 
situates the state between a progressive structure of constitutional rights and the 
systematic violation for such rights.  In this context, human rights repertoires fulfill 
various key roles in making political, social, and collective rights contained in the 
national constitution a possibility.  Both through intervention in the legislative process 
and through courts litigation, human rights mobilization engage with the constitutional 
state but also with the bio-political state. By constantly raising juridical claims around the 
state’s continuous violation or inability to protect individual’s human rights, activists 
have continuously struggled to rebuild citizenship ties between individuals and the state.  
Moreover, with the continuing application of the state of exception and the growing 
significance of security policies, human rights mobilization and long-term human rights 
repertoires have played a key role in re-working undermined citizenship. Through both 
legal-oriented activism and by continuously re-framing the legacies of politically 
motivated violence with the current, intensified trend of human rights violations under 
Democratic Security policy, human rights mobilization has maintained open the 
possibility to constitute an alternative, more inclusive common sense on the political 
violence in Colombia.  In the process, human rights mobilization has provided a space for 
broader social movements to re-work bio-political governance based on both their own 
agendas and on the human rights tradition.    
 While not unified or articulated under the same organizational or ideological 
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principles, human rights organizations in Valle del Cauca have worked, relatively 
synchronized, towards problematizing security as a governmental tool whose application 
entails the production of violence.  In the following section I will discuss some of the 
mechanisms organizations have used to challenge of the discourse and effects of state 
security policies.  I will use the case of mass detentions for this purpose.  The three axes 
that will articulate this discussion will be 1) The engagement with the constitutional and 
the bio-political levels of the state, 2) The use and articulation of human rights and 
collective rights as defense against and alternatives to security, and 3) The bridges 
towards broader social mobilization or otherwise constitution of larger publics around the 
rhetoric of human rights.  The overall argument I will advance through these points 
contends that human rights has been a key discursive and strategic field to negotiate the 
state of exception and its effects on citizenship.   
4.3 Engaging the State: Mass Detentions and Bio-Political Governance  
 During the brief but active life of Uribe government’s Anti-Terrorist Statute 
(2003-2004) and throughout Democratic Security (2002-2010), the state armed forces 
commanded a large offensive against guerrillas which ended up with the collateral result 
of intimidating, submitting to surveillance, and imprisoning a number of peasants, 
indigenous, and workers rarely tied to social movements. One of the chief mechanisms 
used during this period were mass detentions—armed forces-led operations where large 
groups of people were detained under charges of collaborating with guerrillas. Typically, 
detentions involved police or army-initiated arrests in rural areas under the basis of secret 
informants’ testimonies. The majority of arrestees were usually released due to weak 
evidence after being in prison for terms of up to two or three years, while the judicial 
  170  
process was conducted. 
 This practice, which extended throughout the whole country, was widely applied 
in Valle del Cauca rural areas.  According to human rights platform, Coordinación 
Colombia – Europa – Estados Unidos (CCEEU), in the period of 2002-2004, mass 
detentions left over 6,300 detainees after 77 mass arrests throughout the country 
(Eminent Jurists Panel, 2006).  Human rights organizations showed that mass detentions 
were part of a systematic pattern introduced with Democratic Security by showing how 
the number of mass detentions had almost tripled in regards to the previous five years 
(Alliance of Social and Like-Minded Organizations et al, 2008).  
 In the early period of Democratic Security application, Valle del Cauca was the 
epicenter of several episodes of mass detention in semi-rural towns of Queremal, Juntas 
(Dagua), and Cisneros, close to the western Pacific coast, and also in the south eastern 
towns of Florida and Pradera (about 27 miles from Cali), which left over 120 detained 
people (CPDH Communique, 2003).  The most emblematic cases occurred in the towns 
of Cisneros and El Queremal in June and September of 2003.  26 persons in Cisneros and 
36 in El Queremal were simultaneously captured under charges of rebellion and 
terrorism.  Some of the detainees were indigenous leaders, while the majority were 
workers without any political affiliation and broadly known and esteemed by the local 
population.19 
 The first mass detention in Valle del Cauca, on July 27th, 2003, set the tone for 
                                                
19 Other mass detentions in the neighboring department of Cauca also brought the 
solidarity of Valle del Cauca organizations.  In 2004 there were 12 indigenous people 
were captured in the town of Toribio, accused of having ties with FARC after the Army 
and that guerrilla group held combats in the area. Rumors spoke of 50 more possible 
captures of “guerrilla helpers”. 
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the following ones.  On this arrest, members of the Police, Army, DAS, and the Attorney 
General's Office entered Cisneros by air and land arresting and conducting raids. On 
September 25th and 27th, 2003, 45 peasants and workers were arrested, as well as 3 
indigenous people from the Yu'Yic'Kwe and Kwez Kiwe cabildos, affiliated to the 
Association of Indigenous Cabildos from the Pacific-ACIVARP, who were buying and 
selling agricultural products at the local market (CPDH Communique, January 14th, 
2004).  On December 7th, 2003, two indigenous men were detained in Pradera and one 
more in the nearby town of Florida. Again, on December 20th and 27th, 2003, 51 people 
were detained in Popayán, Cajibío, Silvia, and Piendamó, in the neighboring department 
of Cauca, located just a few hours from Cali, in Valle del Cauca.  Some of the detainees 
in this operation participated in social or political organizations in the area at the same 
time that they worked in agriculture, education, or commerce. 
 Detentions continued, although with lower intensity, until December 31st, 2006, 
when the police, executing “Operation Emperor”,  detained a group of peasants and 
indigenous people who were selling their products at the market, in the town of Florida, 
under accusations of collaborating with guerrilla group FARC.  As denounced by Cauca 
indigenous communities, the police agents did not have warrants and they proceeded to 
detain based on secret informants' accusations (Communique Valle del Cauca Indigenous 
Authorities, 2006). Indigenous authorities framed this detention as the government's 
revenge for the events surrounding a frustrated process to effect a humanitarian exchange 
with FARC in the towns of Florida and Pradera in Valle del Cauca, and presented the 
detentions as kidnappings and as part of a campaign to terrorize local populations.  In San 
Isidro, Buenaventura, in Bajo Calima, 9 people were detained also in 2006.  2 of them 
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were, indeed, members of FARC and they negotiated with the prosecutor for a reduced 
sentence due to confession, but the  remaining 7 went to trial and were finally absolved 
after 15 months in prison (Interview with Lawyer Duarte). 
 Cases in Valle del Cauca occurred almost simultaneously with other prominent 
mass detentions at the national level.  In Arauca, on December 12, 2002, about 2000 
people were detained (Organizaciones Sociales de Arauca, 2011); “Operación Orión”, on 
the other hand, left 422 people detained during a mass arrest in Medellín (Coordinación 
Colombia – Europa – Estados Unidos - CCEEU, 2006).  In the following year, Comisión 
Colombiana de Juristas (2003), a national human rights organization with consultive 
status before the United Nations, determined that during 2003, 2,140 persons in 
Colombia were subject to arbitrary detentions or to detentions in violation of the due 
process. 
 As established by human rights organizations throughout the country, these 
detentions either flagrantly violated national and international guidelines regarding 
captures or, being slightly more adjusted to the law, they were still borderline arbitrary.  
More prominently, captures did not apprehend someone caught in the act, or they lacked 
judicial authorization, and, in most cases, ignored the requirements that the arrest has to 
be reasonable and proportional in regards to the act committed by the arrestee.  In some 
occasions, warrants were filled up by the prosecutor during or after the detention, which 
spoke about the need to formally justify the capture but not having any previous 
justification to conduct the arrest. 
 Human Rights organizations characterized mass detentions as the direct 
consequence of the recently approved Anti-Terrorist Statute.  Mass detentions and the 
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policy of “total war” advanced by the national government in practice established a 
system where all citizens had the official duty to surveil their own neighbors and 
relatives, as well as the presumption that human rights organizations were “political 
organizations at the service of terrorism”, as President Uribe indicated in a speech 
pronounced before the armed forces in September, 2003 (Presidencia de la República, 
2003).  In this context, activists characterized detentions as an instrument to criminalize 
social protest and detainees were presented as political prisoners. 
 The perceived injustice of mass detentions attracted manifestations of solidarity 
from both communities and different regional organizations.  Simultaneously with the 
independent intervention of particular organizations, a coalition formed under the identity 
of Network of Valle del Cauca Human Rights Defenders.  The Network grouped  over 
twenty regional organizations of indigenous, forcefully displaced people, students, 
unionists, and human rights groups from the department.  Among them, Organizations 
included CPDH - Valle del Cauca; Nomadesc; Foundation-Committee in Solidarity with 
Political Prisoners; Union of University Workers of Colombia-SINTRAUNICOL; Union 
of Workers from Cali Municipal Enterprises-SINTRAEMCALI; Prohibido Olvidar 
Campaign; National Association for Aid in Solidarity-  ANDAS; Valle del Cauca 
Regional Indigenous Organization-ORIVAC; Association of Indigenous Cabildos from 
the Pacific-ACIVARP; Human Rights Network associated to the Valle del Cauca Union 
of Education Workers-SUTEV; Workers' Unitarian Central union-CUT (Valle del Cauca 
chapter). 
 As part of the Network and also as independent organizations, groups established 
contacts with local social leaders in order to conceive a coordinated response to the 
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current detentions and to what might come once random town inhabitants started to be 
pointed as suspect guerrilla collaborators.  The first action was presented on the 
Network’s first press bulletin, dated January 26th, 2004.  Here the coalition announced a 
peaceful mobilization to “take over” Cisneros and make the situation visible to all the 
country and to demand a fair, prompt resolution of the cases to the judicial authorities in 
charge of the investigations.  The take, entitled “Jornada in Solidarity for the Life, 
Dignity, and Liberty of the Retained People,” would include a session  for the detainees' 
families to present the different cases, as well as the take over, without blocking, the 
neighboring, key, Road to the Sea.  Throughout the day, there would be cultural events 
with artists and collectives from the region.  
 In an unprecedented manifestation of solidarity, a host of community 
organizations from Cali joined the day or Jornada. Among others, DESEPAZ' Youth 
Group; Universidad del Valle students; Youth House-Commune 16 (Cali); Association of 
Youth Groups LIBERTAD-ASOLIBERTAD, Community Cultural Center Las Colinas -
CECUCOL participated in the events.  Also, the Cisneros' Community Action Board 
(Junta de Acción Comunal) joined in support of the organization, as well as the relatives 
of detained persons in Cisneros, El Queremal, Juntas (Dagua), Pradera, and Florida 
participated in this effort.  Furthermore, Valle del Cauca Defensoría del Pueblo 
(Ombudsman Office); Valle del Cauca Gestión (Management) Office; and the Peace 
Advisory of the Cali Mayor's Office-DESEPAZ, three public departmental agencies 
supported the event in various capacities.  
 Later, in March of 2004, Network organizations and communities organized the 
“II Minga for Life and Dignity and Liberty of People Detained in Pradera, Queremal, 
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Juntas (Dagua), Cisneros, and Florida” in the town of Pradera.  In the indigenous 
tradition Minga means communal work.  Here, organizations and communities came 
together for a day to carry multiple cultural and political activities in solidarity with the 
detainees and their families.   At the center of the day there was an activity where the 
detainees' pictures were collected and exhibited in what was  called a “Gallery of 
Injustice”.  The Gallery, inspired on MOVICE’s similar event, Gallery of Memory, 
attempted to make evident the unfairness of the detentions by telling the life story of the 
people detained and to generate an impact in media, and to stimulate mobilization among 
the affected community (Interview with María).  Among the Network activities, there 
were also marches both in Cali and in the affected towns in order to give visibility to the 
situation. Nationally, responding to a report human rights organizations presented 
denouncing mass detentions as violations to the international law of human rights, the 
Inspector General (Procurador General) opened a disciplinary investigations against 
public officials presumably engaged in irregularities during the captures and requested 
guarantees and corrections to the mass detention policy from the national government.  
 In Cisneros, especially, the constant work with the community was key 
throughout this process, as it was the continuous presence of activists in the area.  
Furthermore, not only at the beginning of the process, but even when the first arrestees 
were released due to lack of evidence, there was presence of human rights activists and, 
at this final point, they managed to even organize a cultural event in celebration with 
participation of the community.  Yet, what gave this process its distinctive character was 
its articulation around the tension between security and human rights. While national 
security as ideology and project  were key in the previous decades, and whereas the state 
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of exception has been a constant in the constitutional history of Colombia (García 
Villegas, 2001), the current security-based governance, to a large extent inaugurated with 
mass detentions, instituted a coercive mode of governing that was still based on the idea 
of freedom for all (Hindess, 2001). 
 For human rights organizations mass detentions were the first encounter with the 
newly structured Security Policy and the chance to articulate a position about the 
draconian measures it started to imposed.  While communities had lived the six-decade 
long national conflict in multiple ways that included display of excessive force by all 
armed actors, and were dramatically affected by paramilitary massacres in the recent 
years of the early 2000s, for the first time, in 2003, they witnessed such high level of 
conflict-related violence in the form of an institutionalized, governmental intervention 
that targeted them as enemies.  In this conjuncture of state-inflicted violence a question 
emerged for the affected by arbitrary detentions and for the families of extrajudicially 
executed people, in particular--if with paramilitary massacres entire communities became 
forcefully displaced having to flee to urban areas, to other towns, and even to neighboring 
countries, what would be the place to go for those criminalized by the state in mass raids 
and detentions?  While this question continues open in light of the persistent exclusion 
that broad sectors of the Colombian population face, the radicalization of state coercive 
governmentality led to a conjuncture where human rights mobilization became central for 
both human rights organizations and for other social organizations which had to 
incorporate this concern in light of the deepening forms of repressive governance.   
 As I show in the next section, throughout the mobilization around mass detentions 
the language of human rights was central.  By virtue of the human rights mobilization 
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that took place, mass detentions were re-framed from security measures to arbitrary 
detentions; from legal captures to abuses of authority; from expressions of the sovereign 
people to state co-optation; from impartial judicial measure to targeted arbitrariness 
against peasants, workers, and indigenous; from expressions of popular sovereignty to 
elimination of dissidence; from expression of the rule of law to violation of citizens' 
rights. For a short but key period, human rights repertoires chiefly structured the 
reactions against the security state.  Not only that; the collective work between 
organizations and communities generated both juridical, individual responses to the 
problem, and a beginning of a reflection on the larger issues of power and political 
economy underlying the detentions. 
 
4.4 The Politicization of Human Rights 
 
 Having been present in the area due to previous cases of human rights violations 
by paramilitary and by army members, organizations such as Foundation-Committee in 
Solidarity with Political Prisoners (FCSPP) were able to re-activate ties with local 
communities in Cisneros and El Queremal, and in this way to collaborate in organizing a 
community response to the governmental measures over a three years period, between 
2003 and 2006.  FCSPP also accompanied communities in other towns with mass 
detention cases, such as Pradera, Florida, Buenaventura, and Corinto in the department of 
Cauca, yet, in these towns, they worked with detainees' families and not with the 
communities, as they had not developed organizing work there previously.  An important 
component of this human rights organization's work was to generate social mobilization 
                                                
21 In regards to the “Constitutional Bloc” see Constitutional Court Sentences C-
225/1995, C-578/95, C-358/1997 and C-191/1998. 
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around the captures and what they meant for the communities.   
 Mass detentions were a key point to develop an organizing work around the 
recently approved governmental security policy. Given the way how the security policies 
unfolded, using the legal state apparatus, the first response co-generated by organizations 
and communities was juridical. Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners, in 
particular, brought about several lawyers that had worked associated to them to provide 
legal defense to the captured individuals.  Officially accepted by the detainees’ families 
as legal counselors, lawyers repealed the evidence that motivated the capture.  The 
defense pointed that testimonies supporting the capture came from secret witnesses, and 
also that information to detain was based on a military population census—a mechanism 
that had been previously declared unconstitutional by national courts.   
 Lawyers challenged the captures’ legality  by stating that administrative 
detentions—those decreed by governmental agents such as a police officer or an army 
member and not by a judge, could only be practiced in very specific cases where delaying 
the capture created an imminent risk for the community.  Human rights lawyers 
determined that in these captures, there had been a clear violation of international and 
Colombian constitutional principles about detention.  In particular, as stated by the 
United Nations group for Arbitrary Detentions, which in 1995 established, as interpreting 
parameters, that detentions adopted in situations of exception must be proportional to the 
danger that is trying to be avoided with the capture.  
 Besides their role in facilitating legal counseling, FCSPP played a key role in 
making the legal process legible for communities.  Not only did they discuss the 
significance of judicial decisions with the community and mediated the decision-making 
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process to respond to the measures adopted within the investigation, they also articulated 
the legal process with the surrounding political context.   An activist pointed out, “(...) in 
the community the are many rumors, comments, and exaltation.  If anything happened, 
the community was alarmed, so it was very interesting because we were clarifying things 
all the time (...) clarifying the juridical part, clarifying all that relationship between the 
political and the juridical.  That is to say, that people found why this was happening, 
because their first question was, why is he detained? And that led for people to point at 
each other” (Interview with María).  By ‘de-coding’ and discussing judicial decisions, 
human rights activists made governmental rationales more accessible for the community 
and to that extent prepared the terrain for them to engage along the lines of more concrete 
claims.  
 In this way, FCSPP, CPDH, and other regional human rights organizations started 
stressing the larger explanations of mass detentions as the political backdrop of criminal 
investigations.  As a result, for instance, the systematic execution of mass detentions was 
seen not only as an initiative of the armed forces, but as the result of the government’s 
total war agenda throughout the national territory.  In multiple public interventions, 
president Uribe asked military commanders to proceed with collective detentions as they 
“might be mass captures but not arbitrary detentions” (El Colombiano, 2003, July 11).  
Organizations’ work focused, to a large extent, on making apparent how particular 
presidential interventions were expression of a larger policy and, ultimately, of a broader 
discourse of security whose end was not only to end with terrorism, but with all 
expressions of dissent to political economic designs.  
 With their coordinated action, organizations and their associated lawyers 
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uncovered and challenged state security strategies in the terrain establishing that security 
was a state structuring principle and not only a policy of the current government.  
Through the various criminal actions raised with mass detentions, legal counselors for the 
arrestees determined that judges and prosecutors had assumed the role of ad-hoc 
Democratic Security defenders.  In one case, for instance, the prosecutor defended a 
capture done during a mass detention by stating, “(collaboration with guerrillas) is 
causing much damage to Colombian society and especially to those places where there is 
not much presence of the State, as is the case of El Queremal, where there is only a 
minimum number of Police Officers. (These officers) not only have to surveil the town, 
but also live in fear of being attacked as they are so close to the camps of guerrillas” 
(CCEEU, 2006:165). Arrestees’ defense lawyers pointed at how, by emphasizing the 
threat posed to state security, prosecutors and judges privileged the position of the state 
over the rights of the individuals subject to the prosecution. 
 The resolution of these cases followed a similar pattern.  Whereas El Queremal 
detainees were freed about a year and a half after the detentions, and most Cisneros' 
detainees were released on probation in 2005, for 21 people in these second group there 
had not been a sentence when these interviews were conducted, in september, 2010.  This 
lack of judicial resolution was seen, by activists, as a way of maintaining  this community 
under permanent pressure and fear that persons could go back to prison at any given 
point. 
 Organizations’ work was very important for the community to gain an 
understanding of the captures in the larger political scheme of the state security project.  
Importantly, through the legal strategy organizations established a clear tie between 
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Democratic Security’s mass detentions and the growing international trend to use 
detention as a political tool in cases where there was an impending conflict that required 
the state to affirm its power against an internal enemy.  Organizations’ platform, 
Coordinación Colombia-Europa-Estados Unidos (CCEEU), for instance, cited, in one of 
their reports, a 2004 document of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detentions which stated:  “(…) The Working Group received numerous reports according 
to which detention on charges of terrorism, with the ensuing limitations on the right of 
habeas corpus, is used to detain political opponents, religious dissenters, and other 
persons exercising their freedoms of opinion, expression, conscience and religion”.  (UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions 2004, cited by CCEEU, 2006).  With this 
horizon for their organizing work, human rights activists approached Democratic 
Security measures as part of a global discourse that, nevertheless, possessed concrete 
local manifestations and, as such, had to be addressed with domestic tools. 
 Through litigation in mass detention cases, human rights organizations appealed 
to the constitutional state structure under the figures of due process and right to defense, 
yet it was clear that these basic rights were conditioned to the governmental needs of the 
security state.  Organizations appealed to conventional interpretations of the international 
law of human rights under  the figure of Arbitrary Detentions, and, at the national level, 
exhausted all the possible judicial resources before the prescribed tribunals. Insisting on 
the Constitutional Court jurisprudence that international treaties signed by Colombia  
constitute a “constitutional bloc” or a unit with other constitutional internal norms and as 
such must be respected by the state at all times21, organizations challenged the legal 
erosion that Colombians faced with Democratic Security policy.   
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 The law had a protagonic position in movements’ struggles. While movements 
had seen the law as a structuring factor of state security, they used judicial resources to 
strategically combat securitization through the law. Reflecting on the meaning of 
Democratic Security, organizations pointed at the type of governance deployed with this 
policy.  In particular, they established how military authorities  and not elected local 
officials exercised a de facto authority in areas where the armed forces conducted mass 
detentions.   
4.4.1 From Human Rights to Social Mobilization 
 
 Parallel to this judicial involvement pursuing the defense of particular individuals’ 
rights violated during detentions, organizations also worked with families and 
communities in a comprehensive reflection on the implications of the judicial process for 
them.  Organizing on this front chiefly included a pedagogical approach to establish the 
connection between the mass detentions and the larger context of conflict and human 
rights violations in the area, the larger region, and the country as a whole.  With this goal 
in mind, both FCSPP and CPDH conducted periodic workshops and sessions with the 
local communities to try and collectively explain the broader meaning of what occurred 
on the background of the detentions.  As an activist observed,  
We started working using workshops (to find) in what ways there was a 
direct relationship with the political persecution and the community; that 
this (situation) was not aimed towards some specific persons, but towards 
the community.  A community where there were some strategic, economic 
interests, in an area with mining resources, where transnational 
(corporations) have laid their eyes and there is a Colombian state interest 
that communities that reside there leave, especially black and indigenous 
communities (Interview with María). 
 
Working to establish a political economy of local mass detentions in this region, activists 
showed how the arrests had been preceded by periodical paramilitary massacres in the 
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area, as well as by other less conspicuous collective detentions in other Valle del Cauca 
towns such as Pradera, Florida, Buenaventura, and also Caloto in the neighboring 
department of Cauca.  Activists mapped the situation of human rights violations in the 
region and located instances of forced displacement, extrajudicial executions, threats, and 
other violations in the broader geopolitical context of regional forces. In Cisneros, 
specifically, mass detentions were seen by activists as part of a forced displacement 
strategy where detentions were the latest moment in a sequence of paramilitary massacres 
and military-ordered extrajudicial executions. 
 Activists analyzed mass detentions as scare tactics connected to a larger design to 
depopulate the region with the further purpose of appropriating the territory for exploiting 
the forest, water, and other natural resources.  Indeed, not long after massive detentions 
and massacres occurred in the area, a new flux of coca growers coming from the south of 
the country (now under the military control of Plan Colombia) started to arrive to the 
region, largely replacing the original populations, who abandoned the area, fearful of new 
state or paramilitary actions.  Workshops with local communities stressed the geopolitical 
importance of this region not only given its proximity to the Pacific coast, but also its 
biodiversity and location in a rainforest area.  Monitoring the broader situation in the 
area, activists verified the climate of terror instilled by the permanent presence of army 
and police and the fear that their shooting aim practice  would be in reality a combat with 
guerrillas.  Furthermore, it became a relatively common occurrence that occasionally 
peasants' or random persons' corpses appeared nearby the town (Interview with María).  
 In this sense, activists highlighted that mass detentions were not individual 
isolated events but manifestations of a larger state strategy to guarantee the execution of 
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economic mega-projects, as well as the result of corporations attempting to exploit 
natural resources without even consulting with the communities that had been residing in 
those territories ancestrally. As a result of this work, not only individual rights were 
invoked in the process of repealing mass detentions, but also, importantly, there was a 
great concern for the social rights of  those captured within mass detentions operations in 
questions such as right to land, housing, enjoying the natural resources. 
 The impact of mass detentions was analyzed, as well, in terms of their 
demobilizing potential for local communities.  In this regard, a human rights defender 
from Cali who worked with the communities since the early 2000s pointed out how 
especially the criminal investigation in Cisneros “has split the community a lot.  Besides 
the social tissue, it has lowered economic, social and cultural rights to the minimum, and 
also, organizationally, at the level of social cohesion. (...) People point: It was this 
person's fault, it was someone else's fault... they are all pointing at each other (...)” 
(Interview with María).  The type of resolution that occurred in different cases also 
contributed to this fragmentation.  In Cisneros, one of the groups was released from 
prison with parole after two years.  A second group of 26 people was initially absolved 
and then, after the prosecutor appealed, it was declared guilty.  This result was divisive 
for the communities, not only because of the prolonged criminal trial, but because by 
giving a differential treatment to the detainees, it ended up pitting detainees' families 
against each other.  As a result of these divisions, the organizing process that had started 
in Cisneros back in 2000, with the first paramilitary massacres in the area, was affected 
too.  After the split caused by mass detentions, community organizing eventually had to 
be separated from the work with families, as  this work became more concentrated on the 
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particular cases and less on the organizing process that had been achieved with the whole 
community.  
 Nevertheless, the judicial process was key as a forum to articulate individual 
problems with political issues in the communities affected by mass detentions. 
Throughout the process, human rights repertoires, from legal tools to human rights 
vocabulary about violations, were key for local communities to organize a response to the 
state repression that was an integral part of Democratic Security's orientation.  While  this 
effort was, to a large extent, coordinated by human rights organizations, local 
communities and their organized bodies played an important role in the mobilization. A 
member of FCSPP  explained this process noting, “(...) at the beginning what we wanted 
was to involve the community and we achieved this partially, we were able to have the 
Communal Action Board, the Community Council, the women's group participate... the 
detainees' families, they were all, for a while, organized” (Interview with María).  
Adverse judicial decisions became the main obstacle for this mobilization, yet, the 
conjuncture led to an unprecedented organization where the individual legal strategy  
gave place to a convergence around the political issues raised by the security policy.  At 
the moment this research was conducted, in the second semester of 2008, a limited 
number of people still attended meetings with FCSPP, about 12 in the last meeting, yet 
the population had become more sensitive to the economic and political issues underlying 
mass detentions.  The military and police presence continued and while detentions rates 
decreased, extrajudicial executions in the area have been reported, and the situation of 
socio-political and drug trafficking-related violence in neighboring port city of 
Buenaventura continues being dire.  
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 At this point, the Army continued conducting censuses and collecting information 
about the population in the Juntas (Dagua) and Cisneros area.  Registries, questioning, 
and photographing workers leaving the mines towards their homes in these towns have 
become common practices.  Both anti-narcotic police and Army members enter houses 
asking whether guerrillas have been in the area, and occasionally, under the pretense of 
conducting social campaigns, take the names of all the house inhabitants, from children 
to elderly persons.   Given the antecedents of mass detentions, communities take these 
practices seriously and often associate them with the possibility of a new mass detention 
(Interview with María).    
Human rights activists have analyzed security policy not only as a set of 
surveilling, monitoring practices but also as a strategy to demarcate 
appropriate political behavior.  Jorge, one of the national coordinator of a 
human rights organization expressed, “mass detentions (against) people 
with social leadership (...) have been the first expression of that action 
against the population, understanding that the government continues the 
doctrine of national security developed by the United States, which is to 
drain the water from the fish, that has been developed by paramilitary 
groups killing and terrorizing many people.  This government intends to 
apply a new version, which is not to kill, massacre or massively displace, 
but to detain people, which has a similar effect of terrorizing the 
population  being victim of these detentions or unfair imprisonment” 
(Interview with Jorge).   
 
4.4.2 Citizenship in Times of Exception: Building upon Human Rights  
 
 While Democratic Security stigmatized human rights organizations and turned 
them into military aims, in the long run human rights mobilization persisted and, in fact, 
became more unified around issues like mass detentions and extrajudicial executions. 
FCSPP leader, Jorge, summarized human rights organizations' views in regards to 
Democratic Security.  In his words, “what the security doctrine has done is to create the 
conditions so governments can destroy those oppositional social basis and working basis 
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for a different society” (Interview with Jorge).  Largely as a result of this toughened 
repression, organizations throughout the country and in Valle del Cauca, too, coordinated 
sustained actions and demonstrations to protest the violation of rights and legal 
guarantees through the governmental policy. 
 In this effort, human rights repertoires of denunciation, acompañamiento (being 
with), and political mobilization were key to structure local manifestations against 
Democratic Security's effects. Colombian scholars like Martha Cecilia García V. (2008) 
suggest that social mobilization led by women, LGBT groups, and ethnic groups 
including Afro-Colombians and indigenous people have been key in social struggles for 
the right to life, integrity, and liberty during the last decade and a half.  However, 
attending at the activism displayed around Democratic Security throughout the first 
decade of the Two Thousands, it is possible to observe that human rights mobilization 
has become an articulating point for defending the rights claimed by these “newer” social 
movements.  Beyond the traditional role of denunciation in individual violation cases, 
human rights repertoire and networks have been central to preserve other activist 
expressions . 
 The work of networks Black Communities Process and Process of Popular Unit 
from the Colombian Southwest—PCN and PUPSOC, respectively for their Spanish 
acronyms, is significant in this respect. PCN and PUPSOC, both regional networks 
linking a plethora of local organizations represent forms of social mobilization that 
heavily rely on human rights repertoires as an integral part of their agenda.  Both of these 
movements have advanced their collective projects amidst a war scenario that 
permanently threatens individuals' and communities' very existence.  At the same time, 
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two aspects common to their experience are, on the one hand, their organic integration of 
the human rights discourse and tools, and on the other, their radical re-conceptualization 
of human rights as a central element of their collective struggle.  
 As I show in chapter 2, throughout its struggle for territory, culture, and identity, 
the organizations and communities that form PCN have seen a continuous and extremely 
serious attack of entire  areas populated by afrocolombians.  Explaining such attacks 
within the context of dispossession of their collective territories, PCN and its affiliated 
organizations and leadership bodies (Palenques and Community Councils) have 
articulated the protection of afrodescendants rights through human rights.  After the 
systematic paramilitary attacks on collective territories after the early 2000s, initiatives to 
denounce and prevent cases of massacres and assassinations throughout the Pacific 
region, and especially in the port city of Buenaventura, led to a major effort to use and 
promote human rights instruments.  PCN facilitated the denounce of human rights 
violations by legal and illegal armed actors, educated communities on human rights and 
international humanitarian law, promoted communities' mobilizations and food 
sovereignty, as well as their permanence in the territory, the contact with other 
organizations to give visibility to the conflict, while it educated on the negative impact of 
coca and monocultives in these communities and their relation with the conflict (PCN 
n.d. a, 38).   
 Between 2005 and 2007 PCN's Regional Palenque “El Congal” also subscribed to 
an agreement with British social justice NGO War on Want, as a result of which further 
attention was devoted to human rights, or, as the title of one of their publications put it, to 
the project of “supporting Black communities democratic processes through the 
  189  
promotion of human rights” (PCN n.d. a).  Both regional human rights organizations and 
the National Vice-presidency Human Rights program and the local ombudsman office  
supported this effort.  With an emphasis on education, analysis, investigation, and 
exchange of experiences about human rights violations, the project reported 
achievements on the capacity to denounce; articulation with unions, students, 
transporters, and other social sectors; strategies to stay in the collective territories and to 
resist, as well as early alerts of armed actions (PCN n.d., a 40).  Continuing this effort, 
Palenque “El Congal” formed a permanent team to coordinate actions in defense of 
human rights.  
 PUPSOC, on the other hand, constituted a similar project to use human rights in 
supporting their social mobilization agenda throughout four departments in the 
Colombian southwest. In 2000, following large mobilizations against state policies and 
economic initiatives such as the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, PUPSOC 
created a human rights network.  Unlike existing human rights mobilization structures, 
PUPSOC's human rights network was an integral part of the larger movement, its 
members were representatives of the movement's organizations, and its task was to 
defend human rights and to denounce its violations in relation to the larger goals of the 
movement (Interview with César).  Representing PUPSOC's mobilization for collective 
demands of land and autonomy, as well as against state's criminalization of their protest, 
in 2006, the human rights network took the name of ‘Francisco Isaías Cifuentes’.  
Cifuentes was a PUPSOC member, unionized teacher, agrarian leader of the rural sector, 
and human rights defender who was tortured and then died during the 2000 
mobilizations.  Invoking the spirit of popular unity and human rights struggle that 
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Cifuentes incarnated, the new network was instituted (Interview with César).  
 Apart from their particular structure directly articulated to a larger social 
movement, PUPSOC's human rights network, ‘Francisco Isaías Cifuentes’, is exemplary 
of the conception that guides human rights work in conjunction with broader social 
mobilization.  As an activist told me, human rights activism not only responds to the 
denounce of individual violations, but it was mostly concerned with connecting human 
rights with broader popular struggles.  In his words: “We don’t see human rights from an 
essentialist perspective or from a liberal vision, human rights as an entity, as an eternal or 
constant vision, but we see above all in the case of people’s struggles, that human rights 
are a tool for popular struggle and a flag of the popular movement in Colombia” 
(Interview with César).  The orientation that guides this work is not the liberal conception 
of human rights as typically individual. Instead, network members conceive of human 
rights work as a defense of collective interests.  In César's words, “We constantly claim 
for the rights of peoples, which comes from the Declaration of Algiers from 1976 and 
from different experiments of declarations of peoples carried throughout the world”. 
 While growing stronger, this trend to pair social mobilization and human rights 
mobilization has not spread to all social mobilization sectors in the region.  Jorge, for 
instance, from FCSPP, stated, “I believe we, NGOs, have been assuming our role and 
social mobilization has taken its role, so there's no problem that we say we're the ones 
who mobilize indigenous people--no; indigenous people mobilize themselves, we protect 
them when they get mobilized.  We demand guarantees for their mobilization (...) What 
we do is to serve as a shield so they can do their job” (Interview Jorge).  Jorge’s position 
about human rights organizations as shields was certainly one of the ways human rights 
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activists saw their work, yet it was also clear that, for them, mobilizing communities 
around the type of governance that facilitated the growth of human rights violations 
required an effort to articulate the relationship between violations and larger political 
structures. 
 In cases like mass detentions, human rights organizations were key in bringing 
human rights vocabularies and repertoires that strengthened and structured movements' 
claims in a situation of severe, irregular armed conflict.  Because the state was a major 
actor within this context of sociopolitical violence and, in fact, it utilized such violence as 
a central governmental tool, human rights repertoires brought by these organizations were 
instrumental to articulate a reaction from collective actors affected by the state action.   In 
that sense, human rights mobilization has made social struggles more legible for some 
community sectors and has more effectively connected their situation to an overarching 
narrative of opposition against repressive governance.  
 Throughout the proliferation of human rights violations occurred during the 
application of Democratic Security, human rights organizations’ traditional roles as 
vehicles for victims to denounce violations against them or their relatives became re-
evaluated.  Although continuing with this task of denunciation, organizations turned to 
“acompañamiento”, or the task of being with/supporting communities while they 
organized to present their claims on their own behalf.  While human rights organizations 
varied in the level of their work with communities, the mobilization generated with mass 
detentions showed that human rights work in the region was clearly moving towards 
further involvement with collective (rather than exclusively individual) rights and that 
their work became further entrenched with broader social mobilization efforts.  Mass 
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detentions offered a conjuncture for human rights organizations (which in the past 
advocated for the rights of particular individuals given their political militance or their 
opposition to the state) to re-formulate their role at a time when individuals' rights 
violations became entrenched with abuses against entire communities.   
 The degree to which this has happened varies considerably across the spectrum of 
human rights organizations, yet it is this trend towards what I call the politicization of 
human rights what has marked the period of Democratic Security.  The case of mass 
detentions illustrates an early moment in this politicization process where organizations 
like FCSPP and CPDH more clearly articulate human rights as integrated to collective 
rights of a broader community.  While this political character of human rights has always 
characterized their work, as human rights violations are usually responses to those who 
question state power extra-limitation, I sustain that the activism elicited by mass 
detentions motivated an enhanced and further politicized conception of human rights 
violations as part of a broader state political project entailing harsher control and coercion 
of entire populations and not anymore, exclusively, of individual opponents. 
 
4.5 Re-constituting Narratives of Security and Citizenship through Human Rights 
Activism  
 
 The activism deployed with mass detentions brought about a combination of 
tactics ranging from denunciation to pedagogy, judicial confrontation, protest, and, very 
importantly, use of human rights repertoires as a tool in building community 
organization.  While neither of these tactics is new in the veteran work of human rights 
activists in Colombia, the latest battles against institutional developments of Democratic 
Security policy show that the old-time tactics have sedimented into a more solid  
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understanding that juridical and political work need to go hand in hand.  
Organizations understood that the human rights framework both constitute a protective 
shield for individuals in a community, but also that violations usually coincide with a 
state design, with a policy, where the violation is but the spearheading of  a more 
systematic project.     
 Human Rights activism around massive detentions also showed that 
organizations’ mission has evolved from denunciation of violations to pedagogy and 
“acompañamiento” or active assistance to communities.  Human rights activism has come 
to address a variety of grievances or injustices which were once the subject of leftist 
politics.  In that shift, human rights have become the singular discursive terrain for 
addressing a wide variety of social issues, an articulating point where all social 
mobilization converges to challenge securitization and advance their agendas of change.  
 Incorporating the human rights tradition in their respective movement agendas, 
organizations have managed, with an important degree of success, to face Colombia’s 
“permanent exception” (García Villegas, 2001) and to continue with their movement 
agendas while they continue to pursue spaces of autonomy and dignity.  Understandings 
of human rights are deeply rooted in broader political projects and are not only mere acts 
of condemnation of the state.  While human rights denunciation is usually formulated in 
contexts of dire urgency and severe violence, it appears that human rights are not only 
used as a protective instrument; instead, I would like to argue that human rights and their 
meanings are part of a larger mobilization ethos.   
 Activists I interviewed saw human rights as rooted in broader views of justice, 
equality, and conduction of the state.   Furthermore, they engaged in a politics of human 
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rights whose direction was largely defined by a critique of the state and by their own 
broader mobilization agenda. Elements of the human rights tradition, including the 
memorialization of human rights violations,22 have helped to establish a link with 
existing repertoires and the current political dilemmas posed by securitization.  
 
                                                
22 “Gallery of Memory”—a mobile street exhibit of images pertaining to human rights 
violations’ victims created by the National Movement of Victims of State-Sponsored 
Crimes (MOVICE), is an example of the repertoire elements that configure the human 
rights mobilization culture.  Gallery of Memory has become a strategic sites for human 
rights activists in times of securitization to the extent that it has contributed to develop a 
culture of contestation and of constructing citizenship and community-making in 
securitized Colombia.  Although public space has become highly securitized in Colombia 
in the discourse of Democratic Security, as a sign of street criminality and urban decay, 
Gallery of Memory organizers managed to appropriate the space of city and town squares 
and to produce a disruption in current meanings about security while investing it with a 
different signification. 
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